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During the past two years, beginning with the special session in the fall of 2001, the
General Assembly has devoted significant time to grappling with the state budget within the
constraints of declining revenues. General Fund revenues fell about $981 million during
FY 2001-02 and another $94 million in FY 2002-03. Thus, over two years, General Fund
revenues declined almost $1.1 billion. The General Assembly took a three-pronged approach in
addressing the state's budget difficulties. First, it transferred about $1.2 billion in cash funds to
the General Fund over the course of three budget years. Second, it freed up General Fund
revenues and funding for specific programs by establishing new and increasing existing fees.
Third, it cut spending. General Fund expenditures decreased by $22 1 million in FY 200 1-02 and
$96 million in FY 2002-03, before increasing by $82 million in FY 2003-04.
The revenue reductions that created the state's budget difficulties were caused by a severe
downturn in the state economy that began in early 2001. Although the economy stalled in 1991
and 1992, the 2000 recession was the first major economic downturn since TABOR was adopted
in 1992 and Amendment 23 was adopted in 2000. It was the first recession that occurred while
TABOR, Amendment 23, and the Gallagher Amendment were all in place. In short, TABOR
limits state revenue, requires voter approval for tax increases, and limits growth in property
taxes.' Amendment 23 requires minimum increases in funding for elementary and secondary
education, diverts a portion of income tax revenues to a special fund, and establishes minimum
levels of appropriation increases for the school finance act.2 Finally, the Gallagher Amendment
holds down increases in the property tax base for local governments, including school districts by
limiting the taxable value of residential pr~perty.~
During the 2003 legislative session, the General Assembly recognized that the three
constitutional provisions interact in such a way as to limit the state's budgetary flexibility and the
ability of the state to maintain current services during economic downturns. Questions also arose
as to how the constitutional provisions would affect the state budget as the economy recovers.
The General Assembly recognized that the three constitutional provisions were adopted at
different times and more information is necessary to assess their combined impacts. In response,
the General Assembly adopted House Joint Resolution 03-1033. This resolution requires the
Legislative Council Staff to conduct a study of the interaction of TABOR, Amendment 23, the
Gallagher Amendment, and any other relevant constitutional and statutory provisions. It also
requires the report to include options for constitutional or statutory changes the General
Assembly could pursue to better enable the state to fund necessary programs and services in
times of economic weakness and reduced state revenues.

' Article X, Section 20, Colorado Constitution
Article IX, Section 17, Colorado Constitution

1'

Article X, Section 3 (I), Colorado Constitution
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Executive Summary

Organization of Report
This report is divided into six chapters, as follows:

J Chapter 1: The Business Cycle and Government Expenditures
J Chapter 2: Revenue and Spending Limits
J Chapter 3: Fiscal Emergencies
J Chapter 4: Property Taxes

-

I

J chapter-5: Amendment 23 and State Fiscal Issues
J Chapter 6: Capital Construction Funding
In addition to these six chapters, the report includes four appendices. Appendix A is a
copy of House Joint Resolution 03-1033, which contains the parameters for the study.
Appendix B provides more in-depth information on state government expenditures for the six
state departments that consume the greatest portion of General Fund money. Appendix C
contains an overview of tax and expenditure limits in other states. The cwent TABOR refund
mechanisms are summarized in Appendix D.

Overview of the Report
The following paragraphs highlight the major discussion points of each chapter.

Chapter 1: The Business Cycle and Government Expenditures
During the robust economic expansion of the 1990s, General Fund spending was
constrained by the state's constitutional and statutory,limits. The previous year's TABOR surplus
had to be refunded, and, with some exceptions, General Fund appropriations could not increase
by more than 6 percent each year. With revenues expanding steadily, the General Assembly was
able to afford relatively high levels of highway and capital construction.
As the recession hit over the last three budget years, General Fund spending was no
longer constrained by TABOR or the 6 percent limit, but by declining revenue. General Fund
expenditures decreased 4 percent between FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04. The recession also
changed the distribution of General Fund spending. The Departments of Education, Corrections,
and Health Care Policy and Financing were protected relative to other programs in state
government. Cash fund revenue and reserves were drawn upon to help maintain General Fund
appropriations, and the funding mechanisms for many programs changed, as the General
r
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Assembly searched for programs that could be funded with other sources of revenue. Spending
on capital construction was dramatically curtailed, and General Fund spending for highway
construction went from $197.2 million in FY 2000-0 1 to zero during the last two budget years.

Chapter 2: Revenue and Spending Limits
Colorado is among 28 states that have tax and expenditure limits, although Colorado is
generally considered to have the most restrictive limits in the country. State tax and expenditure
limits differ in how they were enacted, their flexibility, how they handle the transfer of
government programs, whether the limit is imposed on spending or revenue, how the limit is
calculated, and the treatment of money over the limit. TABOR has three major provisions that
qualify it as a state tax and expenditure limit. First, it requires voter approval for tax increases.
Second, it limits
amount of revenue the state may collect each year. Third, through its
provision requiring'voter approval to weaken an existing limit, it limits General Fund
appropriations. The report primarily addresses the latter two limits.

Limit on revenue. TABOR limits annual growth in most state revenue to inflation plus
the percentage change in the state's population. When revenue is less than the allowable TABOR
limit, the base for determining the following year's limit is reduced. Because the new limit is at a
lower level than it otherwise would have been, the limit is said to have ratcheted down. Since
revenue in FY 2001-02 and FY 2002-03 was lower than the limit, Colorado's allowable revenues
are permanently reduced. Because the state typically experiences population growth and
inflation, it will need to provide services to more people, at a higher cost, but with less revenue
than in previous years.
J An option for addressing this conundrum to submit a constitutional amendment to the
voters to eliminate the tatchet-down effect of TABOR.

Three states use the same measure as Colorado to limit spending or revenue, while
fourteen states use personal income. Should the General Assembly decide the current TABOR
limit factors are not the most appropriate indicators for limiting government revenues, it could
consider a constitutional amendment to use the annual percentage change in personal income as
the growth limit on state revenue. With either the current limit or personal income, the General
Assembly could also consider a multi-year moving average of the limit.
I

II.

-

Limit on General Fund appropriations. Continuing to increase General Fund
appropriations by 6 percent or more will consume an increasing portion of allowable TABOR
revenue.
J The General Assembly could consider making the appropriations limit the same as the
TABOR limit so that the two limits would move in tandem.

Other issues. Additional options to make the state TABOR limits more responsive to
changes in the economy include:
r
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J permanently exempting from TABOR any spending for reimbursement of the
homestead exemption; and
J excluding unemployment insurance taxes from the TABOR base.

Regarding the homestead exemption, the lack of a TABOR surplus meant that the
General Fund paid the $44.1 million that was originally expected to come from reduced taxpayer
refunds. The General Fund also paid the $17.4 million difference between the estimated cost and
the actual cost. The unemployment insurance tax is the result of a federal mandate and is volatile
and countercyclical to the economy. Because of its interaction with the economy, General Fund
revenue available for spending increases during years when revenue is plentiful and is
substantially reduced during years when it is not.

Chapter 3: Fiscal Emergencies
Colorado currently keeps two types of reserves. The first reserve is statutory and is equal
to 4 percent of the state's General Fund appropriations. The second reserve is required by the
state constitution and is equal to 3 percent of total TABOR revenue. The statutory reserve is
available for most purposes while the constitutional reserve is very restrictive in its allowable
usage and payback.
Unlike 45 other states, Colorado does not maintain a reserve fund specifically for fiscal
emergencies. These funds are typically referred to as rainy day funds. Although the
requirements surrounding these funds vary widely, they are usually very detailed in how money is
deposited into the fund. Equally detailed are the restrictions for when money can be spent from
the fund; rainy day funds typically have spending restrictions intended to limit the use of money
to economic downturns. Should the General Assembly wish to create a rainy day fund, several
options are available for accumulating money in the fund and restricting its use.
Options for accumulating money in a rainy day fund include cutting spending
elsewhere in the budget, using excess General Fund reserves, asking voters to change
the constitutional reserve into a rainy day fund, and asking voters to allow the state to
retain surplus revenue for such a fund.
Options to limit the use of money in a rainy day fund to fiscal emergencies include
setting economic or budgetary triggers, requiring a supermajority vote to spend money
from the fund, and limiting the percentage of the fund that can be used at one time.
Another option would be to ask voters to allow savings to be exempt from TABOR
spending limits up to some specified amount and to require that the money count
under TABOR limits when it is spent.

x
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Chapter 4: Property Taxes
Property taxes play into the state's fiscal situation through the school finance act, which is
funded primarily through a combination of property taxes and state aid. State aid makes up the
difference between the total amount of funding provided through the school finance act and the
amount available through local sources, mainly property taxes.
The data point to three important conclusions about Colorado's property tax system.
First, the constitutional limits have been effective in holding down increases in property taxes.
Second, the 6quirement to revalue property every two years creates a volatile pattern of growth
in taxable property values that contrasts with the annual limits. As a result, the property tax often
does not generate revenue sufficient to reach the limits allowed by law. Third, the state's share of
funding under the school finance act has grown significantly and is expected to continue growing
in the future, adding pressure to the state's budget. To varying degrees, these conclusions are the
result of a decline in the residential assessment rate driven by Gallagher, TABOR limits on
property tax revenue and mill levy increases, and the requirement in Amendment 23 to increase
school finance act funding more than the maximum allowable growth in property taxes.
Several options exist for modifying the property tax system to make the system more
equitable and improve the state's flexibility in funding necessary programs and services in times
of economic weakness and reduced state revenues.
One option would be to ask voters to restore the authority of the General Assembly to
set property taxes for school finance. Or, voters could be asked to restore the link
between changes in a district's wealth and its contribution for school finance.
The General Assembly could ask voters to restore the floating mill levy for schools
within certain limits, similar to temporary property tax reductions used by other local
governments.
The General Assembly could ask voters to make the constitutional school finance
provisions consistent, either by reducing the Amendment 23 requirement for one
additional percent or by increasing the TABOR limit to allow for the one additional
percent through FY 2010- 11.
The General Assembly could address the state's biennial reassessment cycle in the
context of TABOR'Sannual limits, either by changing the cycle for reassessing
property or by modifying the calculation of the limit to account for two-years' worth
of growth in values.

Chapter 5: Amendment 23 and State Fiscal Issues
Amendment 23 guarantees a minimum increase in per pupil funding in the school finance
act and for categorical programs. To pay for the school finance act increases,#theamendment
requires the General Fund appropriation for state aid to increase by at least 5 percent annually,
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except when state personal income increases by less than 4.5 percent. It also diverts one-third of
one percent of taxable income on state income tax returns to the State Education Fund. The
diverted income tax revenue is exempt from the state revenue limits of TABOR. Money in the
State Education Fund can be used to help pay for the minimum increases in school finance and
categorical funding or for programs to reform education, reduce class sizes, expand tzchnology
education, or meet state academic standards, among others.
Since Amendment 23's passage, the economic downturn has resulted in a number of
unantici&d consequences. Income taxes, the primary revenue source for the State Education
Fund, declined 19 percent in FY 200 1-02. In addition to affecting revenue for the State
Education Fund, the decrease in income and other taxes affected the General Fund's ability to
support the appropriation increases necessary to develop a substantial balance in the State
Education Fund. Therefore, the fund will not be in a position in the next several years to cushion
General Fund increases for school finance. The drop in state revenues also means that the
diversion of income tax revenues to the State Education Fund will affect the General Fund, rather
than TABOR surpluses, now and in the future. At the same time, the minimum spending
increases for school finance and categorical programs continue. Amendment 23 is estimated to
account for $1.4 billion in increased education funding in its first seven years.

J The General Assembly's options to mitigate the impact of Amendment 23 on the state
budget include asking voters to increase revenue, either by increasing taxes or further
reducing taxpayer refunds, or to reduce the spending requirements of Amendment 23.

Chapter 6: Capital Construction Funding
State appropriations for capital construction and controlled maintenance projects are
made from the Capital Construction Fund and the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund.
However, the funding source for these two funds is primarily the General Fund. Of the $2.9
billion appropriated for capital in the last 15 years, 74 percent has come from the General Fund.
The state has mostly relied on a "pay-as-you-go" system to fund projects. It has, however,
borrowed money by issuing certificates of participation at times when General Fund revenue was
insufficient to fund capital needs.
Because the General Fund is susceptible to changes in the economy, capital funding can
be erratic and fluctuate from year to year. Over the past 15 years, state funding for capital
projects in Colorado rose from less than $100 million in the early 1990s to a peak of $523
million in FY 1998-99, then plummeted to the current year's appropriation of $9.5 million. Of
the $2.9 billion appropriated for capital projects since FY 1989-90, $264.3 million, or about
9 percent, was appropriated for projects funded through certificates of participation.
Colorado's capital needs tend to grow despite vacillations in the economy. Over the last
13 years, the state has increased its inventory of state-funded facilities by 38 percent, from
27.3 million gross square feet to 37.3 million gross square feet. Approximately 30 percent of the
increase is due to the acquisition of existing facilities. As the state acquires existing facilities and

xii
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constructs new facilities, the cost to maintain the facilities increases. This cost is primarily borne
by '5;General Fund.
The largest recipient of capital construction funding over the last 15 years has been higher
education institutions, followed by the Department of Corrections. Higher Education and
Corrections received about 65 percent of the capital construction budget for the 15-year period.
The Department of Corrections' square footage grew by 175 percent between FY 1990-91 and
FY 2003-04, from 2.4 million square feet to almost 6.6 million square feet. The square footage
for Higher Education, by contrast, grew by 33 percent, from 17.7 million to 23.6 million square
feet.
The primary factor contributing to the erratic funding for capital is its reliance on the
General Fund as a source of revenue. The General Fund is subject to the growing and competing
operating needs of state departments. It also suffers during economic downturns. Options
available to the state to pay for its current and future capital needs include statutory changes as
well as constitutional changes.

J Statutory options include extending the minimum annual General Fund transfer to the
Capital Construction Fund, requiring appropriations for new projects to include costs
for out-year maintenance, and using student fees to fund higher education facilities.

J Options requiring voter approval would include establishing a new dedicated tax or
fee and allowing for general obligation debt.

I

This chapter describes the relationship between the business cycle and state General Fund
expenditures. A business cycle is comprised of an expansion and a recession in the economy.'
The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section describes the most recent business
cycle, which began in Colorado in 1986. Since expenditures are constrained by revenue, the
second section describes the relationship between the economy and General Fund revenue. The
third describes government expenditures and their relationship to the economy. In summary,
General Fund revenues and expenditures increase faster during periods of economic fortune than
during periods of economic hardship. During the most recent recession, revenues and
expenditures declined. The economy also changes the distribution of General Fund spending.
The state's six largest departments receive a larger share of General Fund during lean years than
during years in which revenue is plentifil. During economic downturns, General Fund spending
on capital construction and highways can be dramatically curtailed, cash fund reserves may be
drawn on to augment General Fund spending, and programs previously funded by the General
Fund may become funded with user fees.
Appendix B provides a more detailed discussion of state expenditures in the six largest
departments of state government. The information included in Appendix B is the basis for some
of the observations and conclusions made regarding state spending during Colorado's most recent
business cycle.

-

Colorado's Business Cycle: 1986 2003
Colorado's current business cycle is nearly 17 years old. The cycle began in late 1986,
when employment in Colorado reached its lowest point in a regional recession. The recovery
that followed was weak through the rest of the decade, and was just gaining steam in the early
1990s when it was temporarily stalled by a national recession. The period between early 1990
through late 1991 was characterized by growth below the normal trend, impeded by the national
recession. Stronger growth resumed in 1992 and continued through the end of the decade. The
peak in Colorado's economy occurred in late 2000. Colorado began to shed jobs in January 2001,
and the losses accelerated through the remainder of the year. Colorado lost over 8 1,000 jobs
between December 2000 and July 2003, equal to 3.6 percent of the peak in Colorado's

1. An expansion occurs between a trough and a peak in the economy. A recession occurs between a peak and a trough.

The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the organization responsible for dating peaks and troughs in
the national business cycle, primarily bases dates of peaks and troughs on movements in inflation-adjusted Gross
Domestic Product (GDP), inflation-adjusted income, employment, industrial production, and wholesale-retail sales.
While the NBER tends to give more weight to changes in inflation-adjusted GDP than other economic variables, our
analysis for Colorado's business cycle emphasizes changes in employment and inflation-adjusted income more
heavily than changes in inflation-adjusted Gross State Product (GSP).
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employment, which occurred in December 2000. The peak loss was 85,000 jobs, or 3.9 percent
of December 2000 employment. Figures 1-1 through 1-3 show employment growth, inflationadjusted per capita personal income growth, and retail trade growth since 1983. Where available,
comparable national economic indicators are also shown.
Figure 1-1
Employment Growth
Seasonally Adjusted, 4-Quarter Moving Average

Colorado

-U.S.

-

1986 1990: Weak recovery. More than 30,000 jobs, or 2.1 percent of peak
employment, were shed in two years between December 1984 and November 1986. It took
another 19 months to attain the previous job peak. The regional recession was caused by the
bursting of the oil and gas bubble and a bust in the real estate market that had become highly
speculative in the early 1980s. The late 1980s were characterized by a slow recovery. Between
1987 and 1989, slow growth was seen in employment, income, and gross state product, while the
unemployment rate slowly decreased. The data disguises continued pain during this period
among many who, due to the changing mix of availablejobs, were left out of the recovery.
Although the state began adding jobs in l987,25 1,000 more people moved away from Colorado
than moved into Colorado between 1986 through 1989. The construction sector did not fully
recover until the early 1990s, after the large excess supply of homes and office buildings had
been filled. By 1990, Colorado's economy was healthy, with past excesses corrected and the cost
of living and cost of doing business in the state competitive with other parts of the nation.
Colorado began to outperform the national economy.

-

1991 1992: A stalled expansion. By 199 1, Colorado's costs of housing and office
space had adjusted, leaving the state in a relatively favorable position to compete with other
states. Thus, the Colorado economy was poised for sustained growth in 1991. While growth in
employment, inflation-adjusted Gross State Product, and inflation-adjusted retail trade continued
throughout this period, the economy experienced a slight slump and remained below the normal
trend for nearly two years. Only inflation-adjusted per capita personal income suffered losses.
Strong growth would have to wait for the national economy to recover from recession and war.

.........................................................Chapter 1: Business Cycle and Government Expenditures
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Figure 1-2
Inflation-Adjusted Per Capita Personal Income
4-Quarter Moving Average Growth Rate

Colorado U . S .

1992 - 2000: Sustained expansion. The national and Colorado economies enjoyed
strong and sustained growth between 1992 and 2000. By most measures, Colorado outperformed
the nation. Employment in Colorado increased by nearly 670,000 jobs and at an average annual
rate of 4.1 percent between 1991 and 2000. National employment increased at an average annual
rate of 2.2 percent over the same time period. Colorado's population increased at the third-fastest
rate in the nation between 1990 and 2000, growing by more than one million people on a base of
3.3 million. Personal income in Colorado increased at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent
during the decade, the second fastest rate in the nation.
Growth in Colorado was fueled by strength in the advanced technology sector, a
construction boom, and tourism. Within the advanced technology sector, the
telecommunications industry was a particularly robust source of growth. Colorado's employment
in the communications industry and its average wage paid doubled during the 1990s. The
industry invested heavily in fiber-optic cable networks, creating excess capacity by the end of the
decade. Software firms and advanced technology manufacturers also experienced strong growth
over the decade as businesses nationwide invested heavily in computers and equipment designed
to increase productivity. Meanwhile, Colorado's telecommunication and advanced technology
firms, along with other less volatile sectors of the economy, invested heavily in office and
industrial space. Residential construction also expanded steadily to fill the needs of a growing
and upwardly-mobile population. Finally, the tourism industry benefitted from a strong national
economy.

I
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Figure 1-3
Inflation-Adjusted Retail Trade in Colorado
4-Quarter Moving Average Growth Rate
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2001 2003: Recession. Colorado's economy followed the nation into recession in 2001.
The sectors that fueled the boom in the 1990s were the hardest hit. The bubble burst in the
advanced technology industry in March 2000, as the NASDAQ index fell precipitously,
continuing to decrease through the summer of 2002. The telecommunications industry, saddled
with an oversupply of cable and confronted with decreasing demand worldwide, contracted
sharply. The tourism and airline industries were particularly hard hit after the September 11
terrorist attacks. Wildfires and a severe drought prevented whatever recovery may have occurred
in the tourism sector in the summer of 2002. The drought caused widespread damage to
Colorado's agriculture industry. Many crop harvests were substantially reduced, and for lack of
adequate grazing land, ranchers found themselves forced to sell off cattle for slaughter.
Colorado began to shed jobs in January 2001, and the losses accelerated through the
remainder of the year. Colorado lost over 8 1,000jobs between December 2000 and July 2003,
equal to 3.6 percent of its peak in December 2000. The peak loss was 85,000 jobs, or 3.9 percent
of its December 2000 peak. Personal income growth slowed from 11.4 percent in 2000, to
3.6 percent in 2001, and to 0.8 percent in 2002. Adjusted for inflation, personal income in
Colorado decreased 0.9 percent in 2001 and 1.1 percent in 2002. Retail trade in Colorado slowed
from a 10.4 percent growth rate in 2000 to a 1.8 percent growth rate in 200 1 before decreasing
0.6 percent in 2002. The construction sector sputtered, with the value of nonresidential
construction decreasing 14.2 percent in 2000,0.6 percent in 2001, and 20.9 percent in 2002. The
correction in residential construction took longer to materialize. The number of home permits
continued to expand through 2001, but decreased 12.2 percent in 2002. Buoyed by low mortgage
rates, home prices continued to rise through the summer of 2003, although at diminished rates.
Colorado's recession was deeper than the nation's because it had a higher than average
concentration in the advanced technology, telecommunications, airline travel, apd tourism
sectors. These were the sectors that fueled the boom in the late 1990s and were the hardest hit by
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the national recession. To illustrate Colorado's economy relative to the nation's, Figure 1-4
shows a history of Colorado's national ranking for personal income growth, per capita personal
income growth, employment growth, and population growth from 1995 through 2002.
Figure 1-4
Colorado Economic Indicators
1995-2002

Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau

General Fund Revenue and Colorado's Economy
Economic conditions have a significant influence on General Fund revenue growth.
Figure 1-5 shows General Fund revenue and growth in employment and personal income since
FY 1990-91. Income and excise taxes, which are particularly vulnerable to economic conditions,
comprised more than 90 percent of General Fund revenues during most of the time period shown
in Figure 1-5. Income taxes were hit particularly hard by the recent recession; they declined by
$1.0 billion between FY 2000-0 1 and FY 2002-03. Sales and use taxes, which represent about
95 percent of all excise taxes, fared better, decreasing $89.1 million between FY 2000-01 and
FY 2002-03, and at an average annual rate of 2.4 percent. To help maintain core government
services, the General Assembly chose to a ~ ~ m e n t ~ e n eFund
r a l revenues with revenue from cash
h d s in FY 2001 -02 through FY 2003-04. Prior to these recent transfers, the last transfer of cash
h d revenue to the General Fund occurred in FY 1991-92, also a time of fiscal stress, when
$1 1.6 million was moved from the Capital Construction Fund.

I
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Figure 1-5
General Fund Revenue and the Economy
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Individual income tares. While wages and salaries are the primary influence on
individual income tax revenue, capital gains introduce volatility to the tax revenues that is much
different than the volatility of the overall business cycle. Individual income taxes increased at an
average annual rate of 10.6 percent between FY 1990-91 and FY 2000-0 1, while personal income
increased at an average annual rate of 8.2 percent. Capital gains were responsible for much of
the double-digit growth in individual income taxes during the late 1990s and the large decreases
in the past two years. In Colorado, capital gains were more than seven times higher in 2000 than
in 1990. Personal income does not include capital gains income, and thus individual income
taxes tend to be more volatile than personal income. Figure 1-5 shows that employment
decreased and personal income growth was flat in FY 2001-02. These facts alone would not
warrant a 16.7 percent decrease in individual income taxes. The large decrease in individual
income taxes was likely attributable to a decrease in capital gains. While capital gains data
specific to Colorado are not available, capital gains decreased 44.5 percent nationwide in 2001.
Meanwhile, individual income taxes decreased an additional 6.7 percent in FY 2002-03.
Corporate income tares. Corporate profits are substantially more volatile than the
overall business cycle. Thus, corporate income taxes are also quite volatile. Corporate income
taxes increased at an average annual rate of 11.1 percent between FY 1990-91 and FY 2000-0 1.
Corporate income taxes decreased 46.0 percent in FY 2001-02 as a result of the recession and
declining corporate profits, the telecommunications industry's struggles, accounting scandals, and
the September 11 terrorist attacks. Corporate income taxes increased 26.4 percent in
FY 2002-03, but remained $104.6 million lower than in FY 2000-01.
I
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Sales and use taxes. Taxes on consumer spending tend to more closely minor changes in
income growth than do income taxes. Sales and use taxes increased at an average annual rate of
8.5 percent between FY 1990-91 and FY 2000-0 1, while personal income increased at an average
annual rate of 8.2 percent. Although personal income was relatively flat at a 0.3 percent growth
rate in FY 2001-02, sales and use taxes decreased 2.2 percent. A reduction in the tax rate from
3.0 percent to 2.9 percent in January 2001 contributed to the decrease. Sales and use taxes
decreased an additional 3.0 percent in FY 2002-03.

General Fund Expenditures and Colorado's Economy
The economy affects General Fund expenditures because it influences the amount of
General Fund revenue available to fund expenditures. The economy did little to restrain General
Fund expenditures during the economic boom of the 1990s. The only restraints came from the
state's constitutional and spending limits. The story is different during an economic downturn.
Reduced revenues constrained General Fund expenditures during FY 200 1-02 through
FY 2003-04. The General Assembly responded with a combination of three strategies. First,
programs that are constitutionally protected or deemed necessary for public health and safety
were prioritized. Second, the General Assembly searched for programs whose General Fund
appropriations could be reduced or replaced with another source of existing revenue or new fee
revenue. Third, the General Assembly augmented General Fund revenues with cash fund
revenues and reserves. Lower priority programs that couldn't easily be funded another way were
reduced or eliminated. As a result, not only did the level of General Fund expenditures fall
during the recession, but the distribution of General Fund spending changed.

General Fund expenditures: 1990-2004. The General Fund is used to pay the operating
expenses of many state government agencies2 Among other things, it is also used to reimburse
local governments for the homestead exemption, pay for lawsuit settlements, and construct,
maintain, and renovate state buildings and highways. Figure 1-6 shows total General Fund
expenditures since FY 1989-90, spending for the six largest departments, and spending for all
other depart~nents.~Excluding the TABOR refund, General Fund expenditures increased at an
average annual rate of 7.8 percent between FY 1989-90 and FY 2000-0 1, from $2.60 billion to
$5.94 billion. However, due to the state's recent economic downturn, General Fund expenditures
decreased for two consecutive years: by $221 million in FY 200 1-02 and $96 million in
FY 2002-03. In FY 2003-04, the General Assembly increased General Fund spending by
$82 million, or roughly 1.5 percent over FY 2002-03. Total General Fund obligations for
FY 2003-04 are $5.70 billion, approximately $235 million lower than three years ago.

2. Operations for some agencies are paid for with cash fund revenue. For example, the Department of Transportation

is primarily funded with state and federal gasoline taxes and with motor vehicle registration fees. The Department
of Labor and Employment is entirely funded with state and federal unemployment insurance taxes and other cash fund
revenue. The Department of State receives all of its operating revenue from fees and fines.
3. Spending data reflect actual expenditures for each year from FY 1989-90 to FY 200 1-02, including capital spending

and Senate Bill 97-1 diversions for highways. Data for FY 2002-03 and FY 2003-04 are total appropriations for
operations and capital.
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Figure 1-6
General Fund Expenditures
(dollar9 in millions)

These figures include the Senate Bill 97-1 diversion of sales and use taxes, even though
technically these revenues, when diverted, never actually reach the General Fund. Senate
Bill 97-1 diverts 10.355 percent of state sales and use tax revenue flom the General Fund to the
HUTF. Each year, the diversion occurs only if there is enough money available to fund General
Fund appropriations at a six percent growth rate and the four percent statutory General Fund
reserve. Between FY 1997-98 and FY 200 1-02, $746.1 million was diverted to the HUTF. Only
$35.2 million was diverted in FY 2001-02. Nothing has been diverted since FY 2001-02, and
diversions are not expected to resume in the near future.
Figure 1-7 illustrates how the distribution among the major departments changed during
this time period. Total General Fund expenditures increased at an average annual rate of
5.8 percent between FY 1989-90 and FY 2003-04. This roughly matches the TABOR-imposed
revenue cap of inflation and population growth in this time flame. Three departments have
grown faster than total General Fund expenditures since 1990: Corrections (9.4 percent), Health
Care Policy and Financing (6.5 percent), and Education (6.2 percent). As a result, these three
departments now account for a larger share of General Fund spending than in FY 1989-90.
General Fund expenditures for the remaining large departments - Judicial, Higher Education,
and Human Services - have all grown at a slower pace than total General Fund expenditures.
Meanwhile, the average annual growth rate for all other departments was 1.0 percent.
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Figure 1-7
Average Annual Growth in General Fund Expenditures
FY 1989-1990 through FY 2003-2004

TOTAL

All Other
Higher Education
Human Services

3.9%

Judicial
Education
Health Care Policy & Financing
Corrections
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2001 - 2004: What happened as a result of the recession? The recession changed the
distribution of General Fund spending. The first half of Figure 1-8 shows the change in General
Fund spending on each state department between FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04. The second half
shows the total budget for each department, including General Fund, cash funds, and federal
funds revenue. General Fund spending on the six departments that consume the largest share of
the General Fund (Education, Health Care Policy and Financing, Higher Education, Corrections,
Human Services, and Judicial) showed modest gains between FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04.
Partially as a result of Amendment 23, General Fund spending on education increased
12.8 percent during this period, and the proportion of total General Fund expenditures received
by the Department of Education increased from 37.3 percent to 42.4 percent. General Fund
expenditures on the six largest departments increased fiom $5.0 billion in FY 2000-01 to
$5.3 billion in FY 2003-04, an increase driven by caseload and cost increases in prisons, schools,
and the Medicaid program. General Fund spending on the remaining departments, however,
decreased by $82.3 million since FY 2001-02, or by 28 percent. Spending for capital
construction decreased by 97 percent, or approximately $276 million. In addition, the General
Assembly temporarily eliminated the homestead exemption on property taxes for seniors. Thus,
one of the General Assembly's budgetary responses to declining state revenues has been to
maintain General Fund support for the largest state agencies by cutting General Fund support for
other departments.

a
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Figure 1-8
Change in Spending
(millions of dollars)
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The proportion of General Fund spent on the six largest departments tends to be greater
during economic downturns. Figure 1-9 shows the percentage of General Fund spending
allocated to the six largest departments. Support for the six largest departments peaked in
FY 1991-92 and FY 2003-04, years saddled with poor economic conditions. During periods of
economic growth, however, ample General Fund revenues were available for other purposes. For
example, while General Fund spending for the six largest departments increased in FY 1998-99,
the overall share of support allocated to the six largest departments dropped to 81 percent of total
spending as additional General Fund revenues were transferred to the Capital Construction Fund,
the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund, and the Department of Transportation for highway
construction (Senate Bill 97-1). The percentage of total General Fund resources allocated to the
six largest departments is at 93 percent in FY 2003-04, its highest level in the past 15 years.4
Figure 1-9
Allocation of Total General Fund Spending To Six
Largest Departments

4. Total General Fund spending includes transfers for capital construction and controlled maintenance, as well as Old

Age Pension Fund expenditures required by the State Constitution. If capital expenditu~sand Old Age Pension
expenditures are excluded, the six largest departments would account for 96 percent of the total.
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Constitutionallyprotected programs and other programs deemed necessaryfor the
public health and safety were prioritized As shown in Figure 1-1 0, the Departments ot
Education, Health Care Policy and Financing, and Corrections each experienced an increase in
General Fund support, while the Departments of Higher Education and Human Services lost
General Fund resources between FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04. The Judicial Branch's General
Fund appropriation in FY 2003-04 was roughly the same as in FY 2000-01. In absolute dollar
terms, the Department of Education had the largest increase in General Fund support, at $275
million, followed by the Departments of Health Care Policy and Financing and Corrections at
$149 million and $52 million, respectively. Conversely, General Fund su?port for the
Departments of Higher Education and Human Services dropped by $1 56 million and $30 million,
respectively.
Figure 1-10
Change in General Fund Expenditures, FY 2000-2001 to FY 2003-2004
(dollars in millions)

Figure 1-8 shows the components of the $526 million reduction in General Fund
spending for all other departments and funds from FY 2000-01 to FY 2003-04. The single
largest decrease was in General Fund transfers to the Capital Construction Fund, which
amounted to $275.8 million. Senate Bill 97-1 diversions to the Department of Transportation
also decreased by $197.2 million. All other departments lost General Fund support, with the
largest being the Department of Public Health and Environment ($21.0 million), the Department
of Revenue ($19.3 million), Department of Natural Resources ($9.3 million), and the Department
of Personnel and Administration ($6.9 million).
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Figure 1-1 1 shows the distribution of General Fund expenditures for FY 2003-04.
Education is receiving the highest share at 42 percent, Health Care Policy and Financing the
second highest share at 21 percent, followed by Higher Education at 10 percent, Corrections and
Human Services both at 8 percent, and Judicial at 4 percent.
Figure 1-11
Share of General Fund ~ppro~riations,
FY 2003-2004 ($5.7 billion)

All Other, 7%

,,-Corrections,

8%

Judicial, 4%-

Human Senices, 8%-'

/

Higher Education.

lo?!

Health Care Policy
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Thefunding mechanism for many program changed Figure 1-8 also shows that
many programs whose General Fund appropriation was reduced actually experienced gains in
total funding over the three-year period. The funding shortfall in the General Fund forced the
General Assembly to look for programs whose General Fund appropriations could be reduced or
replaced with other sources of money. During the 2003 legislative session, many fees and fines
were increased and multiple new fees and fines were created. For example, Senate Bill 03-261
enacted new fees and increased others to replace General Fund support to the Division of
Property Taxation in the Department of Local Affairs. Fees were also imposed to increase the
amount of funds the state can draw from the federal government. For example, Senate Bill
03-266 imposed a new daily fee per patient on certain nursing home facilities. Revenues from
this fee will be used to reduce General Fund appropriations to the facilities, serve as a match for
federal Medicaid funds, and reimburse for Medicaid services.
General Fund revenue was augmented with cashfund reserves and revenue.
Substantial cash fund revenues were either diverted or transferred to the General Fund to increase
spending for the Departments of Education, Health Care Policy and Financing, and Corrections.
Net transfers from various cash funds totaled $1.0 billion in FY 2001-02 and $206.2 million in
FY 2002-03. Net transfers of an estimated $42.0 millionfrom cash funds to the
General Fund
r
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are scheduled for FY 2003-04. Diversions of existing cash find revenue from two cash funds to
the General Fund totaled $16.3 million in FY 02-03, including $14.6 million of unemployment
insurance surcharge revenue from the Unemployment Compensation Fund and $1.7 million from
the Family Stabilization Services Fund. The amount estimated to be diverted in FY 2003-04
totals $23.0 million, from the Unemployment Insurance Compensation Fund ($19.8 millionj, the
Family Stabilization Services Fund ($2 million), and the Corrections Expansion Reserve Fund
($1.2 million).

Conclusion. During the robust economic expansion of the 1990s, General Fund spending
was constrained by the state's constitutional and statutory limits. The previous year's TABOR
surplus had to be refunded and, with some exceptions, General Fund appropriations could not
increase by more than six percent each year. With revenues expanding steadily, the General
Assembly was able to afford relatively high levels of highway and capital construction.
As the recession hit over the last three budget years, General Fund spending was no
longer constrained by TABOR or the six percent limit, but by declining revenue. Amendment 23
added an additional constraint on the distribution of available revenue. In addition to the
Department of Education, the Departments of Corrections (prisons) and Health Care Policy and
Financing (Medicaid) were protected relative to other programs in state government. Cash fund
revenue and reserves were drawn upon to maintain General Fund appropriations for those
departments. The funding mechanisms for many programs statewide changed, as the General
Assembly searched for programs with other sources of revenue that could supplant General Fund
appropriations. Lower priority programs without other sources of revenue were reduced or
eliminated. Very little General Fund was available for capital construction, and no General Fund
revenue was spent on highway construction during FY 2002-03 and FY 2003-04. Finally, there
was no longer any TABOR surplus to pay for the homestead exemption on property taxes for
seniors. With the General Fund now permanently responsible for it, the exemption was
eliminated during FY 2003-04 through FY 2005-06. During the next five years, General Fund
spending will again be constrained by the state's spending and revenue limits as revenues recover
with the economy.

1
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CHAPTER 2

Colorado is in its worst fiscal crisis since the Great Depression. State revenue plummeted
in FY 2001-02 and declined again in FY 2002-03. Since the early 194Os, the state had only three
previous year-over-year revenue declines. The revenue declines of FY 1962-63 and FY 1980-81
were at least partly attributable to tax cuts enacted by the General Assembly. The decline in FY
1944-45 was concurrent with a 5.3 percent drop in jobs in 1944 as more of Colorado's citizens
went to fight in World War 11.
To cope with the recent revenue declines, the state legislature reduced General Fund
appropriations, stopped many capital and highway construction projects, and transferred more
than $1 billion fiom other funds to keep the General Fund solvent. Other steps included an
increase in fees for many services and the temporary suspension of the homestead exemption for
senior citizens. Meanwhile, General Fund spending needs will continue to increase while
revenue growth will not match the needs. Thus, the General Assembly is faced with potentially
having to fund General Fund appropriations at less than the 6 percent maximum for the next two
years, despite the need to increase cost- and caseload-driven parts of the budget by more than the
projected total increase for appropriations.

In addition to the revenue decline, several fiscal issues complicate the General
Assembly's ability to deal with the state budget in the short term, as well as the long term. This
chapter examines the state's revenue and spending limits. These limits are the Taxpayer's Bill of
Rights, commonly known as TABOR, and the state restriction on General Fund appropriations.
There are many issues regarding the state's revenue and spending limits. To address these
issues, this chapter is divided into three sections:

Background on Tax and Expenditure Limits in Colorado. This section describes the
genesis of Colorado's revenue and spending limits.
Other State Tax and Expenditure Limitations. How do Colorado's limits compare
with other states' limits? What have other states chosen to do to limit government and
how effective are their limits?
TABOR, the Six Percent Limit on Appropriations, and the State Budget. This
section describes how each limit impacts Colorado's government and how each,
individually and together, affect Colorado's budget. This section presents several options
that the General Assembly may consider with respect to TABOR and the limit on General
Fund appropriations. Brief arguments for and against each option are presented.
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Background on Tax and Expenditure Cimits in Colorado
Colorado has a long history of creating limitations on government growth and spending.
The Colorado Constitution requires a balanced budget and limits the state's ability to incur debt.
Further, Colorado was one of the first states to enact a statutory cap on the growth of state
spending and Colorado voters have enacted what is generally considered to be the most
restrictive law in the country limiting the growth of government. This section provides some
background on Colorado's efforts to impose both statutory and constitutional limits on the fiscal
powers of the state.

Initiative attempts to enact tax and expenditure limits. During the latter part of the
1970s, numerous tax and expenditure limits (TELs) were proposed in several states. New Jersey
was the first state to pass a TEL in 1976. California's voters passed Proposition 13 in 1978. This
measure limits property tax increases and is regarded as the measure that spurred numerous other
states to enact TELs. By 1982, TELs had been enacted in 17 states. Much of the impetus for
TELs was a belief that states needed to end the "boom and bust" budgeting syndrome, the pattern
whereby government tended to increase spending in good times and raise taxes in bad times.
Colorado's first attempt at a TEL occurred in 1966 through a citizen initiative which attempted to
limit property taxes and gradually exempt certain personal property fiom taxation. Colorado
voters also failed to pass other TEL proposals in 1972, 1976, and 1978.
In the middle and late 1980s, Colorado experienced an economic downturn, mostly due to
the collapse of its energy and construction industries. At this time, a group of citizens started a
grassroots tax reform effort for state and local governments. This new surge of citizen-initiated
TELs began in November 1986 with Amendment 4, which would have required voter approval
on all tax increases and required the state to backtill local governments for any state mandated
spending increases. The latter initiative was not approved and other comprehensive proposals
failed to pass in 1988 and 1990. After some modifications to these proposals, voters approved
the TABOR Amendment in 1992.

Climate in which TABOR was approved During the early 1990s, as the state was
emerging fiom its own economic downturn, a national recession caused the state to once again
face budgetary problems. Due to the budget shortfall, some legislators were advocating tax
increases and a proposal was on the 1992 ballot to increase the state sales tax rate fiom 3 percent
to 4 percent. The additional revenue would have provided funding for K - 12 education. Voters
rejected this sales tax increase, while voters in several local elections approved just 10 of a b u t
30 proposals to increase taxes or float bond issues. At the time of TABOR'S passage, Colorado's
per capita state and local taxes ranked in the middle of all states. Meanwhile, state and local
taxes as a percentage of personal income were the 16' lowest in the country.
Legislative attempts to create TELs. The first statutory limit on growth in taxes came in
1913. The General Assembly limited increases in property taxes to 15 percent in 1913. (The
state had its own property tax levy until 1964.) Subsequent limits were 5 percent until 1976,
when the limit was changed to 7 percent. The current statutory limit of 5.5 percent was adopted
for property tax years 1988 and later.
6
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The first statutory limit on the growth of state General Fund appropriations, named the
"Kadlecek amendment" after Senator Jim Kadlecek, was enacted in 1977. As first enacted, the
Kadlecek amendment limited General Fund appropriations growth to 7 percent over the previous
year. The amendment also required a 4 percent reserve, and provided that the excess revenues
were to be used for property tax relief. The limit was due to expire in FY 1982-83 and in 1979
the limit was made permanent. An amendment to the limit in 1984 changed the limit to 7 percent
over the previous year plus costs of property tax reappraisals. A portion of the state
appropriation for school finance was exempted from the 7 percent limit up until FY 1985-86.
During the early 1990s, sensing growing public support to enact a state TEL, some
legislators attempted to propose various comprehensive TELs for the state. However, none of
these constitutional proposals won the necessary 213 majority of both houses to be placed on the
ballot for voter consideration. One proposal would have required a 213 majority of both houses
of the general assembly to approve any tax increase, while another would have limited state
spending to 5 percent of the state's personal income. Other proposals would have created a
constitutional spending limit based on population growth and inflation or growth in personal
income. Under one proposal, taxes could have been raised without voter approval as long as
spending did not exceed a certain limit.
The current statutory General Fund appropriations limit, sometimes called the
Arveschoug-Bird limit after its sponsors, was enacted in 1991. A similar proposal failed to pass
in 1990. This limit is expressed as the lesser of 5 percent of Colorado personal income or a 6
percent increase over the total state general fund appropriations from the previous fiscal year.
The personal income part of the formula has not operated to limit appropriations, thus the limit is
alternatively known as the 6 percent limit. The new limit was instituted during a time when
revenue growth was weak and the state had budget problems. During the mid to late 1980s,
when Colorado's economy experienced a downturn, revenue growth was consistently less than
the 7 percent limit. It was also below the 6 percent limit in all but one year. There have been no
significant changes to the Arveschoug-Bird limit since its enactment. However, a 5 percent limit
was proposed, but defeated, in the 1999,2000, and 2001 legislative sessions.
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Other State Tax and Expenditure Limitations
Colorado is generally considered to have the most restrictive tax and expenditure limits
(TEL) in the country. In this section, we analyze the characteristics of TEL,s across the states in
order to provide a comparison with Colorado's TELs.
Twenty-eight states currently have TELs that statutorily or constitutionally restrict
government revenue or spending. Some states, including Colorado, have more than one TEJ,.
TELs vary significantly, and depending on their design and characteristics, certain TELs are
considered to be more restrictive than others. Some state TELs have little or no impact on stak
budgeting.
TELs differ in how they were enacted, whether they are statutory or constitutional, their
flexibility, how they handle the transfer of governmental programs, and whether the limit is
imposed on spending or revenue. Perhaps most importantly, they also differ in how the limit on
spending or revenue is calculated and the treatment of surplus money that is over the limit. In
addition, some states base their limit solely on the prior year's limit, while others may base their
limit on the actual revenue or spending of the prior year. Finally, states may have voter approval
or supermajority requirements as other limitations on government revenue or spending.
TELs across the states generally fall into the following categories:

J revenue limits -tie yearly revenue increases to measures such as personal income,
population, or inflation;
J expenditure limits -tie annual spending levels to growth indexes or other authorized
levels (most common limitation); and
J hybridrs - have combined limit features. For example, some states may impose
limits tied to a measurable index and also have provisions to refund revenues that
exceed the limit or have supermajority requirements for tax increases.
Appendix C provides an overview of the TELs in the 28 states. Specific information such
as the year of adoption, type of limit, method of approval, how the limit is applied, the treatment
of surpluses, and other provisions that may trigger or impact the implementation of the limitation,
is provided.

Studies on the impacts of TELs. Academic studies that have investigated TELs have
shown mixed results regarding whether they have a significant impact on limiting state spending.
This could be due to the differences in the way TELs have been designed and whether or not state
governments have been able to circumvent the limits. Further, state TELs have been found to
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have more of an impact on the growth of government when combined with local government
TELs.~,~
The impact of TELs may also depend on differing state economies and tax systems.
Some studies have concluded that TELs have little or no impact on the growth of
government. However, most of these studies did not analyze some of the most binding limitations
that have passed since 1990. Other studies indicate that the characteristics of the TEL are a
primary factor in determining how much a limitation impacts government spending and legislative
fiscal discretion.

Characteristics of TELs
The following paragraphs analyze the characteristics of TELs. Colorado's tax and
expenditure limits are generally classified as restrictive using the criteria established in the
following paragraphs.

Origination of limit. TELs initiated by citizens are generally more restrictive than
limitations enacted by legislatures. Citizen-initiated TELs are more likely drafted by citizens with
an interest in enacting characteristics that place greater constraints on state spending. Seven TELs
have been enacted through the citizen-initiative process and twelve have been enacted through the
legislative process; the rest have been enacted through referenda or constitutional convention.
Colorado's TELs have been enacted by both the legislature and through citizen initiative.
Revenue versus spending limit. Revenue limits are considered to be more restrictive than
spending limits because states have more control over spending levels than revenue; it is diEcult
for states to anticipate incoming revenues accurately which makes it more difficult for states to
formulate their budgets. Twenty-three TELs impose limits on spending, while eight are revenue
limits. Colorado has a revenue limit and an appropriations limit.
Flexibility of limit. Certain TELs allow for more flexibility than others. For example,
some TELs may exempt certain categories of spending or revenue from their limits. The most
common exemptions are for debt service, federal mandates and court orders, Medicaid, capital
outlays, and federal funds. In addition, some TELs have built-in flexibility by including
provisions for emergencies or changes in their economy, such as a recession. For example, North
Carolina's statutory TEL allows the appropriations limit to be exceeded if Medicaid, prison
operations, or state health insurance increases exceed the percentage increase in state personal
income growth. If this were to occur, the limit would be increased to reflect the adjustment for all

5.

Rafool, Mandy. 1996. "State Tax and Expenditure Limits",National Conference ofState Legislatures. Legislative Finance Paper No. 104;
Mullins, Daniel R. and Phillip G. Joyce. "Tax and Expenditure Limitations and State and Local Fiscal Structure:An Empirical Assessment."
Public Budgeting and Finance Spring (1996): 75-101.
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According to a 1995 study by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, 46 states haveTELs that apply either to
counties, municipalities, or school districts. These TELs include property tax rate limits, limits on revenue or expenditure increases, limits
on assessment increases, or full disclosure to taxpayers of levy increase requirements. Only 10 states have TELs for local governments that
are applied to annual increases in revenue or expenditures, which are considered to be more restrictive than other TELs.
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subsequent fiscal years. According to the North Carolina Fiscal Research Division, the limit is
significantly higher than the actual revenue used in state budgeting and the limit has not been a
factor in state budgeting.
In Massachusetts, the revenue limit cannot be lowered if allowable revenue is calculated to
be lower than the preceding fiscal year due to changes in the economy. In this case, the limit
would equal the preceding year's limit. Connecticut excludes budget reserve fund expenditures
from its limit, including expenditures to fund shortfalls. Colorado's appropriations limit is more
flexible than its revenue limit. The flexibility stems from the many allowable exceptions to the
appropriations limit.
Constitutional versus statutory. Constitutional limitations are more dificult to amend or
circumvent than statutory limits. For example, a statutory limit may be amended by a legislature
to exclude certain spending or a legislature may vote to raise the limit. Washington's legislature
voted to suspend its statutory limit in 2001 until July 1,2003, in order to pass a budget that
exceeded its limit. Fifteen TELs are statutory and eighteen are constitutional. Colorado's revenue
limit is constitutional, while its statutory appropriations limit now requires voter approval to
weaken its provisions.
Transfer of responsibility of governmentprograms. Some states allow for their limit to
be changed if governmental programs are transferred between federal, state, or local governments.
One way states may get around a limit is to shift programs and services (and thus expenditures) to
local governments. Several of the states with TELs have provisions regarding the transfer of
responsibility for government programs. For example, Missouri's limit may be adjusted if
program responsibility is transferred from one level of govemment to another. In addition, the
state is prohibited from reducing its current proportion of local services financed through state aid,
and no new program can be required of local governments unless it is funded by the state.
In Arizona, the legislature is required to modifl the limit if a court order or legislative act
transfers program responsibility between federal, state, and local governments. Eighteen TELs do
not have provisions relating to the transfer of responsibility for govemment programs. In
Colorado, TABOR provides that, exceptfor K-12 education, a local government can reduce or
end its subsidyfor any state-mandatedprogram.
Limits used by the states. One important measure of the impact of TELs on govemment
spending or revenue is the frequency that a limit is triggered. This is primarily determined by the
index used to calculate the limit. For example, because an inflation plus population growth limit
is generally less than a personal income growth limit, the use of the former limit would keep
spending or revenue at a lower level.
Fourteen state TELs are designed to hold government spending increases to the growth
rate of state personal income. Limits based on personal income are generally less restrictive than
limits based on population growth and inflation because personal income tends to grow faster over
time than population growth and inflation. Further, studies indicate that TELs based on
I
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population growth and inflation may be the most restrictive type of limit.7 Limits based on a fixed
percentage increase over the prior year's appropriations are also considered to be more restrictive,
depending on the amount of the percentage increase.
Figure 2- 1 shows which states' limits are based on population growth and inflation, state
personal income, a percentage of state revenue received, a percentage over prior year's
expenditures, or a rate of growth based on some other economic indicator, such as a combination
or average of indicators. Colorado's revenue limit is based on inflation andpopulation growth,
thus is considered to be more restrictive. Its appropriation limit is based on a fixedpercentage
increase annually.
Figure 2-1
Indicators Used to Calculate Tax and Expenditure ~irnits'

Alaska
Colorado
Nevada
Washington

Arizona
Florida
Hawaii
Idaho
Louisiana
Michigan
Missouri
Montana
New Jersey
North Carolina
Oregon
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas

Delaware
Iowa
Mississippi
Oregon
Rhode Island

Colorado

California
Connecticut
Massachusetts
Ohio
Oklahoma
Utah

7. New, Michael J. 2003. "Taxand Expenditure Limitations: A Comparative Political Analysis", Harvard University; Stansel,
Dean. 1994. "Taming Leviathan: Are Tax and Spending Limits the Answer?" Washington, D.C. Cato Institute, (Policy
Analysis No. 213).
8.

'States that are listed more than once have more than one TEL.
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Yearly appropriations growth in California is limited to the percentage increase in population and per capital personal income.
Appropriations in Connecticut are limited to the average percentage change in state personal income over the preceding five years or the
increase in inflation for the preceding 12 month period, which is greater. Massachusetts' growth in revenue ca?not exceed the three-year
average growth rate of wages and salaries. Ohio's limit is applied to the excess revenue above a statutorily set m m n u m year-end balance
in the General Revenue and Budget Stabilization Fund. Oklahoma's appropriation of revenues is limited to a 12 percent yearly increase
(adjusted for intlalion) and 95 percent of certified revenue. In Utah, the yearly appropriations are tied to formulas that utilize population
growth, inflation, and the percentage change in personal income.
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Treatment of surpluses. States that require taxpayer refunds of surplus revenue exceeding
their revenue or spending limits may have more restrictive limitations than those states that retain
or divert moneys to a rainy day or other special fund." Some of these states require the return of
all the excess revenues over their limit, while other states require that some of the excess be
placed into a reserve or other fund, while the remainder may be returned to taxpayers. Some
states' limits may be set high enough so that refunds never occur. The laws that require the
immediate refund of all surplus revenue are considered more restrictive in that they make it
difficult for states to retain any excess revenue. Three states that mandate immediate refunds,
Michigan, Missouri, and Colorado, enacted tax cuts during their recent surplus years to lower their
revenue base. Colorado is among ten states that require a taxpayer refund of surplus revenues.
Enforcementprovisions. Some state TELs give taxpayers the ability to sue to enforce the
limit's provisions. TELs may also mandate that any revenue illegally collected over the limit must
be refunded or require injunctive relief to prohibit any illegal taxes or spendbg while enf'orcernent
suits are pending. TELs with enforcement provisions can be considered more restrictive because
they mandate what can happen when <government
i
violates its TEL. Without enforcement
provisions, a TEL may not be adhered to. Missouri's TEL gives taxpayers standing to sue to
enforce its revenue limit provisions. Further, the courts must invalidate any taxes and fees that
were enacted in violation of Missouri law and require a refund of money or a reduction in taxes to
offset the excess revenue collected.

Colorado's TABOR amendment explicitly allowsfor thejiling of individual or class action
enforcement suits. Successful plaintiffs are allowed costs and reasonable attorney fees. The
amendment states that any revenue collected, kept, or spent illegally for four fiscal years before a
suit is filed must be refunded with 10 percent annual simple interest. There is no enforcement
provision explicitly written into the 6 percent limit.
Ratchet-down effect. A ratchet-down effect occurs when a state's revenue is less than its
allowable limit and reduces the limit for subsequent years. States that base their limit on the
lesser of the prior year's limit or actual spending or revenue experience a ratchet-down effect
when spending or revenue falls below the maximum allowable limit. States whose limits are
based solely on the prior year's maximum allowable limit, and not on actual spending or revenue,
would not experience a ratchet-down effect when spending or revenues decline.

Florida's revenue limit is determined by multiplying the average annual growth rate in
state personal income over the previous five years by the maximum amount of revenue permitted
under the limitation in the previous year, not the actual revenue the state receives. Therefore, a
revenue decline will not ratchet down the base for which the next year's limit is calculated; the
limit can continue to grow depending on state personal income growth.
Massachusetts' revenue growth limit is determined by the maximum amount of allowable
state tax revenue based on a formula, not the actual revenue received. Utah's appropriations limit
is based on formulas that involve either inflation and population growth or personal income
growth. The limit is based on the maximum allowable growth and not on the previous year's

.
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actual spending. Both of Colorado's limits contain the ratchet-down effect; they are based on the
lower of the previous year's limit or on actual spending or revenue.

Voter approval and supermajority requirements: other limitations on tax and spending
increases. Voter approval and supermajority requirements also restrict state tax and expenditure
options. Colorado is one of four states with a voter approval requirementfor tax increases or for
spending increases over the limit.
Supermajority requirements mandate either a 315,213, or 314 majority vote in both
chambers to pass tax increases or new taxes. Proponents of supermajority laws believe that such
requirements place a limit on the ability to raise taxes and can effectively limit the growth of
government. Opponents believe that supermajority requirements give too much power to a
legislative minority that can block any tax increases. In states with one predominant party, the
majority party may have enough votes to approve tax increases. In other states, the requirement
can be very restrictive. Colorado, with its emergencyprovisions for increasing taxes, is among
13 states that have a legislative supermajority requirement for increasing taxes. Colorado's
TABOR law does not define an emergency, rather it defines what an emergency is not. An
emergency excludes economic conditions, revenue shortfalls, and governmental salary or benefit
increases. An emergency may include natural disasters, such as tornados, earthquakes, forest
fires, and blizzards. Colorado has not used the emergency tax provision of TABOR.
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TABOR, the Six Percent Limit on Appropriations, and the State Budget
This section focuses specifically on TABOR and the 6 percent limit on General Fund
appropriations. TABOR, a constitutional amendment enacted via initiative, limits most state
government spending. It is a limit on General Fund and most cash h n d revenue. The 6 percent
limit is a statutory cap on increases in General Fund appropriations with some exceptions.
TABOR provided that the appropriations limit could only be weakened by future voter approval
and not by legislative action only.
The section describes how each limit was designed to limit Colorado's government and
how each, individually and together, affect the state budget. Several options addressing issues
raised in the discussion are presented. In particular, the discussion will examine:

J the major provisions of TABOR;
J the composition of the TABOR base;
J the history and projections of the TABOR surplus;
J how the state refunds the TABOR surplus;
J the relationship between TABOR and the economy;
J the ratchet-down effect;
J an alternative formula for TABOR'S growth limit;
J tax increases under TABOR;
J the enterprise provision of TABOR;
J the relationship of cash fund revenue to TABOR, and
J the state's statutory limit on General Fund appropriations.

The Major Provisions of TABOR
TABOR has three major provisions: a requirement of voter approval for tax increases; a
revenue growth limit; and a fieeze on existing spending limits. The following sections examine
these provisions.

Voter approvalfor tau increases. TABOR states that any tax district must ask voters to
approve tax increases. These include: a new tax; a tax rate increase; a local mill levy increase; an
increase in a property assessment valuation ratio; an extension of an expiring tax; or a tax policy
change causing a net tax revenue gain. No approval is needed for a tax decrease. Any income tax
rate increase or base change must occur the year after it is approved. TABOR also prohibits
certain types of taxes, such as new or increased real estate transfer taxes, local income taxes, and
state property taxes, as well as surcharges on state income taxes.
Revenue growth limit. TABOR limits the amount of revenue that a tax district may
collect each year. The formula for determining the revenue limit varies by tax authority. For the
state, TABOR limits annual growth in most state revenue to the Denver-Boulder-Greeley inflation
rate plus the annual percentage change in state population. For local governments, including
school districts, the inflation rate is included in the formula, but different criteria are used for the
growth factor. Revenue collected above these limits, commonly referred to as the TABOR
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surplus, must be returned to taxpayers in the form of refunds or credits, unless voters approve a
plan for spending the TABOR surplus.

Existing spending limits cannot be weakened without voter approval. TABOR
stipulated that existing limits on revenue, spending, and debt can be "weakened only by future
voter approval." In the context of the state budget, the General Assembly has interpreted this
phrase to refer to the 6 percent limit on General Fund appropriations. Prior to TABOR, this limit
could be changed by the General Assembly.

What is the TABOR Base?
The TABOR revenue base does not include all revenue that the state receives. TABOR
specifically excludes revenue from enterprises, federal funds, gifts, collections for another
government, employee pension contributions, pension fund earnings, damage awards, and
property sales. Thus, in FY 2002-03, the TABOR revenue base was an estimated 58.5 percent of
the total state budget.
For FY 2002-03, TABOR revenue was nearly $7.7 billion. General Fund revenue made
up 70.9 percent of the TABOR base. Individual income taxes are the largest component of the
General Fund and were 38.4 percent of TABOR revenue. Sales and use taxes were 24.0 percent.
There are over 200 cash funds that constitute nearly 30 percent of the TABOR revenue base.
However, only three subject-related cash funds comprise about 73 percent of all cash fund
revenue. Figure 2-2 shows the composition of all TABOR revenue.
Figure 2-2
Major Sources of TABOR Revenue, FY 2002-03
(millions of dollars)
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History and Projections of TABOR Surpluses
The state did not incur a TABOR surplus until FY 1996-97, the fourth year that TABOR
was in effect. Starting in FY 1996-97, the state exceeded the limit for five consecutive years,
resulting in approximately $3.25 billion in surplus revenue during that time. We expect that the
state will be at or below the revenue limit for FY 2001-02 through FY 2003-04. The state will
again experience surpluses beginning in FY 2004-05 through FY 2007-08. The state will refund
an estimated $1.3 billion to taxpayers over that time period. Figure 2-3 shows the history and
projections of TABOR surpluses. A surplus will not occur in FY 2003-04 because of the
population adjustment (see page 34 for an explanation of the population adjustment).
Figure 2-3
TABOR Surpluses
(dollars in millions)

96-97
97-98
98-99
99-00
00-01
01-02

$139.0
$563.2
$679.6
$941.1
$927.2
$0.0

02-03
03-04 est.
04-05 est.
05-06 est.
06-07 est.
07-08 est.

$0.0
$0.0
$113.6
$341.5
$477.4
$394.7

How is the TABOR Surplus Refunded to Taxpayers?
When the state incurs a TABOR surplus, it must be refunded within one year unless
taxpayers allow the state to keep a part of the surplus. For the first two years that the state had a
surplus, it was returned to taxpayers as a sales tax refund based on the amount of federal adjusted
gross income on the income tax return. Additional methods of refunding the surplus have been
added and the number of refund methods now totals 19. With the exception of the sales tax
refund, each particular refund method is triggered only when the TABOR surplus reaches a certain
threshold. Each method's threshold is increased annually by the percentage growth in personal
income. Appendix D provides a brief description of each refund method.
Several attempts have been made to allow the state to either modify the TABOR base or
keep a portion of the TABOR surplus. For example, in 1996, the General Assembly passed
House Concurrent Resolution 96-1006, which referred a measure to the voters to amend the state
constitution concerning unemployment compensation insurance taxes. The measure would have
allowed unemployment insurance taxes to be increased without voter approval. Further, the
measure would have excluded unemployment compensation revenues fiom the calculation of the
TABOR revenue limit and the TABOR base. The measure was defeated at the general election in
November 1996.
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In 1998, the General Assembly passed House Bill 98-1256, which referred a measure to
the voters of Colorado seeking to retain a portion of revenue in excess of the limitation on state
fiscal year spending. The measure requested that the voters allow the state to retain and use the
first $200 million of revenue in excess of the state constitution's revenue limit per year for five
years, up to $1 billion in total. The money was to have been used for capital construction projects
as follows: 50 percent for transportation, 30 percent for K-12 schools, and 20 percent for higher
education. The transportation money would have been shared by the state, counties, and
municipalities. The measure was defeated at the general election in November 1998.
Amendment 23 was a citizen initiative that passed in November 2000. The amendment
provided for the diversion of one-third of one percent of Colorado taxable income on income tax
returns to the State Education Fund. The diversion is exempt from TABOR'S revenue limit, thus
it reduced the amount of the TABOR surplus by $164.3 million in FY 2000-01. However,
because of the lack of a TABOR surplus in the following two fiscal years, the state retained the
same amount of revenue it would have without Amendment 23. In fact, the state's TABOR
revenue limit fell to a lower level as a result of the ratchet down than would have been the case
without Amendment 23. Therefore, the state will refund more revenue in the future and retain
less revenue than would have been the case if Amendment 23 had not passed. The interaction
between Amendment 23 and TABOR will result in more required spending on education and less
state revenue to spend on other programs than would have been the case without the passage of
Amendment 23.
Referendum A was a legislative proposal that was also approved by the state's voters in
November 2000. Referendum A provided a property tax homestead exemption to qualifying
senior citizens. The state's TABOR revenue limit was increased by the estimated amount of the
property tax reduction, thus would have reduced the amount of taxpayers' refunds of the TABOR
surplus. However, the lack of a TABOR surplus meant that the General Fund paid for the
homestead exemption. Meanwhile, the eventual cost of $6 1.5 million for the homestead
exemption was higher than the estimated cost of $44.1 million, and the General Fund was also
responsible for the additional cost.

The Issue: Referendum A of 2000 provided for the cost of the senior citizen
homestead exemption by allowing for an offsetting increase in the TABOR limit
during the first year of the exemption. However, because the TABOR limit
ratcheted down in the same year, any funding of the homestead exemption must
now be made @om the General Fund.
Option: The General Assembly could ask voters to permanently exemptj-om
TABOR any spending for reimbursement of the homestead exemption.

1
1

I
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Issues for consideration. The original intent of the provision was to pay for the senior
homestead exemption by increasing the TABOR limit, thus using money from the TABOR
surplus. However, due to the ratchetdown effect of TABOR, it is impossible for the tax cut to
ever be f h d e d from the TABOR surplus without further approval. This is an example of how
different voter-approved measures did not work together as intended.
On the other hand, voters already approved the homestead exemption and raised the
TABOR limit. The state should be responsible for funding the tax cut by whatever means is
necessary without asking voters to fund the proposal a second time.

Accounting for the TABOR Surplus
Under TABOR, the state is required to refund any revenue collected over the limit to
taxpayers in the next fiscal year after the surplus revenue is collected. House Bill 98-1414
allowed the state to use the cash basis of accounting for recognition of the state's TABOR liability.
In other words, the liability was recognized in the year after the surplus was incurred. The state
was not required to set aside or reserve the money for the refund in the year that the surplus
revenue was collected. This worked well in years in which the surplus was larger than the
previous year because each year's surplus could cover the prior year's refund and the difference
could be (and was) used for other expenditures. The effect was to "pre-spend" the TABOR
surplus. It proved difficult for the budget, however, when the state's $927.2 million surplus for
FY 2000-01 was followed by a revenue decline of $98 1 million and no TABOR surplus in FY
2001-02. The state's decision to "pre-spend" the surplus in earlier years contributed to the many
budget reductions that were made in FY 2001-02 and FY 2002-03. Because the state had used
most of the available revenue for other projects and spending during FY 2000-01, the state was
faced not only with the revenue shortfall but also with the need to refund the $927.2 million to the
taxpayers.
The General Assembly repealed House Bill 98-1414 during the 2003 legislative session.
When surplus revenue is collected in the future, the state will be required to account for the
TABOR refund liability in the year that the surplus was collected. The refund will then have no
impact on the following year's budget as the funds to make the refund will already be available.
However, it will affect the budget in the current year because it no longer allows the pre-spending
of the surplus. Other expenditures will potentially have to be reduced.

TABOR and the Economy
Colorado's economy began to surge in 1992. From 1992 through 2000, Colorado
employment increased at a compound average annual rate of 4.3 percent. From 1984 to 1991,
Colorado employment increased at an average pace of 1.4 percent. The relatively slow growth
during this period was attributable to excess capacity in the state's ofice and retail markets and a
downturn in the energy industry. High vacancy rates caused employment in the state's
construction industry to fall from a cyclical peak of 90,700 in 1984 to 60,000 iri 1989.
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Construction jobs did not surpass the prior cyclical peak again until 1994. Similarly, a fall
in oil prices caused employment in the energy sector to decline by more than one-half between
1983 and 1989. As a result of the weak economy, more people left Colorado than came to it
between 1986 and 1990.
TABOR'Scontribution to the state's economic prosperity, if any, cannot be statistically
quantified. When TABOR passed in late 1992, Colorado was well on its way to emerging from
the economic doldrums of the 1980s as employment increased by 3.4 percent that year. Further,
most of the country, particularly the Western region, did very well during the 1990s. Colorado
was well positioned in 1992 to outperform the country as its relative costs for labor, housing, and
commercial and industrial buildings were lower than those in competing areas. It is important to
note that Colorado underperformed the nation from 1985 to 1991, as indicated in Figure 2-4.
Colorado typically outperforms the nation. For example, from 1975 to 2002, Colorado
employment increased at a 3.1 percent annual pace, while the nation's employment increased at a
2.0 percent clip. Finally, the state began to incur a TABOR surplus in FY 1996-97 when the stock
market boomed. Realized capital gains increased nearly six-fold between 1992 and 2000. They
were an important factor in Colorado's fiscal well-being in the late 1990s, contributing
significantly to the TABOR surplus. The health of the stock market cannot be linked to the
presence of Colorado's TABOR limits on government spending.
Figure 2 4
Employment Growth Comparisons
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A national recession started in March 2001 and ended in November 2001. While national
output and inflation-adjusted income are generally increasing, employment is still on a downward
trend. While the economy is recovering by most measures, it is thus far a jobless recovery.
Through August 2003, the nation continued to shed jobs.
1
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Colorado was not immune from the national recession. In fact, Colorado had a greater
exposure to some of the factors causing the national recession. Colorado had one of the nation's
highest concentrations of high-tech and telecommunications workers. The collapse of these
sectors because of excess capacity dominated layoff announcements in 2001 and 2002. Further,
Colorado is a significant destination for national and international tourists. The recession,
compounded by the impact of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, put a big crimp on tourism in
Colorado. Consequently, the decline in the state's economy was more severe than much of the
nation. For instance, Colorado's employment declined 1.9 percent in 2002. Only one state had a
worse performance. By contrast, Colorado ranked third best in employment growth only two
years previously.
Colorado revenue that is subject to the TABOR limit declined by 12.6 percent in
FY 200 1-02 and by 1.1 percent in FY 2002-03. TABOR revenue declined by $1.2 billion during
this time. Just as there is no evidence that TABOR was responsible for the economic boom of the
1990s,TABOR was also not responsible for the recent economic downtum. With or without
TABOR, the state would have been forced into a combination of appropriations and capital
construction spending reductions, as well as borrowing from other funds. Additionally, the state
would still have to set future budgets based on revenue that is growing from a smaller base. Due
to the revenue downturn, the state will not be able to increase General Fund appropriations by the
typical 6 percent limit and maintain a balanced budget in FY 2004-05 and FY 2005-06.
At the same time, the state will be faced with TABOR surpluses again in FY 2004-05,
compounding the General Fund's problems. TABOR ratcheted the state's revenue limit down to
the level of actual revenue in FY 2001-02 and FY 2002-03.

The TABOR Ratchet Down
If revenue is less than the allowable TABOR limit, the base (actual revenue) for
determining the following year's limit is reduced. Since the new limit is at a lower level than it
otherwise would have been, the limit is said to have ratcheted down. In Figure 2-5, it can be seen
that the state's TABOR limit was forced down when revenue declined in the past two fiscal years.
The actual revenue in FY 200 1-02, which became the new TABOR base to determine the
following year's limit, was $365.7 million lower than the TABOR limit in FY 2001-02. In fact
revenue fell so far in FY 2001-02 that it was $188.1 million below the previous year's TABOR
limit. Additionally, revenue in FY 2002-03 was an estimated $703.6 million lower than the limit
for that year. The top line in Figure 2-5 shows the limit without the ratchet-down effect. The
bottom line shows where the limit will be under current law. As can be seen, the limit is
permanently moved to a lower base due to the ratchet-down effect. Because the state typically
experiences population growth and inflation, it will need to provide services to more people, at a
higher cost, but with less allowable revenue than in previous years.
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Figure 2-6
Ratchet-Down Effect In Colorado
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Because of the ratchet-down effect of TABOR, the state will incur TABOR surpluses
sooner when revenue growth again exceeds the inflation rate and population growth. Our office
predicts that TABOR surpluses will resume in FY 2004-05. After application of the population
adj~stment(discussed in the next section), we expect that the cumulative surpluses will be over
$1.3 billion during the four-year period beginning in FY 2004-05. Annual estimates of the
TABOR surpluses can be found on page 28.
Because of the combination of the ratchet-down effect and the repeal of House Bill 981414, appropriations in FY 2004-05 and FY 2005-06 can only increase by 1.2 percent and 3.2
percent, respectively. These figures are based on our June 2003 forecast and assume a balanced
budget with a 4 percent reserve. These increases are $270.2 million and $156.0 million,
respectively, below the 6 percent limit.
An economic recovery will not necessarily improve the state's budget picture. Additional
revenue resulting from an economic recovery may contribute to a TABOR surplus. When the
state incurs a TABOR surplus, the liability is recorded in the same year as the surplus and the
surplus will be refunded in the following year.

f ~ h eIssue: Because of the ratchet-down eDct of TABOR, the state must
permanently contend with a lower revenue limit.

I

1

Option: The General Assembly could submit a proposal for voter
approval to eliminate the ratchet-down efect of TABOR. It could
consider making FY 2001-02 the base for future spending limits.
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Issues for consideration. The option acknowledges that the costs of government services
increase over time and the need for services expands as population grows. The ratchet-down
effect makes it difficult to resume government services that are reduced or eliminated when
TABOR revenues fall. Although this option would permit the state to keep more revenue than
currently allowed, it maintains the requirement for voter approval of tax increases.
On the other hand, the ratchet-down effect forces a permanent reduction in government
during economic downturns. Elimination of this provision would allow government to return to
previous spending levels.

The TABOR Limit
This section discusses the population adjustment enacted by the General Assembly in 2002
to offset the population underestimates in the 1990s and explores the use of alternative limits on
revenue.

Thepopulation adjustment. TABOR limits annual growth in most state revenue to
inflation plus the percentage change in population. During the 1990s, the Census Bureau
underestimated Colorado's population growth. Thus, the census in 2000 caused the "official"
estimate of population growth during the previous year to be 6.0 percent. The underestimates
during the 1990s caused the state's revenue limit to be lower than it should have been based on
the actual population growth that the state experienced. As a result, the state refunded $483
million more than necessary to taxpayers during the 1990s. TABOR allows the state to adjust the
limit every decade to account for such discrepancies. Therefore, the General Assembly
determined that the state would carry forward all of the unused portion of population growth
available under TABOR from the corrected 2000 census count until such time as revenue would
allow for the use of the growth. Due to the drop in revenue experienced during FY 200 1-02, the
state was able to carry forward all six of the available percentage points of TABOR growth
attributable to population growth in 2000. This carry-forward is called the population adjustment.
According to our June 2003 forecast, the state will be able to use 3.1 percentage points of
its population adjustment in FY 2003-04 and the remaining 2.9 percentage points during FY
2004-05. During FY 2003-04, the state will retain $236.9 million that would have been refunded
without the adjustment. During FY 2004-05, an incremental amount of $232.6 million will be
retained. The combined impact of both years' adjustments will allow the state to keep an
additional $477.2 million in FY 2004-05. Because the population adjustment permanently
increases the state's TABOR base, the state will continue to retain this amount on an annual basis
into the future as long as the state does not experience another ratchet down.

Use of alternative revenue limits. This section examines using personal income and a
moving average of the current limits of inflation and population growth as alternatives to the
current formula for the TABOR limit.
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Colorado's use of inflation and population growth is generally considered the most
restrictive of the revenue or spending limits that states have enacted. Three other states use
inflation plus population growth as a limit, while 14 states use personal income.
Critics of TABOR contend that the use of the inflation rate and the percentage change in
population does not allow government to at least match the growth rate of the economy as a
whole. Gross state product (GSP) is a measure of the state's economic output. Figure 2-6 shows
the relationship between GSP and the two separate economic indicators of personal income versus
inflation plus population growth. There appears to be a stronger relationship between GSP and
personal income. A statistical modeling of the relationships indicated a stronger correlation
between GSP and personal income than with the existing TABOR growth factors.
Figure 2-6
Colorado Economic Growth and Economic Indicators
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Use of the percentage change in personal income would generally allow a higher revenue
limit than the existing TABOR growth factors of inflation and population growth. Since 1976,
personal income growth exceeded the inflation rate plus population growth in all but seven years.
Most of these occasions were during periods of a national or state recession.
If personal income is used as the revenue limit effective in FY 2004-05, the TABOR
surplus would be $3 15 million less than under current law from FY 2004-05 through FY 2007-08.
If the first effective period of the alternative limit is FY 2005-06, the TABOR surplus through FY
2007-08 would be $48 1 million less. Personal income growth in 2003 is projected to be less than
the sum of inflation plus population growth. The 2003 economic indicators are used for
determination of the FY 2004-05 limit.
Chapter 2: Revenue and Spending Limits
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Several states use a moving average of an economic indicator on the premise that wide
swings in limits would be eliminated. Thus, a state government would be able to plan more
efficiently.
We analyzed what would have happened in Colorado if a three-year moving average of
inflation plus population growth had been in effect at the start of TABOR. Figure 2-7 compares
the actual limits used and a three-year moving average of the limit factors.
Figure 2-7
Comparison of TABOR Limit Factors and a Three-Year Moving
Average of Inflation and Population Growth

01-02* 1
4.0% 1
4.5%
I
* Both limits use the inflation factor only for 2000. The General Assembly provided

that the population factor would be used as necessary when TABOR surpluses resume.

Figure 2-8 shows what would have happened to the limit if the moving average concept
had been used since TABOR'S inception. From FY 1993-94 through FY 1995-96, the state would
have incurred small surpluses with the use of a moving average for the limit. Colorado did not
have TABOR surpluses during this time period. The results for FY 1996-97, the first year of
actual TABOR surpluses, would not have been significantly different. However, from FY 199798 through FY 2000-01, the surpluses would have been smaller by a combined total of $448
million.
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Figure 2-8
Comparison of Current Limit and Three-Year Moving
Average of Inflation and Population Growth

FY 93-94 FY 94-95 FY 95-96 FY 96-97 FY 97-98 FY 98-99 FY 99-00 FY 00-01 FY 01-02

- - - -Current law limit

T h r e e - y e a r moving average of limit

The implications of smaller surpluses are mixed. While the TABOR surplus would have
been less, the money would have been available as a cushion against the eventual downturn in
revenue only if it had not been spent on capital or highway projects. However, when the revenue
downturn did occur in FY 2001-02, the amount of money that would have been refimded that year
would have been smaller. This would have been a critical issue in the environment of House Bill
98-1414 where the TABOR surplus was booked as a liability in the following year. The state had
a surplus liability of $927 million at the same time that available General Fund revenue was
declining by $981 million. Thus, with smaller TABOR surpluses, the level of budget cuts in FY
2001-02 and FY 2002-03 would have been lower.
We also applied a three-year moving average of inflation and population growth to our
June 2003 revenue forecast. We assumed that the change in the limit would first be effective in
FY 2004-05. Figure 2-9 shows these results. The TABOR surplus would be smaller from FY
2004-05 through FY 2006-07 and slightly larger in FY 2007-08. During the four-year period, the
TABOR surplus would be $154 million lower. The surpluses are lower because the moving
average would incorporate relatively high inflation and population growth rates in 2001. Both
inflation and population growth eased after 2001. Thus, if the change in the limit is effective in
FY 2005-06, increased TABOR surpluses of $327 million over three years would result.
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Figure 2-9
Comparison of Current Limit and Three-Year Moving Average of Inflation and
Population Growth, FY 2004-05 to FY 2007-08
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While it is readily apparent that the additional money could be used to increase General
Fund appropriations in FY 2004-05 and later, there are some hidden costs. The increased base in
appropriations in FY 2004-05 would lead to higher levels of appropriations in future years.
Because the budget is so tight, Senate Bill 97-1 diversions to the HUTF and the transfers of any
excess reserve to the HUTF and the Capital Construction Fund would be reduced. Additionally,
the partial payback of borrowed cash funds would not occur in FY 2007-08.

The Issue: Should TABOR'S limit of inflation plus population growth for the state be
changed?
Options: The General Assembly could refir a measurefor voter approval that
amends TABOR to use the annual percentage change in personal income as the growth
limit on state revenue. It could consider using a multi-year moving average of
personal income growth to smooth out the economic cycle and the impact on the state
budget. As a second alternative, a moving average ofthe current limitfactors of
inflation and population growth could be refirredfor voter approval. The General
Assembly could consider spec$c usesfor the additionalfunds that would become
available, including the establishment o f a rainy day fund.
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Issues for consideration. Use of the percentage change in personal income as a measure
for allowable growth better mirrors changes in the state economy. Personal income implicitly
includes a factor for productivity growth. Excluding a productivity factor from allowable growth
in government revenue may not permit the state to adapt to technological changes or to reward its
workers for their increased productivity.
However, some maintain that allowable growth in government spending should not need
to account for increased productivity. The current limit forces government to be more efficient
and selective in the services that it offers to its citizens.

Enterprises
This section defines enterprise status under TABOR, lists current state enterprise
programs, and describes the impact on the General Fund when a program's enterprise status
changes. Enterprise status can create additional budget flexibility for the particular program as
well as the General Fund budget.

What is an enterprise? An enterprise is a self-supporting, government-owned business
that receives revenue in return for the provision of a good or service and has the authority to issue
its own revenue bonds. An enterprise may receive up to ten percent of its annual revenue from
government sources. Other than that, an enterprise must be financially independent of any
government." It must be able to support itself much like a private business, with units of a good
or service produced in exchange for a fee. The General Assembly must designate a particular
function as an enterprise.
State enterprises. The state has designated several functions as enterprises. In
FY 2002-03, these enterprises generated nearly $1.9 billion of TABOR-exempt revenue. Higher
education auxiliary facilities, the state lottery, the higher education student loan program,
correctional industries, and the state nursing home system were designated as enterprises at the
initiation of TABOR. Following the passage of TABOR, the State Fair Authority, the Student
Obligation Bond Authority, and the Division of Wildlife were granted enterprise status as long as
they continued to qualify as such. The Colorado Tolling Enterprise was created as an enterprise in
2002.
How a change in enterprise status affects the General Fund When a program whose
revenue source is new to state government becomes an enterprise, there is no impact on the size of
the TABOR surplus or the financial condition of the General Fund. Examples include the Student
Obligation Bond Authority and the Colorado Tolling Enterprise.

11. According to a March 11, 1997, opinion from then Attorney General Gale Norton, enterprises may receive a direct
appropriation from the General Assembly as long as the appropriated revenues result from the provision of related goods
and services on a fee-per-unit basis.
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There is an impact on the General Fund when a program whose revenue was previously
counted as state TABOR revenue becomes an enterprise or when a state enterprise loses its
enterprise status. Examples include the State Fair Authority and the Division of Wildlife.
TABOR requires that the "qualification or disqualification as an enterprise shall change district
bases and future year limits." Thus, the state's TABOR base must be adjusted when a program's
enterprise status changes. When a program becomes an enterprise, its revenue is no longer
counted as TABOR revenue and the TABOR limit is likewise reduced. It may seem, then, that
there should be no impact on the size of the TABOR refund and the condition of the General
Fund. That is only true if the exempted revenue source increases each year at the same rate as the
state's spending limit.
The General Fund is affected by a change in enterprise status because TABOR places a
limit on all revenue without limiting growth in any individual revenue source. To the extent that
an organization's revenue increases at a slower or faster rate than inflation plus population growth,
that revenue source either contributes to a larger or smaller TABOR surplus. Thus, when it is no
longer included as part of the TABOR base, the surplus will change accordingly. Because the
General Assembly has elected to refimd the surplus out of the General Fund, there will be a
corresponding change in the amount of money available to pay for General Fund obligations.
Figure 2-10 summarizes how a change in enterprise status will affect the state budget.
Figure 2-10
The Impact on the State Budget of a Change in a State Program's Enterprise Status

I

Slower than the
allowable TABOR rate

J TABOR surplus increases.
J GF revenue available to pay for
GF obligations decreases.

J TABOR surplus decreases.
J GF revenue available to pay for
GF obligations increases.

Fasterthan the
allowable TABOR rate

J TABOR surplus decreases.
J GF revenue available to pay for
GF obligations Increases.

J TABOR surplus increases.
J GF revenue available to pay for

GF obligations decreases.

Cash Funds, the General Fund, and TABOR
This section explores two ramifications of TABOR concerning cash hnds. First,
TABOR'Spassage, along with the General Assembly's decision to refimd the TABOR surplus out
of the General Fund, created a new relationship between cash fimds and the condition of the
General Fund. Second, TABOR introduced the potential for more volatility in cash fimd revenue
growth and fee levels statewide -a potential that was realized during the last decade.
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Cashfunds. Cash funds receive revenue from a specific source that is dedicated for a
specific purpose. While some cash funds receive tax revenue, most receive the bulk of their
revenue in fees paid in exchange for a good or service. In FY 2002-03, approximately 250 cash
funds received a total of $2.3 billion in TABOR revenue. Most cash funds receive small amounts
of revenue. The three largest cash funds - the Highway Users Tax Fund, the Unemployment
Insurance Trust Fund, and Higher ~ducatio*cash funds -collectively received 73.3 percent of
cash fund revenue subject to TABOR in FY 2002-03.
Cashfunds and the General Fund TABOR limits growth in the sum of General Fund
revenue and cash fund revenue. During years in which a TABOR surplus exists, a cash fund
contributes to the TABOR surplus to the extent that, over time, its revenue increases faster than
the allowable TABOR growth rate. Because the General Assembly has chosen to refund the
surplus out of the General Fund, cash fund revenue growth that is greater than the TABOR limit
reduces the amount of money available in the General Fund to pay for General Fund obligations.
Likewise, when cash fund revenue increases at a rate slower than the allowable TABOR growth
rate, it reduces the TABOR surplus and increases the amount available in the General Fund.
Example: unemployment insurance. For example, consider how fluctuations in
unemployment insurance (UI) tax revenues can affect the General Fund. Based on guidelines in
federal law, UI taxes are designed to fluctuate in the opposite direction of the economy.12 Rates
rise and fall depending upon the amount of benefits paid to an employer's former employees and
the level of the UI trust fund balance. In addition, a solvency tax is levied when the UI Trust Fund
balance at the end of the fiscal year falls below 0.9 percent of total private wages in the previous
calendar year. Because of these mechanisms, UI tax revenues are countercyclical and can be
volatile.
Figure 2-1 1 shows the actual and projected growth of UI revenues between FY 1995-96
through FY 2,007-08. It also shows the extent to which UI revenues have affected the TABOR
surplus since FY 1996-97 and is expected to affect the surplus through FY 2007-08. Slow growth
in UI revenues reduced the size of the TABOR surplus during the boom years between FY. 199697 and FY 2000-01 by a total of $62.1 million. Because the recent Colorado recession has
depleted the UI reserve, higher tax rates are required to restore solvency to the UI Fund.
Additionally, tax rates for individual employers are increasing because their benefit payments to
their laid-off employees increased. Between FY 2004-05 and FY 2006-07, however, UI revenue
will increase the TABOR surplus by a total of $227.6 million, nearly one-fourth of the surplus
during that period. The increased surplus could hinder the ability of the General Assembly to
fund other programs.

12. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act provides guidelines for the structure of state UI taxes. If a state program meets these
requirements, employers can dcduct taxes paid to state UI programs from their federal UI taxes up to 90 percent of the total
UI taxes due to the federal government.
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Figure 2-11
Unemployment Insurance Revenue's
Contribution to the TABOR Surplus and UI Tax Revenue Growth
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The Issue: The state has a federal mandate to maintain a UI tax structure that is
volatile and countercyclical to the economy. This reduces the TABOR surplus during
economic expansions and substantially increases the surplus following recessionary
periods. As a result, General Fund revenue availablefor spending is increased during
years when revenue is plentiful and substantially reduced during years when it is not.

Option: The General Assembly could refer a proposal for voter approval to exclude
UI taxes@om the TABOR base.

Issues for consideration. The UI tax is a federally mandated tax that reduces available
revenues in the General Fund during years in which revenues are scarce and boosts them during
years in which revenue is plentiful. TABOR excludes revenue from the federal government.
Taxes the federal government requires the state to collect should be treated in the same manner,
particularly when they exacerbate budget difficulties resulting from revenue shortfalls.

UI taxes are mandatory payments, the same as any other tax. Exempting them from
TABOR will increase government spending and reduce tax refunds. The idea was presented to
voters in 1996 and failed. It was also considered and rejected by the General Assembly during the
2003 legislative session.
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The impact of fee changes on the General Fund. Cash fund fee increases affect the
General Fund for the same reasons that cash fund revenue volatility affects the financial status of
the General Fund. Figure 2-12 illustrates a fee change's effect on the General Fund.
During years in which there is a TABOR surplus, the surplus increases by a dollar for each
dollar in additional revenue resulting from a fee increase. Because the refund is paid for out of the
General Fund, fee increases reduce the amount of money available for spending out of the General
Fund. Likewise, fee reductions increase the amount of money available in the General Fund.
During years in which there is no TABOR surplus, a fee change's impact on the General
Fund is more indirect and takes longer to materialize. Because the TABOR limit ratchets down to
actual revenue during years in which there is no TABOR surplus, a fee change directly increases
or decreases the TABOR limit. A fee increase will raise the TABOR limit in the current year and
each year thereafter. Thus, when stronger growth in TABOR revenue resumes, the state will
retain more revenue under the TABOR limit in future years. The opposite is true for decreases in
fee revenue.
Figure 2-12
The Impact on the State Budget of a Fee Change
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Fee Increase
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Fee Decrease

J TABOR surplus increases.
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J The TABOR limit increases and

future surpluses
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J TABOR limit decreases and
future surpluses will be higher.

TABOR andfee volatiliv. TABOR has introduced the potential for more volatility in
cash fund revenue growth and fee levels statewide - a potential that has been realized during the
last decade. Reasons for increasing or decreasing fee revenue have traditionally been either to
provide funding for a new service, eliminate funding for an obsolete service, or increase revenue
in times of budget shortfalls. TABOR added additional reasons to alter fees. Since TABOR
allows the legislature to increase fees without voter approval, and because of the way changes in
fee revenue impact the General Fund, TABOR provides a new incentive to decrease fee revenue
or minimize fee increases during prosperous times and adds to the incentive to increase fee
revenue during times of economic hardship.
In the years following the passage of TABOR, the General Assembly took steps to reduce
the growth rate of cash fund revenue in order to reduce potential TABOR surpluses. For example,
after the first TABOR refund occurred in FY 1996-97, the General Assemjly passed Senate Bill
98-194. This bill requires that fees in nearly every part of state government be reduced until the
excess uncommitted reserves of the particular cash fund fall below a certain level. Higher
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education provides another example. In FY 1995-96, the General Assembly assumed greater
oversight of tuition rates from the Colorado Commission on Higher Education. This was done to
curb growth in cash fund revenue under TABOR.
To cope with revenue shortfalls, 42 bills that either create, increase, or extend fees were
enacted during the 2003 legislative session. Collectively, these bills will increase cash Cund
revenue subject to TABOR by an estimated $69.4 million in FY 2003-04. Many were enacted
specifically to reduce the budget shortfall, thus causing many government services to be funded by
fees rather than the General Fund. For example, Senate Bill 03-1 86 increases fees collected by the
Judicial Department to offset a reduction in the department's General Fund appropriation. Some
fees were also imposed to increase the amount of money the state can draw from the federal
government. For example, Senate Bill 03-266 imposes a new daily fee per patient on certain
nursing home facilities. Revenues from the fee will be used to reduce General Fund
appropriations to the facilities, serve as a match for federal Medicaid funds, and pay Medicaid
services.

Fee volatility, the General Fund, and TABOR. This additional volatility in cash fund
revenue increases the hidden volatility discussed above in General Fund revenues available to
fund General Fund obligations. Without the fee increases, many programs would have lost their
funding this fiscal year. Once General Fund revenue becomes more plentiful in future years,
however, the higher fees will cause the TABOR surplus to be larger than it otherwise would be. It
would seem that the General Assembly could then choose to eliminate or reduce the fee increases
and then resume funding of programs with General Fund revenue. However, there is a great
demand for funding other services with the General Fund. As discussed in Chapter 1,the six
largest departments in Colorado's state government received 93 percent of total General Fund
expenditures in FY 2003-04. Caseloads for these departments are expected to continue rising. If
the General Assembly chooses to fund caseload growth in these departments, there may not be
room within the 6 percent appropriations limit to fund previously cash funded programs without
making budgetary cuts elsewhere.
Could cashfunds help pay for the TABOR refund? Cash fund revenue contributes to the
TABOR surplus but the General Assembly has chosen to refund the surplus only with General
Fund revenue. The legislative declaration in House Bill 99-1001, which created the sales tax
refund, states that, although the surplus is derived from a wide variety of state taxes and fees, it is
not feasible to refund the surplus to the individuals that actually paid the money to the state
because it would be impossible to identify them. In addition, it would be administratively
prohibitive to refund the surplus in a manner proportionate to the contribution of each revenue
source to the surplus.
Refunding a portion of the TABOR surplus from cash funds is problematic because cash
fund revenue is not general purpose revenue. Most cash furrd revenue comes from fees paid in
exchange for a particular good or service. Because most fees are set at a level designed to cover
the costs of providing the good or service, using fee revenue to refund the TABOR surplus would
deny many of these programs their primary source of operating revenue. For example, there is no
constitutional or federal prohibition on using higher education revenues, which represented 3 1
percent of all cash fund revenue subject to TABOR in FY 2002-03, to refund the TABOR surplus.
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However, using a portion of higher education tuition to refund the TABOR surplus would make it
difficult to fund the state's higher education institutions. Unlike higher education, most fee-based
programs are small. Without their fee revenue, many fee-based programs would be unable to
provide the services that those who paid the fee would expect to receive.
Transportation-related revenues represented 36 percent of all cash fund revenue subject to
TABOR in FY 2002-03. Once collected, transportation-related revenues are required by Article
X, Section 18 of the state constitution to be used exclusively for the "construction, maintenance,
and supervision of the public highways of this state." However, a refund method could be created
by reducing the tax rate on gasoline or the level of transportation-related fees. This refund method
would not violate the state constitution because the revenue would never be collected. This is
similar to the refund method adopted in House Bill 00-1227, which lowered annual state
registration fees for motor vehicles during years in which a TABOR surplus exists. That method,
however, includes a backfill from the General Fund to the Highway Users Tax Fund.
Federal law precludes using unemployment insurance revenues to help refund the TABOR
surplus. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act disallows the use of unemployment insurance
revenues for anything other than unemployment insurance benefits, lest the state forfeit a large tax
credit on business's federal unemployment insurance taxes. Unemployment insurance revenues
represented 10 percent of all cash fund revenue subject to TABOR in FY 2002-03.
The General Assembly already has some degree of control on cash funds to limit any
contribution to the TABOR surplus. In most cases, fee increases have been limited to the inflation
rate or the amount required to cover the costs of specific goods or services. Additionally, under
Senate Bill 98-194, fees have been reduced if the uncommitted reserves of a cash fund exceed a
particular level. The General Assembly could choose to apply a cash fund's uncommitted reserves
over and above the allowable level toward the TABOR refund. The uncommitted reserves of all
cash funds totaled $21.7 million in FY 2000-01, the last year a TABOR surplus occurred.

The Six Percent Limit on General Fund Appropriations

.
,

-

This section analyzes the limit on General Fund appropriations. While TABOR limits
most revenue, General Fund appropriations are a smaller part of the overall budget and are limited
to a 6 percent maximum annual increase. TABOR is a constitutional limit, while the
appropriations limit is a statutory limit passed in 1991. The appropriations limit is commonly
referred to as the 6 percent limit or the Arveschoug/Bird limit after its two sponsors. A provision
in TABOR effectively prevents the appropriations limit from being weakened without voter
approval.
Some General Fund appropriations are excepted from the 6 percent limit. There are two
common examples of the exceptions. The first example is appropriations for new programs or
increased service levels required by federal law or final state or federal court order. The second
example is appropriations for Medicaid overexpenditures. Other exceptions include
appropriations for property tax reappraisals, from voter-approved tax or fie increases, and for a
state fiscal emergency. The amount of the exceptions varies from year to year. For example, in
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FY 2001-02. The exceptions are typically added for purposes of calculating the allowable
appropriations in the following year. For example, if General Fund appropriations under the
6 percent limit were $5 billion and exceptions were an additional $100 million, the allowable
appropriations in the following year would be 6 percent higher than $5.1 billion. Thus, the
exceptions to the limit have increased allowable General Fund appropriations. As Figure 2- 13
shows, the actual increases in General Fund appropriations over the past 1 1 years are typically
greater than 6 percent. The revenue downturn of the past two years forced appropriations below
the 6 percent level.
Figure 2-13
General Fund Appropriations Increases

Fiscal Year

The 6 percent limit has operated more as a floor for appropriations rather than the intended
ceiling. By appropriating less than 6 percent, it was considered a ratcheting down of the limit.
Although appropriations increased by 5.66 percent in FY 2001 -02, the increase would have been
even smaller if the General Assembly had not reclassified other expenditures that are exempt from
the limit to an appropriation subject to the limit. Thus, the appropriations base was increased.
The ultimate result was to increase the level of reductions below the traditional 6 percent limit
that needed to be made after FY 2001 -02.
Based on our June 2003 forecast, General Fund appropriations can increase by the full 6
percent in only FY 2006-07 and FY 2007-08. There is little or no money in the excess General
Fund reserve for additional program funding of highways and capital construction because of
relatively weak growth in General Fund revenue and substantial TABOR refund liabilities
generated by stronger growth in cash fund revenue.
?

While the current appropriations limit of 6 percent can be increased only by voter
approval, an increase in the limit could have implications for other parts of the state's budget. An
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increase in the limit could result in reduced diversions of sales and use tax revenue to the
Highway Users Tax Fund (HUTF) and would result in reduced transfers of excess General Fund
reserve monies to the HUTF and the Capital Construction Fund. Additionally, increasing the 6
percent limit on General Fund appropriations would potentially conflict with the establishment of
a rainy day fund.
While the TABOR and appropriations limits generally operate independently of each
other, they do influence each other. For example, the TABOR limit applies to General Fund
revenue and selected cash fund revenue. When cash fund revenue grows faster than General Fund
revenue and a TABOR surplus exists, the state may not be able to increase General Fund
appropriations by the maximum 6 percent. This occurs because the state has elected to r e f h d any
surplus TABOR revenue from the General Fund. Based on the our June 2003 forecast, the lessthan-maximum appropriations increases will occur in FY 2004-05 and FY 2005-06. Increasing
appropriations by less than 6 percent may be an oversimplification in that other General Fund
expenditures could be reduced or refunds could be made from cash funds, but the point is that
TABOR will restrain the growth of General Fund spending.
The interdependency of the TABOR and 6 percent limits is also illustrated by the fact that
General Fund appropriations could eventually consume all of allowable revenue under TABOR.
Appropriations are currently a smaller amount than allowable TABOR revenue. If appropriations
increase at the 6 percent limit, while the TABOR limit increases 5 percent annually, General Fund
appropriations would take up all of the revenue limit in about 50 years. This estimate assumes the
FY 2007-08 starting points projected in our June 2003 revenue forecast and no additional
appropriations that are exempt from the 6 percent limit. Convergence of the limits would occur
even earlier if the TABOR limit increases by less than 5 percent annually as shown in Figure 2-14.
An earlier convergence would also occur with additional exempt appropriations. For comparison
purposes, the average increase in the allowable TABOR limit from its inception through FY 200001 was 5.9 percent. Our office projects an average limit of 4.4 percent from FY 2004-05 through
FY 2007-08, while the actual sum of the inflation and population factors used for the FY 2003-04
TABOR revenue limit is 3.6 percent.

Figure 2-14
Appropriations and Revenue Limits
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The Issue: Continuing to increase General Fund appropriations by 6percent
or more will consume an increasingportion of allowable TABOR revenue.

Option: The General Assembly could consider changing the limit on General
Fund appropriations. A maximum Iimit for appropriations equal to the TABOR
Iimit of the inflation rate plus the percentage change in state population would
move the two limits in tandem. This option would have to be referred to voters
because it would constitute a weakening of the existing Iimit in some years. In
addition, the General Assembly could repeal by statute the existing exceptions to
the spending Iimit and incorporate the required spending within the limit.

Issues for consideration. If the state does not change the appropriations limit to match
the TABOR limit, it may eventually be forced to drastically reduce the rate of growth or even
have year-over-year reductions in appropriations to balance the budget. The lack of a larger rainy
day fund and planned spending for available revenue over the existing 4 percent reserve fund
compound the problem. These issues will need to be addressed as well. The change would make
the limit more restrictive in some years and less restrictive in others.
Some maintain that the existing 6 percent limit does not keep up with economic growth in
many years. Further, voter mandates for increased funding of K- 12 education create a significant
demand on the existing budget. A reduction of the limit could crowd out other demands and
needs for government-provided services.
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CHAPTER 3

During the recent economic downturn and subsequent state revenue shortfall, state budget
writers had a limited number of options to cope with declining revenues and the constitutional
requirement to balance the budget. This chapter discusses the current mechanisms that are
available to use during revenue shortfalls, the measures the General Assembly and Governor
undertook to balance the budget during the recent economic downturn, and other states' rainy day
funds. It also presents several options with respect to fiscal emergencies and the state's reserve
funds.

Current Mechanisms in Place to Use During Revenue Shortfalls
Other than reducing government spending, transferring money into the General Fund
from other funds, and enacting General Fund revenue enhancements, the state has a limited
number of options available to meet the constitutional requirement of a balanced budget during a
revenue shortfall. Colorado does not have a budget stabilization fund, or "rainy-day fund," but
by law it does maintain a General Fund reserve equal to 4 percent of appropriations. This reserve
provides additional money to meet state obligations during the fiscal year. During a revenue
shortfall, state law requires the Governor to reduce expenditures by any lawhl means. During
the recent revenue shortfall, the Governor was given authority to transfer money into the General
Fund from other funds and spend reserve money if necessary. Further, TABOR affects the state's
ability to cope with revenue shortfalls. While the state also maintains an emergency reserve, it
cannot be used to offset revenue shortfalls.

Reserve Funds
This section describes the use of the statutory reserve, the creation of a cash flow
emergency reserve, and the TABOR emergency reserve.

Use of the statutory reserve during revenue shortfalls. Section 24-75-201.1 (1) (d) (111),
C.R.S., requires 4 percent of General Fund fiscal year appropriations to be set aside in case
revenue is insufficient to meet the state's General Fund obligations. This statutory reserve must
be replenished to the 4 percent level each year as part of the budget process. For example, when
General Fund revenue is not sufficient to appropriate up to the maximum level and maintain a
4 percent reserve, appropriations are reduced so that a reserve level of 4 percent is maintained. In
FYs 2001-02 and 2002-03, the General Assembly either eliminated or reduced the required
amount of the General Fund reserve to free up money for appropriations. However, money from
the statutory reserve provided only a fraction of the amount that was needed to cover state
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expenditures. The legislature passed many other budget reduction measures and found additional
revenue sources to balance the budget. The statutory reserve was also reduced below 4 percent
during the early 1990s.

Cashflow emergency reserve. In addition to its reserve levels, the state must also be
concerned with its cash flow position. Although the state may have a balanced budget from an
accounting standpoint, the uneven flow of expenditures and revenues can cause the state to run
out of cash for a period of time during the fiscal year. To help prevent this problem, the
legislature passed two bills during the 2003 session. Senate Bill 03-342 authorized the state to
sell one or more of its facilities to raise up to $160 million for the Controlled Maintenance Trust
Fund for designation as cash flow reserves. Senate Bill 03-268 authorized the sale of up to
60 percent of the state's rights to future tobacco settlement payments in order to raise $260
million. The first $100 million would be earmarked to meet the constitutional reserve
requirement and the remaining $160 million would be available to address cash flow
emergencies. The bill also transferred $40 million from the General Fund to the Tobacco
Litigation Settlement Cash Fund, making up to $200 million available for cash flow emergencies.
TABOR emergency reserve. TABOR requires that at least 3 percent of state fiscal year
spending, excluding bonded debt service, be kept in an emergency reserve. The TABOR
emergency reserve cannot be used to offset revenue shortfalls; it can only be utilized to pay for
non-fiscal emergencies, such as natural disasters. The reserve is currently in several h d s and
includes nonfinancial assets.
While ensuring that moneys are available for emergencies, TABOR creates a significant
disincentive to spending emergency reserves. Once emergency reserve moneys are spent, the
required replenishment constitutes a reserve increase that counts as "fiscal year spending." Since
the replenishment of the emergency reserve must fit within a government's fiscal year spending
limit, money available for other government services and programs would likely be reduced.

Authority of the Governor During Revenue Shortfalls
This section explains the requirements placed on the Governor during revenue downturns
and the options available to the Governor to meet these requirements.

Requirement to reduce General Fund expenditures. When the revenue estimate from
the Governor's Office of State Planning and Budgeting for the fiscal year indicates that General
Fund expenditures will result in the use of one-half or more of the required General Fund reserve,
the Governor must reduce General Fund expenditures so that the reserve will be at least one-half
of the required amount. The Governor is required to use the procedures set forth in Section 24-2102 (4), C.R.S., Section 24-50-109.5, C.R.S., or any other lawful means to reduce expenditures.
The Governor must notify the legislature of the plan to accomplish the reductions. The Governor
may also consider recommendations for reducing General Fund expenditures at institutions of
higher education submitted by the Colorado Commission on Higher Education, after consultation
with their governing boards (Section 24-75-201.5 (2), C.R.S.).
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Section 24-2-1 02 (4), C.R.S, grants the Governor authority to issue an executive order to
suspend or discontinue the functions or services of any department, board, bureau, or agency of
the state government for up to three months when there are not sufficient revenues available to
carry on the functions of the state government. The Governor may extend the executive order if
necessary. During the recent revenue shortfall, Governor Owens issued several executive orders
requiring state agencies to suspend or discontinue functions and services in order to reduce
expenditures.
Section 24-50-1 09.5, C.R.S., requires the Governor to reduce state personnel expenditures
in the event of a fiscal emergency, defined as a significant General Fund revenue shortfall or
significant reductions in cash or federal funds received by the state, which threatens the orderly
operation of state government and the health, safety, or welfare of the citizens of the state. The
fiscal emergency must be declared by joint resolution adopted by the General Assembly and
approved by the Governor.

Actions that may be undertaken to reduce state personnel expenditures include
separations, voluntary and mandatory furloughs, suspension of salary and fringe benefit survey
increases, suspension of performance awards or merit increases, job-sharing, hiring freezes, or
forced reallocation of vacant positions. The head of each department and the governing board of
each institution of higher education are required to order measures in accordance with the actions
taken by the Governor to reduce the personnel expenditures of their departments.
Authority to spend reserve and transferfunds. In addition to the Governor's authority to
reduce expenditures during revenue shortfalls, the Governor is authorized to spend a portion of
the reserve. On occasion, the Governor has also been allowed to transfer money from certain
cash funds to the General Fund and make further use of the reserve. Further, if the Governor
reduces General Fund expenditures by 1 percent or more for the fiscal year, the Governor may
transfer moneys from the Capital Construction Fund into the General Fund.

TABOR and Revenue Shortfalls
Under TABOR, voter approval is required to raise taxes to deal with budgetary shortfalls.
However, this option does not provide an immediate mechanism to handle revenue shortfalls
because proposals to increase taxes can only be voted on in November of each year and,
therefore, additional revenue would not be available until after the election. Again, the TABOR
emergency reserve cannot be used to offset revenue shortfalls; it can only be used to pay for nonfiscal emergencies, such as natural disasters.
Emergency taxes. While TABOR permits governments to impose emergency taxes for
non-fiscal emergencies without prior voter approval, this authority is severely limited.
Emergency taxes can only be imposed after the emergency reserve is depleted. Also, emergency
property taxes are specifically prohibited. Finally, separate two-thirds majority votes of the
appropriate governing body are necessary to declare an emergency and to impose an emergency
tax.
I
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An emergency tax can only be imposed until the next election occurring more than 60
days after the emergency declaration, and the tax will lapse unless ratified by the voters.
Emergency taxes are not included in fiscal year spending for purposes of calculating the
government's spending limit. Finally, any emergency tax revenues not expended on the
emergency must be refunded within 180 days after the end of the emergency.

Budget Reduction Measures and Revenue Enhancements During the Recent
Revenue Shortfall
In response to the recent revenue shortfall, the legislature passed measures that either
transferred moneys to the General Fund, increased General Fund revenues, reduced General Fund
expenditures, or increased fees to meet the balanced budget requirement.

Cashfund transfers. For FY 2002-03, the General Assembly adopted numerous bills
that transferred a net $206.2 million from cash funds to the General Fund. By comparison, the
FY 200 1-02 net cash fund transfers to the General Fund exceeded $1 billion. Some of these
transfers require that the funds be paid back whenever there is a sufficient amount of General
Fund revenue available. In FY 2003-04, a net amount of $42 million will be transferred back to
cash funds from the General Fund. The Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund and the Major
Medical Insurance Fund are the beneficiaries of these transfers. In sum, the transfers have
significantly depleted state cash funds, thus precluding the transfer of money to the General Fund
as an ongoing option. Further, since the transfers provide only a one-time solution to budget
shortfalls, future budgets will be impacted as allowable revenues will not be sufficient to
maintain the level of appropriations that these transfers permitted.
Measures impacting General Fund expenditures and revenue. Most of the legislation
that reduced General Fund expenditures reduced appropriations by cutting programs and
services, delaying scheduled reimbursements to certain state funds, or moving expenditures into
future years. For example, Senate Bill 03-197 shifted the General Fund portion of the payroll for
state employees for the month of June, 2003, from June 30 to July 1. This shift resulted in 11
payroll periods during FY 2002-03, rather than the normal 12. Other measures had a positive
revenue impact on the General Fund. Senate Bill 03-185 created a 30-day tax amnesty program
to allow state taxpayers who owe back taxes an opportunity to pay off their tax liability in full
without penalties. Another bill, House Bill 03-1282, reduces the interest rate that the state pays
on tax refunds. Other measures were enacted to use fees to pay for programs and services that
were previously funded with General Fund moneys. For example, Senate Bill 03-272 allowed
the Department of Revenue to raise fees to pay for the cost of manufacturing license plates.

State Rainy Day Funds
Budget stabilization funds, or rainy day funds (RDFs), are widely used by states. In fact,
45 states have RDFs that are intended to save money when annual revenues are increasing and to
provide money for revenue shortfalls in order to avoid reducing core government services or
increasing taxes. Many states adopted their RDFs after the early 1980s recessions. Colorado's
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4 percent reserve, however, is generally not considered to function as a rainy day fund because of
its size and the requirement that it be refilled each year.
According to the National Association of State Budget Officers, 22 states used some
amount of their RDF as a strategy to deal with their FY 2002-03 budget shortfalls. Further,
according to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, 16 states addressed one-third or more of
their FY 2001 -02 deficit with RDF withdrawals. For example, Massachusetts used about
$1.4 billion from its RDF to help address a $2.3 billion deficit, while Maine withdrew $1 10
million from its RDF to help address a $1 50 million deficit.

Deposits to RDFs. According to data compiled by the National Conference of State
Legislatures (NCSL), deposits to RDFs are usually based on year-end surpluses, are made by
appropriations, or are a combination of the two. The most common deposit rule is that a portion
of the state's year-end surplus be placed in the RDF. For example, Florida and Massachusetts
require surplus revenue to be placed into their RDF. In these states, surpluses may be refunded
to taxpayers when their RDFs reach a certain amount. Seven states require deposits into RDFs
when revenue or economic growth exceeds certain levels. For example, Idaho contributes to its
RDF when revenues are projected to grow by more than 4 percent. Only a small number of states
require annual contributions to their RDFs regardless of the state's financial situation.
Withdrawal of moneyfrom RDFs. Most states limit the withdrawal of money from
their RDFs to cover revenue shortfalls or other budget deficiencies. A small number of states do
not place any limit on how the money in their RDF can be spent. In eight states, withdrawals
from RDFs can only occur with a supermajority vote of the legislature. A few states require a
supermajority vote when the RDF is to be used for purposes other than a revenue shortfall.
Thirteen states limit the amount that can be used per occurrence. For example, Virginia can use
its RDF for no more than one-half of a budget shortfall and can use no more than one-half of the
fund annually. The limit on the maximum withdrawal from Michigan's RDF is dependent on the
size of its budget shortfall.
Replenishment of RDFs. Six states require that withdrawals from RDFs be replenished
over a specified time period. For example, Alabama's RDF must be repaid within five years and
Rhode Island's RDF must be repaid within two years, although the legislature may set a longer
repayment period.
Studies on RDFs. Studies on RDFs have generally found that the structure of the RDF
- specifically the deposit and withdrawal rules - is an important factor in determining a state's

ability to save.13 State RDF laws that require money to be deposited into a fund and provide
strict rules on the withdrawal of money to ensure that the RDF will only be used when necessary

13.

Sobel, R.S. and R.G. Holcombe, 1996. "The Impact of State Rainy Day Funds in Easing State Fiscal Crises
During the 1990-91 Recession, "PublicBudgeting & Finance, 28-48; Wagner, G.A., 2002. "Are State Budget
Stabilization Funds Only the Illusion of Savings? Evidence fiom Stationary Panel Data," Quarterly Review of
Economics & Finance 43, Summer 2003,213-238;and Wagner, G.A. and J.M. Gropp, 2002."The Municipal
Bond Market and Fiscal Institutions: Have Budget Stabilization Funds Reduced State Borrowing Costs?",
Unpublished manuscript, Duquesne University.
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are considered to be effective in ensuring savings. An example of such an RDF is one that
requires a certain amount of revenue to be deposited when revenues are growing and that
requires a supermajority to withdraw funds.

Size offunds. Thirty-five states have caps on the size of their RDFs; ten states have no
caps. Nine states have caps at or above 10 percent of their budgets, eight states have caps
between 5 and 10 percent, and 18 states have caps of 5 percent of their budget or less. However,
money in state RDFs typically has not reached the legal cap, especially due to the use of such
funds during the recent national economic downturn.
Recommended levels of RDFs. NCSL and most bond-rating agencies recommend an
RDF equal to 5 percent of expenditures, while Wall Street analysts recommend that states
maintain RDFs equal to 3 to 5 percent of their General Fund budgets. However, some
economists contend that these figures should be used only to cany states through normal
economic contingencies, such as an error in forecasting or extra expenditures. Other
recommendations were higher than 5 percent. The Government Finance Officers Association
recommends that governments maintain an unreserved fund balance in their General Fund of no
less than 5 to 15 percent of their regular General Fund operating revenues, or no less than 8 to
16 percent of regular General Fund operating expenditures. The Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities recommends that RDF balances be 10 to 15 percent of budgets, while a recent
academic study also recommended an RDF balance in the 10 to 15 percent range.14
Colorado and the recommended level of an RDF. Colorado's circumstances generally
point to the need for a larger-than-average level of reserves. First, Colorado receives a large
share of its revenue from income taxes. These taxes tend to be volatile over the economic cycle
as business profits and capital gains fluctuate. This was evident during the recent economic
downturn. Second, while Colorado has expanded its economic base from a dependence on
natural resources and construction that accompanied the oil boom of the late 1970s and early
1980s to a much more diverse economy, the state still tends to see its growth come from specific
industries. During the last expansion, the state experienced tremendous growth in the advanced
technology, communications, and financial sectors. However, these sectors also proved to be the
hardest hit when the economy turned down. Therefore, the state saw great gains in revenue
during the 1990s and then large declines when the recession hit. These volatile factors would
indicate that Colorado needs a larger reserve than many other states to smooth out the revenue
changes that occur throughout the business cycle.

Issues and O~tions
The state's current budget problems have many people considering an RDF in Colorado.
The concern is that the statutory reserve is not large enough to protect the budget during an
economic downturn and is also required to serve other purposes. In addition, the state's

14. Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, "Heavy Weather: Are State Rainy Day Funds Workingy, May 13, 2003, and
Wagner, G.A. "Fiscal Stress and State Rainy Day Funds: Are They the Answer for Brighter Days Ahead?" Duquesne
University, 2002.
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emergency reserve is overly strict in its usage and payback requirements, rendering it practically
pointless. The existing statutory reserve is better suited for normal economic contingencies
during the fiscal year, such as slight forecasting errors and unanticipated expenditures such as
lawsuits and federal mandates. A new reserve, with a separate set of rules regarding its funding
and the use of its funds, can provide the money to maintain services during an economic
downturn, when the need for some state services increases. Such a reserve could also help the
state's cash flow position.
However, an RDF would be the third reserve fund for the state; the state already has a
statutory reserve and an emergency reserve. An additional reserve could further tie the
legislature's hands in running the state. Under current TABOR limits, since allowable revenue
can be reduced during bad economic times, an RDF could simply delay cuts in government
programs. While revenue will rebound after the downturn, lower revenue limits could lead to
larger refunds, and the need to cut government programs may still exist despite use of an RDF
during the bad economic times.

he Issue: How can the state fund an RDF?

If Colorado creates an RDF, the following four funding options could be used as a source
of money for the fund. The first two options could be done statutorily, while the last two options
would require voter approval.
r o p t i o n 1: The General Assembly could increase savings by cutting spending

1

Issues for consideration. It was clear during the current economic downturn that
Colorado needs larger reserves. The only way the state can quickly build its reserves without
voter approval is to cut existing spending. However, state laws may have to be changed for
further cuts in spending. In addition, the state has already cut or eliminated many programs and
is funding others with user fees. Further reductions could create a serious burden for citizens in
order to save more money as opposed to recent cuts that were the result of the shortfall.
r o p t i o n 2: The General Assembly could increase savings by placing a portion of
the excess General Fund reserve into the statutory reserve or an RDF before the
money is distributed to the Highway Users Tax Fund and the Capital
Construction Fund.
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Issues for consideration. Prior to the passage of House Bill 03-1238, the state was
required to save the first $25 million of excess General Fund reserve each year in order to create
a pool to pay for a change in the TABOR accounting methodology. The accounting change has
now been made. Therefore, the excess revenue is an existing revenue source that could be used
to fund an RDF. However, this option would mean that an additional reserve would be funded at
the expense of highways and capital construction projects.

1

Option 3: The General Assembly could increase savings by asking voters to
substitute an RDF for the state's constitutional reserve or expand the definition of
(1 emergency to include revenue shortfalls.

]I

Issues for consideration. The state's constitutional reserve can only be used during
certain rare circumstances that do not include fiscal emergencies. The state would be better
served with these revenues available for both emergencies and revenue shortfalls. However, if
the state's constitutional reserve is spent for an economic emergency money may not be available
for non-economic emergencies.

foption 4: The General Assembly could ask the voters to allow the state to retain
( a portion of any surplus revenues tofund an RDF up to a certain level.

1
I

Issues for consideration. This option would allow the voters to decide if they want to
fund an RDF to maintain state services during economic downturns. However, it would reduce
taxpayer refunds.

[[ The Issue:

11

How should money in an RDF be spent?

The following spending options could be used to ensure that money in an RDF or other
reserve account is available for economic downturns. Each of these options could be
accomplished statutorily or in conjunction with a vote of the people. If they are implemented by
statute, they could later be changed or amended by statute as well.

I

1: The General Assembly could limit spendingfiom the statutory reserve
or RDF tofiscal emergencies or when revenue falls below the initially budgeted
amount.

Issues for consideration. By limiting expenditures from reserves to revenue downturns,
this option prevents reserves from being spent during the budget process an! only allows them to
be spent when revenue growth falls below budgeted levels. This option wodd prevent spending
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from getting too high as the economy starts to decline and sustain spending during bad times.
However, without incorporating changes to TABOR, additional reserves would only have
delayed the cuts to state government as the ratchet-down provision of TABOR would have
prevented the state from maintaining previous spending levels regardless of the size of the state's
reserves.

1

foption 2: The General Assembly could require a supermajority vote to allow
(1 the use of any or ull of the reserve or a rainy dayfund.

JJ

Issues for consideration. This option could prevent the savings from being used to
supplement spending rather than being used during times of need. However, it gives a minority
of members of the General Assembly increased power in determining when and how the money
can be spent.

1

foption 3: The General Assembly could limit the amount of savings that may
(( be used during any oneJsca1 year.

]I

Issues for consideration. Most downturns impact spending during more than just one
fiscal year so a portion of the RDF should be maintained for use in subsequent years. The goal of
an RDF is not to maintain full fbnding the first year only to experience drastic cuts during the
next year. This requirement would allow any necessary cuts to be made over the course of
several years rather than all at the same time. But, the General Assembly may not have the
ability to use the money as needed depending on the situation and on what the future looks like.
No limits can be set to perfectly account for the size and timing of every future downturn.
f i h e Issue: Since TABOR defines savings the same as spending, it is d@cult
for the state to set additional money aside in a savings account, especially
during bad economic times.

\

Option: The General Assembly could ask the voters to amend TABOR so that
additional money saved up to a certain level is exemptfiom spending limits at
the time it is saved. The money would only count as spending under TABOR
\\ when it is used.

I!

Issues for consideration. It is clear that during the current economic downturn, the state
needed larger reserves. This proposal would create a funding source for additional savings by
exempting savings from the TABOR spending limit. The option also sets a strict limit on the use
of reserve fbnds by counting the funds under TABOR when they are used. The cap on the
needed level of savings would prevent the state from permanently reducing TABOR refunds to
increase savings. Since the money is counted under TABOR when it is spent, it will not be used
unless revenue has fallen below the spending limit, therefore no expansion of government will
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take place. TABOR would become a spending limit that encourages governments to save
money, not a revenue limit that discourages savings. On the other hand, this option would reduce
taxpayer refimds.
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This chapter provides an overview of Colorado's property tax system and an analysis of
two key constitutional provisions that govern property taxes - Gallagher and TABOR. These
provisions affect all levels of local government, including school districts. This analysis focuses
on school finance property taxes because these moneys have a direct impact on state
expenditures, and because the impact of Gallagher and TABOR on school finance property taxes
is similar to the impact on all property taxes.

Introduction
Property taxes have long provided a source of revenue for public services in Colorado.
Today, property taxes are exclusively a local government revenue source, funding public schools,
counties, cities, towns, and special districts. Property taxes have not been used to fund statelevel functions since 1964. However, property taxes are a subject for debate at the state level
because they are governed by state law, both constitutional and statutory. In addition, the
property tax still represents a significant tax burden - in 2003, Colorado homeowners and
businesses paid roughly $4.4 billion in property taxes, over half of which went to support public
schools. Figure 4-1 shows the distribution of property taxes and the relative importance of this
revenue source to local governments.
Figure 4-1
Where Do Property Taxes Go, and How important Are They to Local Governments?
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Three facts become apparent in reviewing the property tax system. First, Colorado's
constitutional limits have been effective in holding down increases in property taxes. Second,
the requirement to revalue property every two years creates a volatile growth pattern in taxable
property values that results in a situation where property tax collections often do not reach the
limits allowed by law. 'Third, the school finance act, which relies heavily on both property taxes
and state moneys, is experiencing a large and growing need for state aid to schools.
Property taxes are limited by law. Two constitutional provisions limit property taxes in
Colorado. Gallagher sets a statewide cap on the taxable value of homes and other residences;
TABOR restricts the amount that each local government's property taxes may increase each year
and requires voter approval for most tax rate increases. Although property taxes, like property
values, tend to increase over time, the limits have combined to hold down the increase, especially
for homeowners. Figure 4-2 illustrates the change in property taxes for a Denver homeowner
between 1991 and 200 1.
Figure 4-2 Home Values, Taxable Values,
Property Taxes and Personal lncome in Denver
Percent
Change
Average Home Value
Residential Assessment Rate

1

1

Assessed (Taxable) Value
Total Mill Levy

$75,454
-

179%

-

14.34%
$10,820
77.419

Average Property Taxes

$838

Personal Income Per Capita

$24,118

Avg Property Taxes as a
Percent of Personal lncome

3.47%

The biennial reassessment cycle creates a "sawtooth" effect, whereby property taxes
often grow by less than the law allows. Under current law, property in Colorado is reassessed
on a two-year cycle. In odd-numbered reassessment years, values increase to reflect two years'
worth of changes in the market. In the intervening even-numbered years, values increase only to
reflect new construction for that year. Plotted on a graph, the growth in assessed values follows a
"sawtooth" pattern both for taxpayers and tax collectors. The pattern is similar for property tax
revenues, creating more pressure on state aid in non-reassessment years. Figure 4-3 shows the
percentage change in school finance property taxes between FY 1992-93 and FY 2002-03.
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Figure 4-3
Growth in School Finance Property Taxes

*Denotes reassessment years

Although attempts have been made to switch to an annual reassessment cycle, the current
system at least provides more up-to-date values than the four-year cycle that was in place until
1987. At one point, the legislature passed a law to require county assessors to update property
values every year. However, the requirement was delayed for several years and eventually
repealed because of the expense.
Totalfunding for schools is growing faster than property taxes. Colorado's school
finance act is funded primarily through property taxes and state aid. Property taxes have always
been a source of financial support for K- 12 public schools. However, state funding has made up
the larger of the two shares since 1991. The state's involvement in providing funding for K- 12
public schools is grounded in the Colorado Constitution's requirement for a thorough and
uniform system of free public schools. State courts have interpreted this and similar
constitutional provisions'i~~
other states to mean that the state has a responsibility to ensure equity
among school district resources. In Colorado, the level of state funding really only began to be
substantial in 1974 following passage of the 1973 school finance act. Since that time, both the
state share and the total appropriation for school finance have grown such that state funding now
accounts for nearly 60 percent of total school finance expenditures and roughly $2.5 billion in
state General Fund appropriations.

Dramatic growth in state funding has been seen over the last 15 years, and can be
attributed to four significant changes. Two changes occurred when voters approved two
constitutional amendments to the property tax system - Gallagher in 1982 and TABOR in 1992.
A third change occurred when the General Assembly articulated a policy to increase the state's
share to 50 percent under the 1988 school finance act. Finally, the last change was the passage of
Amendment 23, guaranteeing certain increases in funding for schools.
The first three changes were part of a conscious effort to hold d o w the property tax
burden. The trade-off, however, was added pressure on the state to meet the growing costs of
school finance. Compounding this pressure on state expenditures is the requirement of
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Amendment 23 to increase the per pupil funding of schools. Under Colorado's school finance
act, state aid makes up the difference between total funding and the amount available from local
sources. Since funding for schools must increase and the local share is limited, the difference in
funding must be paid from state sources. Figure 4-4 illustrates the basic formula for determining
the state's share of school finance funding. Thus, the trend toward an increasing state share of
school finance is expected to continue.
Figure 4-4
The State Aid Formula Under the School Finance Act
= Total Program Funding - Local Share
State Aid
Under the School Finance Act
(formula-driven
(limited)
and guaranteed)

Fiscal year 2002-03 brought the state's share of school finance act funding to nearly 60
percent. This level of funding represents an increase in state expenditures of about $690 million
in FY 2002-03 over what would have been required if the state share had remained the same as in
1988. By FY 2007-08, the state is expected to be responsible for almost 64 percent of the cost of
K-12 education under the school finance act. Today, each percentage point increase in the state
share costs about $42 million. Figure 4-5 compares the state and local shares for school finance
in 1987, the year before the constitutional amendments began to affect school finance funding,
and in FY 2002-03. As shown in the figure, both the state share and state aid per pupil have
increased, while the local share has declined and property tax revenues per pupil have increased
only slightly.
Figure 4-5
Comparison of State and Local Shares of School Finance Funding

I State Share

1

43.5%

1

59.7%

1

16.2%

1

I Local Share
I Average State Aid per Pupil

1
1

56.5%

40.3%
$3,481

1
1

-16.2%

$1,508

1
1

1
1

$1.962

1

$2,097

I

$135

IAverage Property Taxes per Pupil I

$1,973

I

Note: Specific ownership taxes are included in the FY 2002-03 local share
percentage, but not in the average properly taxes per pupil.

Figure 4-6 illustrates the actual and projected state share of school finance act funding
between 1987 and FY 2007-08.
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Figure 4-6
Property Taxes and Total School Finance Act Funding

@Local Share .State

Share

Determining the Taxable Value of Property - Gaiiagher
This section describes the history of the Gallagher Amendment, the factors that affect the
calculation of the residential assessment rate, and the impact of changes in the residential
assessment rate on taxpayers and local governments.
The Gallagher Amendment waspart of a 1982 property tax reform effort. In response
to concerns over a lack of uniformity in assessing property for tax purposes and the potential for
significant property tax increases based on skyrocketing property values resulting from high
inflation in the mid- 1970s, voters in 1982 approved a property tax reform measure referred by the
legislature. The measure was introduced in the legislature as House Concurrent Resolution 821005, and approved by voters at the November 1982 general election as Amendment 1. Along
with the well-known Gallagher Amendment, the ballot measure included the following:

J
J
J
J
J

provisions to ensure that properties are assessed in a uniform and fair manner and a
requirement that counties reimburse the state for excess state school aid payments
made because of undervalued property;
a fixed assessment rate of 29 percent for most nonresidential (business) property;
a property tax exemption for business inventories such as merchandise, materials,
and supplies that were held for sale or consumption;
a property tax exemption for livestock, agricultural and livestock products, and
agricultural equipment used on a farm or ranch;
a system for valuing agricultural property that existed previously in statute using
earnings as a measure of the land's productivity capacity;
,
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a system for valuing producing mines and oil and gas properties that existed
previously in statute using the value of the unprocessed material and procedures
prescribed by law for different types of minerals; and
a newly-constituted State Board of Equalization, including members with more
knowledge and expertise in property tax valuation practices.

Gallagher limits taxes on residential
property. As originally debated by the
legislature, HCR 82- 1005 provided immediate
tax relief for residential property owners by
lowering the residential assessment rate fiom 3
percent of actual value to 21 percent. Prior to
approving the measure and submitting it to
voters, however, the legislature adopted an
amendment establishing a longer-term
mechanism for providing residential property tax
relief. This amendment, commonly referred to as
the Gallagher Amendment, was drafted as a
means for holding down residential property
taxes in the future as home values rose or if
business property taxes were reduced.

Figure 4-7
How are Property Taxes Determined?

Property taxes are determined by
multiplying the taxable (assessed) value of
property by the local tax rate (mill levy).
The assessecl value represents only a portion
of a property's actual value, which is
determined by the county assessor. The
portion is dictated by an assessment rate set
in law, currently 7.96 percent for residential
property (for taxes paid in 2004 and 2005)
and 29 percent for most other property.
Mill levies are set locally by each
governmental entity imposing a property
tax.

The Gallagher Amendment requires that
Assessed Value = Property Value x
the residential assessment rate be adjusted to
Assessment Rate
ensure that the percentage of assessed value
attributable to residential property remains the
Property Taxes =Assessed Value x
same as in the preceding year. Gallagher limits
Mill levy
the residential share of taxable values to a
L
historical proportion, which is modified to
account for changes in value from new
construction and changes in the volume of minerals and oil and gas produced. When the
amendment was first implemented, residential property comprised roughly 45 percent of all
taxable value. Since then, new construction has shifted the proportions somewhat, so that
residential property currently makes up roughly 47 percent of all taxable value.

I

Many other states offer some form of residentialproperty tax reliej: Seventeen other
states use different assessment rates to provide residential property tax relief, although none has a
system quite like Gallagher. Other states offer credits and exemptions, or in the case of Oregon
and California, limits on increases in property taxes for individual properties. Gallagher, on the
other hand, limits the total share of taxes to be paid collectively by all residential property owners
on a statewide basis, without regard to individual properties.

.......................................................................................................... Chapter 4: Property Taxes

68

-

--

-

--

-

Figure 4-8
An Example of How the Residential
Assessment Rate Works

When residential market values
increase rapidly,

t

and nonresidential values
increase by a slower rate,

then the residential assessment
rate declines,

*

C

so that residential assessed values grow at
the same rate as nonresidential assessed
values.

Colorado assesses property on a
biennial cycle. Under Gallagher, the
residential assessment rate is adjusted every
other year as property is revalued. The level
of value changes according to a reassessment
cycle set by law under which county assessors
update property values to more accurately
reflect the current market. In 1983, property
values were scheduled to change from the
1973 level to the 1977 level, reflecting four
years of inflation. Under current law,
property in Colorado is reassessed on a twoyear cycle in odd-numbered years. Twentyfive states assess property annually; the other
25 states assess property over cycles that
range from two to ten years.

The residential assessment rate has
declined over time. Under Gallagher,
whenever residential property values rise
faster or fall slower than nonresidential values, the residential assessment rate is lowered. When
the legislature changes the residential assessment rate to comply with Gallagher, the new rate
applies to assessed values in the current year. Taxes are paid in the subsequent year. Thus, the
newest rate of 7.96 percent was enacted in 2003, based on 2003 assessed values, and will apply
to property taxes paid in 2004. Since 1987, when the amendment was first implemented, the rate
has declined from 2 1 percent to 7.96 percent, or a reduction of 62 percent. In the future, the
residential assessment rate can only remain constant or decline, because TABOR requires voter
approval for any increase in the assessment rate for a class of property. For example, in 1999, the
rate would have been higher except for TABOR. Thus, the rate will never be higher than 7.96
percent unless voters approve the change.
Since the passage of Gallagher, actual values for residential real property have grown at a
faster rate than those of nonresidential property. Between 1986, prior to the first change in the
residential assessment rate under Gallagher, and 2002, the actual value of residential property
grew nearly twice as fast as the actual value of nonresidential property. Residential property
climbed from $35.4 to $3 14.1 billion, or an average of 14.6 percent per year, while
nonresidential actual values increased from $3 1.2 to $103.1 billion, or 7.8 percent per year.
Figure 4-9 shows that the actual values of residential real property had grown to over three times
the amount of nonresidential property values by 2002.

!
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Figure 4-9
Change in Statewide Actual Values

Eg

Residential Actual Values

Nonresidential Actual Values

Figure 4- 10 shows how the residential assessment rate has declined since Gallagher's
inception in 1983. The chart also shows our projected decline in the residential assessment rate.

Figure 4-10
Changes in the Residential Assessment Rate

Projected
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Figure 4- 1 1 shows a comparison between actual and assessed values for residential
property in 1986, before the first change in the residential assessment rate under Gallagher, and
in 2002.

Several factors affect the residential
assessment rate. Varying economic
conditions affect changes in the residential
assessment rate. In general, values of
nonresidential property fluctuate more than
home values. In good economic times,
positive speculation helps to drive business
investment, causing an increase in
nonresidential property values. This increase
contributes to growth in the property tax base
in two ways. First, it adds value in
nonresidential property. Second, it helps
maintain a higher residential assessment rate,
as the rate no longer has to decline as far in
order to maintain the balance prescribed in
Gallagher. At the height of the most recent
boom, nonresidential values grew so fast that
no decline in the residential assessment rate
was needed for the 1999 reassessment cycle,
the only time this has occurred.

Figure 4-11
Residential and Nonresidential Values,
1986 and 2002

Actual Value

Taxable Value

2002
Actual Value

Taxable Value

Similarly, as the economy goes into a
downward cycle, companies tend to act much
more quickly and more severely than
residential homeowners. For instance, when
widespread layoffs occur, displaced workers
vacate business space immediately, thereby
lowering the demand for and value of the
space. Additionally, new construction slows,
limiting demand for vacant land. However,
residential property values are slower to react
to negative news. Laid off workers will not
necessarily sell their homes immediately;
they will seek other employment and subsist
on unemployment, savings, and severance payments. In this situation, the slower growth of
nonresidential property values also forces down residential taxable values through a lower
residential assessment rate.
Other economic factors can also affect changes in the residential assessment rate. For
example, low mortgage rates have helped keep home values increasing in an otherwise stagnant
economy. Similarly, gains in the stock market have led to investment weqlth and income that has
helped residential values increase dramatically during the past decade, especially in Colorado's
mountain communities.
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Figure 4- 12 illustrates the relationship between changes in the value of property and
changes in the residential assessment rate.
Figure 4-12
Market Value Growth and Declines in the Residential Assessment Rate

1989

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

Reassessment Years
Nonresidential Growth

Residential Growth +Residential

Assessment Rate

The Gallagher Amendment limits the property tax base of local governments.
Gallagher limits growth in taxable values and can actually reduce the amount of taxable property
in a jurisdiction. However, the impact of Gallagher varies widely between regions of the state,
and even within a particular region. Since the residential assessment rate is calculated using
statewide property values, but property taxes are exclusively a local revenue source, the impact of
the declining residential assessment rate on local jurisdictions depends on what is happening to
property values locally. Declines in the residential assessment rate affect property tax revenues
based on the following two factors:
J
J

growth in home values within a local jurisdiction; and
the mix of properties within a jurisdiction.

For areas with significant home value growth, the increased property values may more
than offset any impact of the declining residential assessment rate. In these areas, the tax base
continues to grow. Whether this growth in the tax base translates into an increase in property
taxes depends on the jurisdiction's property tax revenue limits. But, for areas where home values
are growing slowly, a decline in the residential assessment rate under Gallagher may reduce the
local tax base.
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This phenomenon is illustrated by
contrasting Denver with the eastern plains.
Denver's residential property tax base has more
than doubled since 1987. Meanwhile,
residential property in Baca and Kiowa
counties grew by roughly half as much
over the same period. Figure 4- 13 shows
the disparity in residential property
assessed value growth between Denver
and Baca counties. Had the residential
assessment rate remained at its original
level of 21 percent, Baca County would
have seen a 132 percent increase in
residential assessed values instead of its
I
actual 67 percent increase.
The second consideration is the
mix of property that makes up a given
local government's tax base.
The larger the portion of a jurisdiction that
is residential property, the more
susceptible that jurisdiction is to declines
in the rate. The opposite is also true. For
Figure 4-14
Concentration of Property
Values in 2002

I

Figure 4-13
Market Value Growth and Declines in the
Residential Assessment Rate
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districts with large
- concentrations of nonresidential
property, the property tax base in the area is more
resilient to changes in the rate because the rate only
affects a small portion of their base.

These two factors contribute greatly to
inconsistencies between Colorado's urban and rural
property tax bases. As shown in Figure 4-14, over
70 percent of property value is concentrated in ten
counties along the Front Range. Fluctuations in the
value of property in these ten counties effectively
dictates the calculation of the residential assessment
rate. Booming increases in home values in many of
Colorado's urban areas, as well as mountain resort
communities, have helped to drive down the
residential assessment rate. Meanwhile, in many
parts of rural Colorado, the,decline in the residential assessment rate has been more rapid than
increases in home values. That is, any growth in home values is more thm offset by the
declining residential assessment rate, resulting in a decrease in the taxable value of homes.
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Impact of Gallagher on who pays property taxes. Gallagher prevents the shifting of a
larger share of the property tax burden to residential property owners, either because of growth in
residential property values or through law changes designed to reduce the property tax burden on
nonresidential property. The value of residential property now accounts for 75 percent of all
property in the state, yet the residential share of property taxes is estimated to be closer to 47
percent.
Figure 4-15 illustrates the savings that owners of residential property have received from
Gallagher. According to the Division of Property Taxation, residential property owners have
saved $6.8 billion between 1988 and 2003. This figure represents the cumulative difference
between what was actually paid by residential property owners and what would have been paid if
the residential assessment rate had remained at 2 1 percent and property tax collections had
remained the same. Figure 4-1 5 divides the $6.8 billion in residential property tax relief savings
into pre-TABOR and post-TABOR periods. The pre-TABOR savings represent the actual shift
in property tax burden from residential to nonresidential property owners; the post-TABOR
savings understate the shift because it is likely that property tax collections would have been
greater.
Figure 4-15
Homeowner Savings under Gallagher
($ in billions)

Source: Division of Properly Taxation.

Prior to TABOR, Gallagher shified taxesfrom residential property to nonresidential
property. Prior to the adoption of TABOR, local governments were allowed to increase their
'property tax collections by 5.5 percent over the prior year's collections, although this limit could
be exceeded under certain circumstances. If assessed values declined or remained relatively flat,
local governments could increase the mill levy to achieve the desired revenue goal, within the 5.5
percent limit. As a result, any reduction in the residential assessment rate that led to an increase
in mill levies caused a shift in property taxes from residential taxpayers to nonresidential
taxpayers.
The TABOR requirement for voter approval for any increased mill levy would have
prevented any further shift in property tax burden between residential and nonresidential
property, if not for two things, First, the reduction in taxable values under Gallagher causes mill
levies to be higher than they otherwise would be under the property tax revenue limits of
TABOR. Second, courts have ruled that the TABOR limits do not apply to all mill levies. For
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example, local governments may increase or "float" mill levies to cover the repayment costs for
bonded debt and to cover property tax abatements and refunds.

The impact of Gallagher on state aid for schools. By limiting the share of residential
taxable values, Gallagher acts as a limit on school district tax bases. When increases in tax rates
are also limited, the need for state aid to schools increases. For example, if the residential
assessment rate of 14.34 percent remained in effect for the last ten years, property taxes would
have been about $91 million higher in FY 2002-03, reducing the need for state aid in that year by
the same amount. This $91 million translates into 2.2 percentage points on the state share in FY
2002-03, or an increase in the state share from 57.5 percent to 59.7 percent. Figure 4-16 provides
an estimate of how the decline in the residential assessment rate affected state aid for schools in
each of the last ten years.
Figure 4-16
Ten-year Impact of the Gallagher Amendment on State Aid
Under the School Finance Act

1 Total

I

$683.1

(

NIA

I

NIA

I

110.91%

1

Looking at the historical impact of Gallagher on an annual basis is helpful because it
provides information on what can be expected in the future.

J

The impact of the Gallagher Amendment is related to the increase in values. That is,
when growth in values is particularly strong, Gallagher has less of an impact on state
aid than when growth is weak or declining. For example, in FY 1993-94 when
statewide assessed value grew just over one percent, the impact of the Gallagher
Amendment on state aid was almost $4 1 million. In FY l995,-96, assessed value
grew almost 9 percent, and the incremental impact was $18.3 million. The reason
that Gallagher has a smaller impact in high growth years is that more districts cap out
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at their property tax revenue limit in spite of a decline in the residential assessment
rate. For these districts, a higher residential assessment rate would raise assessed
values, but would not produce any more property taxes. Instead, the district's mill
levy would simply be lower.

J

The impact of the Gallagher Amendment on school district property taxes is
cumulative. An increase in property tax revenue in a given year provides a higher
property tax base for calculating property tax revenue limits in future years.

J

The Gallagher Amendment has only a limited impact on the "sawtooth cycle of
increases in property taxes.

J

Eliminating the Gallagher Amendment shifts a portion of the property tax burden
from nonresidential taxpayers to residential taxpayers. Although the total estimated
increase in property taxes from holding the residential assessment rate at 14.34
percent is $91 million in FY 2002-03, taxes for residential property owners would
have increased about $209 million, while taxes for nonresidential property owners
would have decreased about $1 17 million. Under current law, residential property
owners paid about 49 percent of school finance property taxes; this percentage would
have increased to about 59 percent at the 14.34 percent residential assessment rate.
Conversely, the share of nonresidential property taxes would have decreased from 5 1
percent to 4 1 percent.

The relationship between the Gallagher Amendment, growth in values, and school district
property tax revenue limits is perhaps more clearly demonstrated in Figure 4-17. This table
compares the number of districts that were capped out at their property tax revenue limit in the
last ten years to those that would have been capped out had the residential assessment rate stayed
at 14.34 percent.
Figure 4-17
Ten-year Impact of the Gallagher Amendment on School District Mill Levies
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Figure 4-17 (cont.)
Ten-year Impact of Gallagher Amendment on School District Mill Levies

INumber of School Districts with a Mill Levy Decrease from the 1

I

I

Prlor Year under:

Budget
Curmnt Law

14.34%
Resident1
Awessment

Di

As shown in Figure 4-1 7, more districts in all but three of the years would have seen a
decline in their mill levy if the residential assessment rate had remained at the pre-TABOR level
of 14.34 percent. But the higher tax base would have yielded more in property taxes than was
actually collected.

A proposal to modify Gallagher is on the 2003 ballot. Although options exist for
providing residential property tax relief through means other than the Gallagher Amendment, a
measure to modify Gallagher has already been proposed. Amendment 32, which will be decided
by voters at the November 2003 election, would repeal the floating residential assessment rate
and fix the rate at eight percent of actual value. Permanently setting the residential assessment
rate creates greater increases in assessed values than would have otherwise occurred because
residential assessed values would be tied to market value increases. However, even if voters
were to approve an increase in the residential assessment rate, the resulting increase in assessed
values may not necessarily increase school finance property taxes in all districts. For districts
already at their revenue limit, such an increase in assessed value would only result in a lower mill
levy, not an increase in local school property tax collections. The measure would shift a portion
of the property tax burden from nonresidential taxpayers to residential taxpayers.

Limiting Growth in Property Taxes - The Taxpayer's Bill of Rights (TABOR)

.

This section describes various impacts of TABOR on property taxes, especially school
finance property taxes.

TABOR limits property tax collections. TABOR was approved by voters in 1992 to
limit the growth in government and require voter approval for any new or increased taxes. Three
provisions directly affect property taxes. First, TABOR imposes a limit on property taxes equal
to inflation in the prior calendar year plus a measure of growth. For schools, growth is measured
as the percentage change in student enrollment, while for other local governments it is the net
percentage change in the value of property from construction. Second, TABOR prohibits a
district from imposing a mill levy above that for the prior year without voter approval. Third,
TABOR requires voter approval for any increase in the assessment rate for a class of property.
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TABOR'S effect on school district property taxes. Prior to TABOR, the General
Assembly set property taxes for school finance. Under the school finance act, the legislature
used a variety of methods to determine property taxes. During various years, the Department of
Education was directed to set the mill levy necessary to raise a dollar amount of property taxes
set by law or to target a specified percentage state share or appropriation. In one year, the
legislature established a mill levy in statute.
With the adoption of TABOR, the General Assembly has been less directly involved in
determining school finance property taxes. Instead of actively controlling the level of property
taxes available for schools each year, the General Assembly established a limit that is essentially
the same as the TABOR limit on property tax revenues and mill levies. School districts levy the
same number of mills from year to year, unless the mill levy would raise more property taxes
than TABOR permits (inflation plus the percentage change in enrollment). The levy must be
reduced to avoid exceeding the property tax revenue limit.
The impact of TABOR on state aid to schools, and therefore the state budget, cannot be
determined without knowing the level at which the General Assembly would have set property
taxes without TABOR. It is possible, however, to examine how state expenditures for school
finance would have differed under a variety of situations, assuming that total program funding
remained constant. Figure 4-1 8 illustrates how certain situations would have changed the current
level of state aid.
Figure 4-18
State Aid Under Various Situations

.

N
Situation

I Maintain a state share of 52.3

I

2002-03

State Ald Impact

I

I

percent, the same that was in effect
in FY 1992-93, the first year of

I

Require a 50-percent state share

I Savings of $404 million

I

Savings of 16308million

I
I

I

I

Maintain property taxes at the
FY 1992-93 level ($1.1 billion)
Require property taxes statewide to
increase annually by inflation plus
enrollment growth

Increase of $508 million

Savings of $473 million

Because the TABOR limits are now the driving factors in school finance property taxes,
changes in assessed value drive changes in property taxes. When assessed values are relatively
stable statewide, property taxes can be expected to remain relatively constant. As assessed values
increase, so too will property taxes. Because changes in property taxes are essentially limited to
inflation plus the percentage change in enrollment, property taxes are capped and mill levies
reduced when assessed values grow at a greater rate.
-

-
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The current method for setting school district property taxes has resulted in the following
phenomena:

J
J
J
J

the dispersion in school district mill levies has increased;
the state's subsidy for districts with low mill levies is growing;
taxpayers in districts benefit from new construction and increasing values; and
variations in oil and gas production can have a significant impact on mill levies.

The dispersion in school district mill levies has increased. Under TABOR, an increase
in assessed value greater than inflation and the percent change in enrollment permanently reduces
a district's mill levy. Sometimes these reductions are driven by rapid increases in assessed value,
especially new additions of nonresidential property that are not accompanied by a similar
increase in student enrollment. But, mill levies have also declined because the limit on property
tax revenue incorporates one year of enrollment growth and inflation while the growth in
assessed values reflects two years' worth of increase in property values. As a result of varied
growth in assessed values, Colorado school districts now impose a wide range of mill levies. In
1991, 133 of the state's 176 school districts imposed the same mill levy: 40.080 mills.
Figure 4-1 9 shows the distribution of current school district mill levies compared with 1991 mill
levies, prior to the adoption of TABOR.
Figure 4-19
Dispersion of Mill Levies
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For individual districts, the changes can be quite dramatic. Figure 4-20 shows the ten
Colorado school districts that experienced the most significant change in mill levies between
1991 and the present. In all but one of the districts, changes in the mill levy were caused largely
by changes in the value of natural resource, oil and gas, or producing mines property.
Figure 4-20
The 10 Most Significant Changes in Mill Levies

County

Schoal Diotrict

'

1991
Mill Levy

2002
Mill Levy

Percent
Change

Las Animas

Primero

40.080

4.588

-88.6%

Gilpin

Gilpin

40.080

5.488

-86.3%

La Plata

lgnacio

40.080

7.598

-81.O%

El Paso

Hanover

40.080

9.067

-77.4%

La Plata

Durango

40.080

11.314

-71.8%

Weld

I

Gilcrest

I

I Meeker

Rio Blanco

1

40.080

I

1

40.080

12.409
14.449

-69.0%

I

1

-64.0%

Baca

Campo

40.080

15.082

-62.4%

Grand

East Grand

38.397

14.516

-62.2%

Garfield

Rifle

40.080

15.488

-61.4%

Some districts, however, have not experienced significant increases in assessed values.
Figure 4-21 shows the ten school districts with the highest mill levies in 2002, as well as the
percentage change in assessed value from 1991 to 2002. In 1991, these ten districts, along with
133 others, all imposed the uniform mill levy of 40.080 mills. Since then, however, mill levies
for these ten districts have changed less than for any other districts, because assessed value
growth in each of the districts has been insufficient to allow property tax collections to reach the
property tax revenue limit.
Figure 4-21
The 10 School Districts With the Highest Mill Levies

I Baca

1

40.080

1

-11.39%

Washington

Lone Star

40.080

-0.12%

Saguache

Moffat

38.976

-9.12%

Phillips

Holyoke

38.785

20.54%

I Morgan

I Weldon

Logan -

Buffalo

37.253

24.94%

Conejos

Sanford

37.024

11.37%

I Weld

1

Windsor

1
1

37.416

36.748

1
1

8.74%

82.45%

1

1
1
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Figure 4-21 (cont.)
The 10 School Districts With the Highest Mill Levies

I Kit Carson I

I Limon

Lincoln

I

2002
Change from
Mlll Levy
1001 to 2002
Arriba-Flanler 1
35.570 1
16.07%
School
District

County

1

14.34%

24.954 1

113.10%

35.546

1

Statewide Averaae

In addition to differences existing on a statewide basis, mill levies can vary substantially
within a county. Figure 4-22 illustrates this phenomenon using El Paso County as an example.
In 1991, most school districts in El Paso County levied 40.080 mills. The most notable
exception was Edison, where the higher mill levy paid for additional funding under the 1988
school finance act's hold harmless provisions. The range of mill levies in El Paso County in
1991 was 15.548 mills. By 2002, the range had increased to over 27 mills.
Figure 4-22
School Finance Mill Levies in El Paso County, 1991 and 2002

Calhan

42.351

33.271

(9.080)

Harrison

40.080

20.917

(19.163)

Widefield

40.080

26.324

(13.756)

Colorado Springs

40.080
41.760

27.628

(12.452)
(8.553)
(14.756)
(11.806)
(12.106)

Cheyenne Mountain
Academy

40.080
40.080

Ellicott

40.080

33.207
25.324
28.274
32.833

Peyton

40.080

27.974

Falcon

40.080

Manitou Springs

I Miami-Yoder

1
Range of Mill Levies 1

40.080
15.548

1
1

24.130
27.128

(7.247)

1
1

1

(15.950)
11.580

The state's subsicty for districts with low mill levies is growing. Figure 4-23 shows the
ten school districts with the lowest school finance mill levies in FY 2002-03, along with the
percentage of school finance costs paid for by the state. In half of these districts, the percent state
aid is higher than the state average; seven of these ten districts receive more than 50 percent of
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their funding from the state. Two phenomena usually account for this anomaly. First, when a
mill levy declines to account for an increase in assessed value, a future reduction of assesscd
value results in a decrease in property taxes and leaves the state heavily subsidizing a school
district with a low levy. In this case, taxpayers in the district benefit from the permancnt
reduction in the tax rate while the state is obligated for a larger share of the district's costs.
Figure 4-23
The 10 School Districts With the Lowest Mill Levies

School
Distrlct

County

State Aid
Share
4.588

58.5%

Rio Blanco

Rangely

4.638

65.1%

Pitkin

Aspen

5.088

20.4%

Gilpin

Gilpin

5.420

51.5%

I La Plata

I lgnacio

1

7.598

1

68.1%

San Miguel

Telluride

7.408

18.5%

El Paso

Hanover

9.067

78.2%

Garfield

Parachute

9.285

69.9%

I Cheyenne I Cheyenne R-5 1
I summit
1
Summit

10.406
11.094

1
1

64.7%

1

1

7.6%

Telluride and Aspen, two school districts with such an abundance of property wealth that
they paid for virtually all of the costs of public schools in the early 1990s, further illustrate this
phenomenon. As recently as FY 1995-96, property taxes in Telluride and Aspen were almost
fully funding the costs of total program in those districts. At the time, the mill levy in Telluride
was 9.815 and the mill levy in Aspen was 7.3 16. By FY 2002-03, however, the state was paying
for over 20 percent of total program costs in Aspen and over 18 percent of total program costs in
Telluride. Together, these two districts accounted for over $3.1 million in state aid in
FY 2002-03.
A school district need not have a reduction in value to have a low levy accompanied by a
high percentage of state aid, however. A spike in assessed value reduces a district's levy so that
the district collects the prior year's property taxes increased by its revenue limit. Thus, the school
district's percentage state share is essentially frozen at the level it was before the increase in
value. The district's assessed value may continue to increase over time and the district may
continue to increase its property tax collections, but its state share does not reflect its low levy.
Gilpin County is an example of this situation. In 1991, the year before limited gaming increased
the assessed value of the school district, the district levied 40.080 mills, which was equivalent to
a state share of 49 percent. Today, the district's state share is about 52 percpt with a levy of
5.420 mills.
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Taxpayers in districts beneJiifrom new construction and increasing values. Unlike
other local governments, where the property tax revenue limit includes a component for growth
in the local tax base, the limit for schools does not. Therefore, in districts where new construction
outpaces enrollment growth, mill levies are required to fall so that the district does not collect
more property tax revenue than it is allowed. For a district that was already at its property tax
revenue limit, the new construction provides no new revenue for the school district. This
situation constrains growth in property tax revenue for school finance, while benefitting the
taxpayers who live in these districts.

El Paso County illustrates how new construction can affect a district's mill levy.
Recently, a new power plant was built in the Hanover school district which effectively tripled the
property tax base and lowered the mill levy by 75 percent. (Figure 4-22 illustrates Hanover's levy
and compares it to other districts in the county.) While the benefit to taxpayers in Hanover is
self-evident, taxpayers in other districts in the county are left with a higher tax burden for school
finance. For FY 2002-03, Colorado Springs residents and businesses paid a tax rate for school
finance three times the rate paid by taxpayers in Hanover and taxpayers in Edison paid four times
the rate paid in Hanover. It is notable that if the same power plant were to leave the Hanover
school district, the constitutional limit on increases in district levies would prevent the school
district from restoring its mill levy to the previous level. The lower property tax base would
yield less revenue, and the district's dependency on state aid would increase.
Variations in the taxable values of oil and gas property can have a sign~jkantimpact
on mill levies. Another interesting phenomenon relates to oil and gas property, which is valued
based on the revenue generated by resources extracted from the property. As prices for oil and
gas rise, so does the value of oil and gas property. In 2001, oil and gas properties nearly doubled
in value. For school districts with substantial oil and gas properties, mill levies declined
dramatically. Later, as prices for the commodities fell, so did values - which are expected to
drop by nearly 30 percent in 2003. Because mill levies cannot increase without voter approval,
the spike in oil and gas values will cause certain districts to collect less in property taxes than the
previous year while the state is obligated for a
larger share of the district's school finance act
Figure 4-24
fimding.
The Impact of Oil and Gas Prices
on Tax Rates
The Ignacio School District in southwestern
Between 2000 and 200 1, natural gas
Colorado provides a good example of how TABOR
production in La Plata County grew four
limits on mill levies can affect local property tax
percent while the value of property
revenue for schools with high proportions of oil and
associated with this production grew 102
gas property. In FY 2002-03,'nearly 85 percent of
percent. This increase in value
the school district property tax base was in oil and
contributed significantly to the decline
gas. This high dependence on a volatile class of
in the average school mill levy from
property has led to declines in local property tax
22.388 mills to 15.960 mills, causing the
revenue despite increases in assessed value and
property tax rate per thousand cubic feet
(Mcf) of natural gas to fall 32 percent.
steady enrollment. From FY 1998-99 to FY 1999Thus, without a significant change in
00, enrollment in the district remained essentially
volume, produters were paying 32
the same. However, local property tax revenue
percent
less in property taxes for each
declined by 4.4 percent because of declines in
Mcf
produced.
assessed value and a mill levy that could not
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increase. Over the same period, state aid increased 18.8 percent, or over $600,000, for a district
whose total program was less than $6 million.
From FY 1992-93 to FY 2002-03, Ignacio's mill levy declined from 40.080 to 7.598 as a
result of increasing values for oil and gas property in the district. When these values decline, the
district may only use the previous year's levy, which results in lower property tax collections
regardless of enrollment growth or inflation. In the Ignacio School District, local property tax
revenue in FY 1999-00 was nearly 25 percent less than in FY 1994-95, despite over 50 percent
growth in assessed value and no significant change in enrollment.

Temporary mill levy reductions. Local governments other than school districts have
adapted to the property tax revenue limits in a variety of ways. For example, state law allows
local governments to enact temporary property tax credits and temporary mill levy rate reductions
as a means for refunding excess revenues. Under this mechanism, local governments certify the
gross (original) levy, the temporary credit or mill levy reduction by which the refund is made,
and temporary (reduced) levy on which taxes will be calculated. In 2002, the Division of
Property Taxation reports that local governments enacted temporary tax credits totaling $128
million.

Increased Funding for Education - Amendment 23
The limitations on property taxes take on even greater relevance in light of Amendment
23. In the next four years, by FY 2007-08, state aid is expected to increase by over $715 million
to $3.3 billion. During that same period, property taxes for schools are expected to increase $157
million. Amendment 23 adds pressure to state aid by requiring increases in school finance act
funding that exceed the maximum allowable increase in property taxes through FY 20 10-11:

J

Amendment 23 requires that the increase in the statewide base per pupil funding
match inflation plus one percentage point through FY 2010-1 1. While admittedly
oversimplified, this requirement means that total funding for schools will grow each
year by inflation plus the percent change in enrollment plus one percentage point;
and

J

Under TABOR, the maximum increase in property tax revenue is the percent change
in enrollment plus inflation. But, this growth only occurs if assessed values increase
sufficiently each year, and such growth is not likely under the state's current biennial
reassessment cycle.

Thus, Amendment 23 will require increases in school finance funding at least one percent
above the allowable growth in property taxes each year until FY 2010-1 1. Through that year, the
gap will grow by one percent per year plus the difference between the property tax revenue limit
and actual property tax qollections. Thereafter, the gap will grow annually by the amount that
actual property tax collections are below the limit. One exception to thi: situation would be if
the statutory formula for determining K-12 total program is amended by the legislature. That
was the case for FY 2003-04, when the legislature reduced funding for the "size factor" portion
of the formula. However, this statutory change still allowed for total program to increase more
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than property taxes, but the gap between the two was diminished. Figure 4-25 compares the
actual and projected growth in total program with the maximum allowable percentage change in
property taxes.
Figure 4-25
Growth in Total Program and Growth in Property Taxes

Percent Change in Total Program

Property Tax Limit (Inflation + Enrollment)

Impact of Gallagher, TABOR, and Amendment 23 on Property Taxes
Figure 4-26 breaks down school finance funding on a per pupil basis, both the state share
and property taxes. The figure shows the points in time when the various constitutional
amendments became effective. Prior to the passage of TABOR, the legislature made an effort to
increase the state share, as can be seen in the figure. After the passage of TABOR, the legislature
lost the ability to control property taxes and the property tax share of school finance. The figure
shows state aid increasing, while property taxes remained relatively constant. Finally, after the
passage of Amendment 23, state aid is seen increasing at an even faster rate.
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Figure 4-26
Schoof Finance Funding Per Pupif
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Issues and Options
Within the property tax system, several options exist for constitutional or statutory
changes to better enable the state to fund necessary programs and services in times of economic
weakness and reduced state revenues. These options range from addressing inherent structural
conflicts to simply modifying the existing structure to provide greater flexibility for state
policymakers. This section reviews individual issues and presents options for addressing the
concerns raised by the issue.

The Issue: The mill levy andproperty tax revenue limits of TABOR and Gallagher
are shifting an increasing share of the cost of school funding from local sources to
the state. TABOR is resulting in tax rates that benefit taxpayers disproportionately
based on district changes in assessed values.

Option 1: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to remove school
district mill levies and property tax revenuesfiom the limitations of TABOR.
Option 2: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to replace the
individual school district mill levy andproperty tax revenue limits in TABOR with a
statewide limitation on property taxes. For example, such a limit could be inflation
plus the percentage change in enrollment, the percentage change in personal income,
or the percentage change in total school districtfunding.
Issues for consideration. These options recognize that school districts are simply
different from other types of local governments, and that school finance requires a greater
emphasis on equity and uniformity than on regional differences. The General Assembly has a
constitutional mandate to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and
uniform system of free public schools. Unlike other local governments where voters may choose
to go without certain services in exchange for lower local taxes, the minimum level of school
district funding is essentially set by the state. Since FY 2001-02, this minimum level has been
set by the state within the parameters of another state constitutional provision, Amendment 23.

.

-

Removing individual district limitations on property taxes and mill levies would give the
General Assembly the flexibility to determine property taxes for school finance. To the extent a
plan developed by the General Assembly is different from the current constitutional provisions,
taxpayers in some districts could see property tax increases. However, taxpayers in other school
districts could experience decreases. In addition, eliminating the constitutional prohibition on
mill levy increases means that the protection against tax rate increases when values decrease
would be gone.
In the period immediately preceding TABOR, all taxpayers shared the benefits of
increases in assessed value that occurred in individual districts from g;owth in property values,
new construction, and increased valuc in mineral extraction industries. All taxpayers also shared
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the effects of decreases in assessed value in individual districts. Now, benefits accrue to
taxpayers in districts where property wealth is increasing, while taxpayers in districts where
property wealth is declining or in'creasing slowly see no similar benefit. These options would
allow the General Assembly to address perceived inequities of the current system, even if
property taxes statewide stay within the levels currently permitted by TABOR. By divorcing
school district levies fiom TABOR, one option the General Assembly could consider is
reestablishing in statute a uniform mill levy for school finance. Such a system would more
equitably spread the property tax burden across a broader tax base. The uniform levy could be
set by the General Assembly each year within certain parameters designed to protect taxpayers
fiom significant increases in taxes.
Future increases in state aid could be slowed by reducing funding, increasing property
taxes, or a combination of the two. The options presented here make the General Assembly
responsible for determining whether property taxes are increased. Option 1 delegates to the
General Assembly the entire decision on the total amount of property taxes for school finance,
while Option 2 sets a maximum statewide limit. In practice, however, a maximum statewide
limit equal to the current district limit of inflation plus the percentage change in enrollment could
still result in increased property taxes, especially in non-reassessment years. Now, school
districts frequently do not collect the maximum revenue allowed in these years. Both options
allow for a more consistent increase in property taxes, eliminating the sawtooth effect that puts
more pressure on state aid in non-reassessment years.

.
The Issue: The limits on school property taxes do not accommodate changes in the
tax base@om new construction and increased mineral production. As a result,
property taxes are declining as a share of total schoolJinancefunding, and the
need for state aid is increasing at a rate that the state cannot aflord

Option: The General Assembly could consider requesting voter approval to adjust
the method of calculating school districtproperty taxes to accountfor increases in
assessed value attributable to new construction and to the increased volume of
mineral and oil and gas production.
Issues for consideration. Immediately before TABOR was adopted, school district
property taxes were based on the wealth of the district: districts with high property wealth
generated a significant portion of their funding fiom property taxes while districts with low
property wealth did not and therefore received a higher proportion of their funding fiom state aid.
With the current system, low wealth districts that become "richer" fiom new construction and
increased mineral production may not contribute significantly more to the funding of schools.
This option partially restores the link between changes in a district's wealth and its contribution
for school finance, whiletaking some of the pressure off state aid. It would not affect the benefit
that these districts and their taxpayers receive from the increase in value9when funding
discretionary programs, such as bond issues and mill levy overrides. The other side of the issue
is that new construction and increased mineral production, especially when not accompanied by
corresponding increases in enrollment, can reduce taxes for all taxpayers in the district in which
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the assessed value increase occurred. This option will increase property taxes over what is
currently allowed when new construction and mineral production occur.

II

The Issue: The restriction in TABOR against increasing levies without voter
approval reduces property taxes when district assessed values decline, thereby
increasing the need for state aid.

Option: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to exempt school
districtsfrom the requirement to obtain voter approvalfor mill levy increases and
(( substitute some historical levy as a cap on the district's levy.

A1

11

Issues for consideration. Providing more flexibility on the maximum number of mills a
district can levy allows property taxes to better keep up with the required increases in spending
mandated by Amendment 23. A historical cap on mill levies could still be imposed, but districts
would be required to respond to declines in assessed values by "floating" their mill levy up to the
historical cap. Further limits could be applied, including an element for enrollment growth to
ensure that taxes stay proportional to total program. In addition, annual increases in mill levies
over thGprior year's level could be limited to a certain number of mills or a certain percentage.
Regardless of the limits imposed, however, property taxes would still increase over the level
currently allowed. In addition, the result could be that districts that are getting "richer" see mill
levy declines, while districts that are becoming "poorer" see mill levy increases.
The Issue: The limits on property taxes imposed by TABOR are mathematically
inconsistent with the increasedfunding requirements of Amendment 23 through FY
2010-11.
Option: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to make the
constitutional school finance provisions consistent, either by reducing the
Amendment 23 requirementfor one additionalpercent or by increasing the TABOR
limit to allow for the one additionalpercent through FY 2010-11.

Issuesfor consideration. The minimum requirements of Amendment 23 will exceed the
maximum revenue fiom property taxes under TABOR by one percentage point through
FY 2010-1 1. Voters approved both of these amendments; Amendment 23 was the amendment
most recently approved. Increasing the maximum allowable property tax revenue under TABOR
will increase taxes in some districts. Keeping both provisions in place over the next six years
will put increased pressure on the state budget. In FY 2002-03, one percent of school district
funding equated to about $42 million, a number which will increase each year. Enacting
statutory reductions in the coqt-based funding elements of the school finance formula will likely
raise legal issues about the requirements of Amendment 23.
9

r

The Issue: Property taxes are relativelyflat in interveningyears, but in
reassessment years mill levies are driven down because the limit on property taxes
incorporates two years' worth of increasedproperty values but only one year of
enrollment growth and inflation. This biennial cycle is inconsisient with the annual
limits in TABOR which include inflationfrom the prior year plus the percentage
change in student enrollment.
Option 1: The General Assembly could require counties to reassess property every
year, instead of every other year.
Option 2: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to adjust the
calculation of the TABORproperty tax limit to makz a consistent comparison by
modijiing the limit to include two years' worth of growth in assessed values
measured against two years' worth of growth in inflation. Enrollment would be
added to the limit annually.

,

Isshes for consideration. Property is currently assessed over a two-year cycle, with
overall increases realized in the reassessment year, but only new construction contributing to
growth in the intervening year. These options smooth out fluctuations in property taxes, making
the need for state aid more predictable from year to year.
Option 1 -reassessing property annually - would significantly add to the workload of
county assessors, but would allow for more current values. Currently, the lag in the reassessment
cycle means that residential property tax biHs are based on home values that are as much as three
years old. Option 2 would allow property taxes to grow more in reassessment years, thereby
reducing the need for state aid, to account for the new reassessment values. But, in intervening
years, when values only growth because of new construction, the property tax revenue limit
would only include the percentage change in enrollment. Taxes paid by property owners are
likely to increase in reassessment years, and the increase would be sustained in the nonreassessment year.
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AMENDMENT 23 AND STATE FISCAL ISSUES
This chapter presents information on the provisions of Amendment 23 and how it has
affected the state's fiscal issues. In light of the state's current fiscal bind, options for changing
Amendment 23 are also presented.

Provisions of Amendment 23
Amendment 23 was passed by the state's voters in 2000. The amendment provides for
guaranteed increases in funding for public elementary and secondary education. It requires an
annual increase in per pupil funding in the school finance act and total state funding for
categorical programs of at least the inflation rate plus one percentage point from FY 2001-02
through FY 2010-11 and by the inflation rate thereafter.
The amendment requires the General Fund appropriation for state aid under the school
• finance act to increase by at least 5 percent annually, except when state personal income
increases by less than 4.5 percent. This minimum required increase is frequently referred to as
the "maintenance of effort" or MOE provision. The amendment also diverts one-third of one
percent of taxable income on state income tax returns to the State Education Fund. The diverted
income tax revenue, which averages about 7 percent of total state income tax collections, is
exempt from the state revenue limits of TABOR. In other words, taxpayers were willing to give
up part of their TABOR refund to create the State Education Fund. Money in the State
Education Fund can be used to help pay for the minimum increases in school finance and
categorical funding or for programs to reform education, reduce class sizes, expand technology
education, or meet state academic standards, among others.

Spending Requirements under Amendment 23
Revenue received through the school finance act accounted for about 72 percent of
non-bond-related revenue for school districts in FY 2001-02, the most recent data available. The
programs defined as categorical programs in Amendment 23 accounted for an additional
3 percent. Before Amendment 23 passed, state policymakers had significant discretion over the
amount of money that was appropriated for school finance and categorical programs. For school
finance, the amount of money the General Assembly decided it could spend determined the
amount of school district funding. Total school district funding is the sum of state aid and the
two local revenue sources - property taxes and specific ownership taxes. In the nine years
between the passage of TABOR and the implementation of Amendment 23, the local share was
essentially set by the provisions of TABOR and the revenue received by school districts from the
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specific ownership tax. Therefore, state aid became the guiding factor in setting total funding.
Said another way, the General Assembly would set total funding based on what the state could
afford, given that the local truces were fixed. Funding for categorical programs was set through
the budget process.
Since the passage of Amendment 23, the General Assembly's flexibility has been reduced
in that the amendment contains minimum requirements for increases in the school finance act
and for the categorical programs it governs. For categorical programs, the minimum increase of
inflation plus one percentage point through FY 2010-11 and inflation thereafter applies to the
sum of funding for all categorical programs. Therefore, the General Assembly can apportion the
increase among the various categorical programs and it can increase funding above the minimum
level, but it cannot fund the programs at a lesser rate of increase. The parameters of the General
Assembly's discretion regarding school finance have been the focus of much discussion since
Amendment 23's implementation in FY 2001-02. However, the local share still remains fixed, so
state aid is the difference between the requirements of Amendment 23 and the local share.
Figure 5-1 illustrates the pre- and post-Amendment 23 and the pre- and post-TABOR differences
in calculating state aid for school finance .

•

Figure 5-1
Calculation of State Aid under the School Finance Act
Pre-TABOR and Pre-Amendment 23
State Aid = Total Funding - Local Shara
(discretionary) (discretionary) (discretionary)
Post-TABOR and Pre-Amendment 23
State Aid = Total Funding - Local Share
(discretionary) (discretionary)
(fixed)
Post-TABOR and Post-Amendment 23
State Aid
(fixed)

= Total Funding
(fixed)

Local Share
(fixed)

Estimated impact ofAmendment 23 on school district revenues. Calculating the impact
of Amendment 23 on school district funding is an impossible task because such a calculation
requires knowing what the level of funding would have been without Amendment 23. However,
Figure 5-2 shows the estimated cinnual change in school district fundin~ for two scenarios. First,

94 ................................................................. Chapter 5: Amendment 23 and State F"iscal Issues

it shows the estimated increase in funding from the "one percentage point" requirement for
school finance. Second, it provides the increase in total funding for categorical programs for the
"inflation plus one percentage point" requirement. Figure 5-2 covers the period from
FY 2001-02, the year that the Amendment 23 funding requirements were implemented, through
FY 2007-08, the last year of our forecast period.

Figure 5-2
Estimated Funding Increase from Amendment 23
(millions of dollars)
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FY 2001-02

$36.9

$7.2

$44.1

FY 2002-03

78.6

15.7

94.3

FY 2003-04

109.4

20.3

129.7

FY 2004-05

156.0

25.2

181.2

FY 2005-06

207.1

31.5

238.6

FY 2006-07

264.0

38.5

302.5

FY 2007-08

325.9

45.9

371.8

$1,177.9

$184.3

$1,362.2

Total

Through FY 2003-04, the one-percentage-point requirement is expected to increase
statewide average per pupil funding under the finance act by about $150; by FY 2007-08, the gap
attributed to the one percent is expected to increase to $428. As previously mentioned, the
impact of the amendment on individual categorical programs depends on how the General
Assembly decides to allocate the funding increase. Figure 5-3 shows the results of its
appropriation decisions to date, comparing the FY 2003-04 appropriation to FY 2000-01, the
year before Amendment 23 took effect.
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Figure 5-3
Comparison of FY 2000-01 and FY 2003-04 Appropriations
for Categorical Programs
ii:t'1

.JJollar

.Chan e

Chan e

Transportation

$4,045,521

11.0%

Speclal Education - Disabled Children

12,661,983

17.7%

690,647

12.6%

1,949,540

11.0%

English Language Proficiency

516,289

16.7%

Small Attendance Centers

(99,546)

-10.5%

Expelled and Suspended Student Services Programs

427,979

7.4%

0

0.0%

$20,192,413

14.2%

Gifted and Talented
Vocational Education

Comprehensive Health Education
Total
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Optional programs. In addition to increasing school finance and categorical program
funding, the General Assembly created new programs that provided revenue to school districts,
qualifying schools, and the Department of Education. These so-called optional programs are
funcled under the provisions of Amendment 23 that allow the State Education Fund to be used for
specified types of programs. Over the course of the current and last two years, the General
Assembly appropriated about $34.5 million for such programs as textbooks, school improvement
grants, teacher pay incentives, summer school, and science and technology education. It also
appropriated about $43 million for school district and charter school capital construction. A
portion of the $43 million for capital construction was for new programs, while a portion of it
replaced some of the General Fund dollars for a lawsuit settlement that were lost because of the
revenue shortfall. Expansion of the Colorado Preschool Program and on-line education and a
new full-day kindergarten program for children attending unsatisfactory schools were initiated
from State Education Fund money, although they were funded through the school finance act.
Many of these programs were short lived because of the state revenue situation.
Interaction between Amendment 23 spending requirements and the economy. The
increases in spending under Amendment 23 for school finance and categorical programs are
required to continue regardless of the state's budget situation or the status of the State Education
Fund. For example, available revenue in the General Fund decreased by 15.0 percent in
FY 2001-02, while income taxes, the funding source for the State Education Fund, declined by
19.0 percent. The General Assembly eliminated or reduced funding of some optional programs
using State Education Fund money and substituted money in the State Education Fund for
General Fund appropriations in order to prevent General Fund budget shortfalls. The safety
valve for General Fund appropriations' support of education funding in the event of an economic
downturn-personal income growth less than 4.5 percent-does not thange the total funding
requirement.
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Diversions to the State Education Fund
At the time of Amendment 23's passage, the state was experiencing economic prosperity.
In November 2000, employment was 4.2 percent higher than in November 1999. However, the
cyclical peak for employment occurred in December 2000 and has since declined as much as
3.8 percent. Projections of perpetual TABOR surpluses that taxpayers would be willing to
forego a part of proved wrong. Revenue that was $927.2 million above the TABOR limit in
FY 2000-01 was $365.7 million below the limit in the following year and an estimated $703.6
million below the limit in FY 2002-03. The diversion of income tax revenue to the State
Education Fund still occurs despite the lack of a TABOR surplus. The following paragraphs
discuss the income tax diversion to the State Education Fund and how the diversion and the
change in the state's TABOR surplus affect state finances.

What is the funding mechanism/or the State Education Fund? Amendment 23 takes
an amount equal to one-third of one percent of Colorado taxable income, exempts it from
TABOR, and directs that it be deposited into the State Education Fund. During FY 2000-01, the
state diverted $164.3 million to the fund for one-half of the fiscal year. In fiscal years 2001-02
and 2002-03, $272.9 million and $188.4 million, respectively, was diverted to the fund. Thus,
the income tax diversion for the first two-and-a-half years of Amendment 23 totaled $625.6
million. In addition to the income tax diversion, Amendment 23 requires that interest earned on
the fund be deposited in the fund. About $49 million in interest had been earned by the end of
FY 2002-03.
Where does the income tax diversion actually come from? When Amendment 23 was
passed in 2000, the state was in the process of collecting $927.2 million in surplus revenue for
FY 2000-01, on top of $941.1 million that was collected during FY 1999-00. These high levels
of surplus were being collected despite $450 million in annual tax cuts that were enacted in 1999
and 2000 and the diversion of $164.3 million to the State Education Fund in FY 2000-01. It was
widely believed that the state's surplus had grown so large that an economic downturn would not
eliminate it. Therefore, it looked like the State Education Fund would be permanently funded by
taxpayers through reduced TABOR refunds, and the General Fund would not be affected by the
diversion of income tax revenues. Although revenues to the General Fund would be reduced, the
General Fund would also experience an equal and offsetting reduction in its liabilities - the
amount of money required to be refunded to taxpayers. The end result would be that the General
Fund would be held harmless and the State Education Fund would provide additional revenue for
elementary and secondary education at the expense of the taxpayers.
The economy, in conjunction with the interaction of TABOR and Amendment 23,
produced different results, however. After one-half year of diverting money to the State
Education Fund, the state entered into a deep and prolonged recession. The entire TABOR
surplus was eliminated and, in fact, the state did not collect enough revenue to reach its TABOR
spending limit in FY 2001-02. This drop in revenue caused the state to "ratchet down" its
spending limit under TABOR. (The "ratchet-down" effect is explained in detail in Chapter 2 of
this report.) The recession continued into FY 2002-03 and the state saw its spending limit ratchet
down again.
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What was the impact of the state's recession on where the State Education Fund
money actually comes from? Had Amendment 23 not passed, the revenue that is transferred to
the State Education Fund would have been counted as TABOR revenue. Once state spending
limits began to ratchet down, that revenue would have lessened the impact of the ratchet down.
Therefore, the state would have retained more money in the General Fund each year than it :foes
currently. In fact, for fiscal years 2001-02 through 2003-04, the entire diversion to the State
Education Fund would have been deposited in the General Fund instead. So, in those three years,
money was diverted to the State Education Fund at the expense of the state's General Fund.
Although the revenue would have been in the General Fund, the state would not have had an
education fund, so the state would have had the same total amount of available revenue with or
without Amendment 23 for those years.
Beginning in FY 2004-05, the diversions to the State Education Fund will be larger than
the reduction in the General Fund revenues. As a result, the state will have more total money
under Amendment 23 than it would have had without the amendment. However, money
diverted to the State Education Fund will come partially from taxpayer refunds and partially from
revenue that would have been retained by the General Fund had Amendment 23 not passed. We
can estimate the amount that comes from each by calculating the TABOR surplus with and
without Amendment 23. Figure 5-4 illustrates the results of that calculation. It shows the
amount of revenue deposited into the State Education Fund each year under current law, the
portion that would have been refunded to taxpayers with the TABOR exemption in Amendment
23, and the portion that would have otherwise gone to the General Fund as allowable spending
under TABOR.
Figure 5-4
General Fund and Taxpayer Refund Reductions
Attributable to the State Education Fund Diversion
(Millions of Dollars)

2000-01

$164.3

$164.3

$0.0

2001-02

272.9

0.0

272.9

2002-03

188.4

0.0

188.4

2003-04

267.9

0.0

267.9

2004-05

290.8

76.8

214.0

2005-06

317.6

94.5

223.2

2006-07

339.8

105.9

233.9

2007-08

~62.7

116.9

$2,204.5

$558.4

Total

•

2-45.8

$1,646.1
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Of the $2.2 billion expected to be diverted to the State Education Fund through
FY 2007-08, $558 million can be considered new money to pay for the mandates of
Amendment 23, while the remaining $1.6 billion is a reduction in General Fund revenue.

Why does the source of the money/or the State Education Fund matter?
Amendment 23 places requirements on the state for funding elementary and secondary education.
These requirements cost the state money, and the State Education Fund was created to provide
additional revenue to the state to meet these demands. However, since the revenue to the State
Education Fund has primarily been revenue that would have otherwise gone to the General Fund,
the state has not received the expected amount of new revenue to fund the mandates of
Amendment 23. If fact, the mandates to increase education spending will cost the state an
estimated $1.4 billion between fiscal years 200 l-02 and 2007-08. The state will only collect
$558 million in new revenue -through reduced taxpayer refunds - during that period to fund
the mandates.

Outlook for State Education Fund and General Fund Appropriations
The income tax diversion to the State Education Fund provides an annual source of
revenue for the fund. Interest income supplements the diversion. When the balance of the State
Education Fund grows over time, it can be used as a mechanism to supplement General Fund
appropriations. The General Assembly can weigh all its expenditure requirements and make a
decision as to how much to spend from the fund as long as it meets its minimum General Fund
appropriations requirements for school finance. When the State Education Fund balance is
limited to annual revenues, it drives General Fund appropriations. That is, the General Fund
must provide all required revenue that is not in the State Education Fund. This is the scenario
that the General Assembly is now facing in the foreseeable future.
For the last three years, the State Education Fund has been somewhere between having a
substantial balance and being limited to the annual diversion. The fund was not in existence long
enough to develop a substantial balance, and the economy resulted in lower-than-anticipated
revenues being diverted to the fund. However, the fund did carry forward a balance from the first
half year of the diversion in FY 2000-01. This diversion preceded the implementation of the
spending requirements of Amendment 23 and the ability of the state to spend money from the
fund in FY 2001-02. Under current estimates, however, the FY 2004-05 General Fund
appropriation increase for school finance cannot be any less than about 3.4 percent to pay for the
act's requirements. (We anticipate that growth in personal income will again be lower than
4.5 percent, suspending the requirement for a 5 percent increase in General Fund appropriations
for school finance.) At this appropriation level, almost all money in the State Education Fund
would be spent until the fund is replenished in the following year with the income tax diversion.
At higher appropriation increases, the State Education Fund is likely to carry some money
forward into FY 2005-06; the amow1t of the carryforward depends on the appropriation increase
in FY 2004-05. Figure 5-5 shows the percentage increases required in General Fund
appropriations in fiscal years 2005-06, 2006-07, and 2007-08 if the scbool finance appropriation
is increased by 4 percent, 5 percent, or 6 percent in FY 2004-05.
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Figure 5-5
Estimated General Fund Increase for School Finance
Based on 4, 5, and 6 Percent Increases in FY 2004-05
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FY 2004-05

4.0%

5.0%

6.0%

FY 2005-06

10.3%

8.2%

6.2%

FY 2006-07

8.4%

9.4%

10.3%

FY 2007-08

6.4%

6.4%

6.4%

Although a high General Fund increase for school finance benefits the balance of the
State Education Fund, and therefore long-term funding for education, it has implications for the
rest of the General Fund budget. Our June 2003 revenue forecast indicates that General Fund
appropriations can increase by only 1.2 percent in FY 2004-05 and by 3 .16 percent in
FY 2005-06. Figure 5-6 illustrates how a variety of percentage increases in General Fund
appropriations for FY 2004-05 will affect the total amount of money available for other programs
supported by the General Fund.
Figure 5-6
Impact of General Fund Increases for School Finance on
General Fund Appropriations

FY 2004-05

$65.1

207%

173%

138%

116%

FY 2005-06

$173.1

86%

112%

138%

155%

FY 2006-07

$339.5

77%

71%

64%

60%

FY2007-08

$359.9

50%

50%

49%

49%

Issues and Options
This section presents two options for addressing the interaction between Amendment 23,
TABOR, and economic d~wnturns. These two options fqcus on increasing revenues and
reducing spending. Chapter 4 describes the property tax impact of the Gallagher Amendment
and TABOR on property taxes on school funding and presents additional options for relieving
the pressure on the state budget of funding for schools.
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The Issue: The interplay between Amendment 23, TABOR, and the economy has
resulted in less new money being available to the state to fund K-12 education than
was expected. Amendment 23 mandates $1.4 billion of spending throughjiscal
year 2007-08, but will provide only $558 million of new revenue. This disparity in
revenues and expenditures has added significantly to the burdens faced by the
state's General Fund.

The following two options either create another revenue source for Amendment 23 or
reduce the requirements of the amendment so that they better fit within the constraints of
available revenue.

Option 1: The General Assembly could ask voters to increase revenue for schools
to fund the requirements ofAmendment 23 by increasing taxes or further reducing
taxpayer refunds.

Issues for consideration. Voters indicated a willingness to pay for increases in public
elementary and secondary education when they passed Amendment 23. In 2000, the estimated
reduction in taxpayer refunds and corresponding increase in funding for education was
$4.58 billion over ten years. Curre11t estimates suggest that the actual reduction in taxpayer
refunds over seven years will be closer to $560 million. Voters may be inclined to support an
increase in revenue for schools given that the money anticipated in 2000 did not materialize.
However, economic times have changed since voters approved Amendment 23. Of the two
means of increasing revenue, reducing refunds may be more preferable to increasing taxes.
Taxpayers may view refunds as money that was already paid, as opposed to a new tax, which
they perceive as coming out of their pockets. Also, many taxpayers are impacted less by the loss
of refunds than they are by a tax increase because of the number of refund mechanisms and how
these mechanisms affect taxpayers differently.

Option 2: The General Assembly could ask voters to reduce the requirements for
spending under Amendment 23 based on a trigger. For example, the requirement
to increase spending by inflation plus one percentage point could be reduced or
eliminated when personal income growth is less than 4. 5 percent or the spending
mechanism could be changed to require that the available new money to the state
triggers what the required increase in spending is. Another example would be
benchmarking the n;quired increase in General Fund appropriations to personal
income in a more proportional manner.
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Issues for consideration. This option provides the General Assembly with additional
flexibility with regards to funding the mandates of Amendment 23, especially during
recessionary periods. The current "trigger" during a slow economic period - personal income
growth ofless than 4.5 percent - applies only to General Fund appropriations and is ineffective
because the amendment's total spending requirements continue. In addition, the trigger does nul
reflect the large variations that can occur in personal income. With the discrepancy thal exists
between the amount of money generated by Amendment 23 and its spending requirements,
funding education to the requirements of Amendment 23 will come at the expense of other state
programs. By providing a catch-up provision to eventually provide for ten years of inflation plus
one percent increases, the original intention of Amendment 23 to correct for past inadequate
funding of education could still be upheld.

Changing the existing mandated increases for education funding could reduce spending
on K-12 education, at least in the short run. Proponents of the amendment indicated it was
needed because inflation-adjusted per-pupil funding had declined since 1989. However, it
should be noted it was difficult in many years to fund any state program to inflation given the
constraints of the state's six percent limit on appropriations. From 1990 to 1999, the inflation
rate and the percentage change in population averaged 6.12 percent. Nonetheless, a bettereducated work force is a key to attracting businesses to Colorado. The financing ofK-12
education suffered in previous economic slowdowns relative to other government programs.
Amendment 23 is a tool to see that education funding is at the head of government programs for
the next eight years regardless of available revenue.
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CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION FUNDING
Colorado funds capital projects at the state level primarily through the General Fund.
Given the state's other demands on the General Fund, this chapter looks at how capital projects
have been funded and explores whether state constitutional provisions prevent the state from
optimizing capital funding.

Colorado has spent considerable money, $2.9 billion, on capital projects over the past
15 years. This is an average of$193.9 million per year. The state has mostly relied on a
"pay-as-you-go" system to fund capital projects, which includes both capital construction and
controlled maintenance projects. It has, however, borrowed money by issuing certificates of
participation (COPs) at times when General Fund revenues were not sufficient to fund capital
needs. Certificates of participation were mostly authorized during the late 1980s, early 1990s,
and more recently during the 2003 legislative session. Of the $2.9 billion appropriated for
capital projects since FY 1989-90, $264.3 million, or about 9 percent, was appropriated for
projects funded through COPs.

Capital Spending in a Fluctuating Economy
Changes in the economy significantly impact capital spending. Although funding for
capital is appropriated from the Capital Construction Fund (CCF) and the Controlled
Maintenance Trust Fund (CMTF), the money in these funds primarily comes from the General
Fund. Of the $2.9 billion appropriated for capital in the last 15 years, 74 percent has come from
the General Fund. Because capital funding is so dependent on the General Fund, and because the
General Fund is susceptible to changes in the economy, capital funding can be erratic and
fluctuate from year to year. Over the past 15 years, state funding for capital projects in Colorado
rose from less than $100 million in the early 1990s to a peak of $523 million in FY 1998-99,
then plummeted to the current year's appropriation of $9.5 million. Figure 6-1 compares
appropriations for capital projects to Colorado's business cycle - as measured by employment
growth - from FY 1989-90 to FY 2003-04.
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Figure 6-1
State Capital Appropriations and the Economy
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In the late 1980s and early 1990s, capital funding remained fairly constant at about
$82 million per year. In the mid 1990s, however, this steady level of funding changed for two
reasons. First, unlike the General Fund, state law does not limit the amount of money that can be
expended from the Capital Construction Fund. Second, General Fund transfers to the Capital
Construction Fund are not counted against the General Fund 6 percent appropriations limit. This
means that General Fund moneys may be expended beyond the General Fund appropriations
limit if the moneys are transferred to the Capital Construction Fund. In the mid and late 1990s,
growth in state General Fund revenue exceeded the amount necessary to fund appropriations up
to the General Fund appropriations limit. As a result, a large portion of General Fund moneys in
excess of the appropriations limit were transferred to the Capital Construction Fund. Revenue
above the 6 percent limit led to a $523 million appropriation in FY 1998-99, a $249 million
appropriation in FY 1999-00, and a $288 million appropriation in FY 2000-01.
In one sense, the passage of TABOR has limited the amount of money available for
capital projects. After the passage of TABOR, the General Assembly lost the ability to change
the 6 percent appropriations limit. TABOR provided that the appropriations limit could only be
weakened by future voter approval, rather than by legislative action. TABOR did not prevent
revenue above the 6 percent limit from being spent on capital projects, but the revenue above the
TABOR revenue limit is now refunded to the taxpayers rather than being identified as excess
reserve that would be available for capital construction or highway projects.
In another sense, though, the legislative response to TABOR leQ to a one-time increase in
the amount of money available for capital. In 1998, the General Assembly approved House Bill
98-1414 that allowed for the TABOR surplus to be booked in the fiscal year it was refunded
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rather than the fiscal year it accrued. The FY 1998-99 appropriation of $523 million was partly
attributable to this new law.
However, this multi-year elevated funding level for capital also led to large cuts to capital
construction for FY 2001-02. For FY 2001-02, within available revenues, the legislature had to
appropriate moneys for operating expenditures in addition to budgeting for a $927 million
TABOR refund from the prior year. This resulted in a decision to cut capital expenditures for
that year by $274 million.
The state's budget problems have also meant that less money has been available for
capital projects in recent years. The General Assembly appropriated $9.5 million for capital for
FY 2003-04, or about 5 percent of the average annual funding for the last 15 years. In addition,
slightly under $310 million in capital appropriations has been cut since September 2001. Even if
more prosperous times return to the state, though, the high appropriations of the late 1990s are
unlikely to return. Under a law passed during the 2002 session, excess General Fund revenues
will now be split between highway construction (two-thirds) and capital projects (one-third).
According to our June 2003 revenue forecast, no excess General Fund revenues are expected
until FY 2007-08.

Colorado's Capital Construction and Controlled Maintenance Need
Determining controlled maintenance and renovation need. Colorado's capital needs
tend to grow despite vacillations in the economy. Over the last 13 years, the state has increased
its inventory of state-funded (as opposed to cash-funded) facilities by 38 percent, from
27.3 million gross square feet (GSF) to 37.3 million GSF. Approximately 30 percent of the
increase is due to the acquisition of existing facilities. As the state acquires existing facilities and
constructs new facilities, the cost to maintain the state facilities inventory increases. This cost is
primarily borne by the General Fund.
Colorado's State Buildings and Real Estate Programs Office explains that annual funding
for controlled maintenance and renovation is guided by the "reinvestment rate" needed to attain a
desired facility condition within a specific time frame. The reinvestment rate for controlled
maintenance and renovation, recommended by a national study, is 1.5 percent to 3.0 percent of
the total current replacement value of all facilities. 15 The study concluded that underfunding of
maintenance and renovation of public buildings is a widespread and persistent problem, states
that the level of annual funding depends on:
✓

✓
✓
✓

the age of the buildings and infrastructure;
the intensity and type of facilities used;
the types and quality of construction materials;
the climate;

15. Harvey H. Kaiser, The Facilities Audit: A Process for Improving Facilities Conditions. Alexandria, VA: APPA, the Association
of Higher Education Facilities Officers, 1993.
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✓

✓

the status of regulatory compliance; and
the effectiveness and efficiency of the maintenance organization. 16

The State Buildings and Real Estate Programs Office values the current statewide
General Fund building inventory at approximately $6.2 billion. The 1.5 to 3 percent guideline
indicates that the state's annual controlled maintenance and renovation budget should range from
$93 million to $186 million. Funding for controlled maintenance, one part of the controlled
maintenance/renovation budget, has averaged about $26 million annually over the last 15 years.
From FY 1997-98 to FY 2000-0 I , funding averaged almost $44 million. Renovation, by contrast
is part of the capital construction budget. Capital construction appropriations have accounted for
89 percent of the total capital budget since FY 1989-90. A breakdown of renovation versus new
construction is not available.
The State Buildings Office annually submits a long-term controlled maintenance budget
recommendation to the Capital Development Committee. For the next five years, FY 2004-05
through FY 2008-09, the five-year need has been identified as $463 million, an average of about
$93 million per year. This recommendation does not include renovation projects. Considering
the low level of capital funding over the past three years, the renovation needs of the state
continue to grow.
New construction. When the cost to renovate an existing facility reaches a certain point,
it makes more economic sense to build a new facility. State agencies continue to submit annual
requests for new construction projects, although funding for new projects has virtually halted.

Revenue Sources for Capital Projects
As previously noted, capital construction and controlled maintenance projects are funded
from moneys in the Capital Construction Fund and the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund,
which primarily come from the General Fund. To a much lesser degree, capital projects are
funded with interest earnings and borrowed money. Revenue to the Capital Construction Fund
totaled $2.8 billion over the last 15 years, while interest revenue available from the Controlled
Maintenance Trust Fund totaled $86.6 million, for a combined total of $2.9 billion.

16. American Public Works Association (A WP A) and the Building Research Board of the National Research Council, Committing
to the Cost ofOwnership: Maintenance and Repair ofPublic Buildings. Chicago: A WP A, 1991. The National Research Council
is the working arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.
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General Fund moneys. General Fund transfers are available for capital projects after the
General Fund has satisfied operating needs and other statutory obligations. These transfers are
exempt from the 6 percent appropriations limit. Consequently, the past practice of the General
Assembly has generally been to transfer General Fund reserve moneys to the Capital
Construction Fund. Since FY 1988-89, a statutory General Fund transfer has been in place to
provide a minimum level of funding for capital construction. The current transfer amount of
$100 million expires after FY 2005-06. In addition, this $100 million transfer was reduced by
the legislature to about $9.5 million for FY 2002-03 and FY 2003-04.
Interest earnings. Money in the Capital Construction Fund can be invested to earn
interest. All interest earned on the fund remains in the fund and is used to fund capital projects.
The Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund, created to allow the interest earned on the
principal amount to be used for controlled maintenance projects, has provided $86.6 million of
interest earnings for controlled maintenance projects since FY 1996-97. The principal of the
Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund peaked at $248. l million, but has since been transferred,
along with existing interest earnings ($9.5 million), to the General Fund to help alleviate the
General Fund revenue shortfall. As a result, no interest earnings have been appropriated from the
trust fund for the last two fiscal years. Senate Bill 03-262 now calls for the repayment of the
Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund to occur over two fiscal years: $138.2 million in FY 2004-05
and FY 2005-06. Figure 6-2 briefly summarizes the funding sources for capital construction and
the amount received from each source.
Figure 6-2
Capital Construction Fund and Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund
Funding Sources: FY 1989-90 to FY 2003-04 ($ in millions)

Capital Construction Fund (CCF)

General
Fund

Interest and
Reversions

$2,151.0

$312.4

74.2%

The amount includes moneys transferred from the General
Fund, which are not subject to the 6 percent appropriations
limit. In addition to transfers from the General Fund, the
General Assembly has also appropriated money to the CCF.
This has usually been done to maximize the appropriations
base for succeeding years.

10.8%

All interest earned from the investment of moneys in the CCF
remains in the fund for future expenditure. In addition, all
unexpended project balances revert to the fund and are
available for appropriation.
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Figure 6-2 (cont.)
Capital Construction Fund and Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund
Funding Sources: FY 1989-90 to FY 2003-04 ($ in millions)
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Lottery
Revenue

Subtotal

$347.2

12,0%

When lottery games were first established in Colorado, the
General Assembly directed that 50 percent of the revenues be
transferred to the CCF. This changed by the passage of the
Great Outdoors Colorado Program in 1992, The constitutional
provision phased out the use of lottery moneys for state capital
construction projects. It allowed lottery proceeds to only be
used toward the payment of selected COPs through
FY 1998-99.

$2,810.6

97.0%

Capital Construction Fund Total

Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund (CMTF)

General
Fund

$248,1

NIA*

General Fund transfers to the CMTF became the principal of
the fund and were not available for appropriation. The amount
transferred was not subject to the 6 percent appropriations
limit The principal, however, was depleted to help address
the state's revenue shortfall.

Interest

$86.6

3.0%

The interest earned on the principal of the CMTF supplements
the CCF and is only available to fund controlled maintenance
projects.

$86.6

3.0%

Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund Total

$2,897.2

100.0%

Subtotal*
Grand Total

• Only the interest from the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund is counted in the total, since the General Fund
amount was the principal of the fund and was not available for appropriation.

Borrowed moneys. A handful of capital projects have been funded over the years with
borrowed moneys through COPs. The amount appropriated for COP projects over the years has
been used to repay the principal and interest for a number of capital projects, including:
✓
✓

✓
✓
✓
✓

regional satellite facilities for the developmentally disabled;
the Grand Junction State Office Building;
the North Classroom Building on the Auraria campus;
Division of Youth Services facilities;
Department of Public Safety facilities; and
Department of Corrections facilities.

Since the state began using COPs in the late 1970s, it has borrowed approximately
$201 million for 11 projects. The repayment cost for these projects is approximately
$301 million, and has been funded through both the General Fund and lottery proceeds.
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In 2003, the General Assembly authorized two new COP projects through the passage of
House Bill 03-1256. The bill funded projects that the Department of Corrections and the
University of Colorado Health Sciences Center had attempted to receive funding for on a
"pay-as-you go" basis. COPs were viewed as a way to get the projects going during the
economic downturn, while extending their repayment over a long period of time. The total
combined cost of these projects over the next 25 years, including estimated interest, is
$549.l million, based on a principal amount of $305.7 million. The payments are projected to
be around $20 million annually through FY 2019-20, then to decrease to about $7 million
annually through FY 2030-31.

Funding Mechanisms: Pay-As-You-Go Versus Debt Financing
The General Assembly weighs several factors, including capital need, available revenue,
and the current and projected economy, when deciding how to fund capital projects. Depending
on the combination of these factors, the General Assembly may decide to fund a project on a
pay-as-you-go basis (based on annual available revenues) or to finance a project by borrowing
money. A later section describes various types of debt in detail, while this section considers the
advantages and disadvantages of debt financing and pay-as-you-go financing. Debt financing
makes funds for capital projects immediately available, particularly in a time of reduced state
revenues. Its major disadvantages, however, are financing costs, fixed long-term annual
appropriations, and the potential for default. The primary advantage of pay-as-you-go funding is
flexibility in prioritizing and funding projects from year to year. Figure 6-3 considers the
advantages and disadvantages of pay-as-you-go financing and debt financing.
Figure 6-3
Pay-As-You-Go Versus Debt Financing

Moneys are not used on interest payments and
can instead be used to fund additional projects.

If there is a revenue shortfall:
- high-priority projects may not be funded; and
- capital needs begin to mount.

The state maintains flexibility in prioritizing
projects for appropriations.

Projects are prioritized and funded based on
available revenue, which can fluctuate from year
to year.

There is a natural restraint on increasing project
spending. Because revenues are limited, only
necessary projects are funded.

When revenues are limited yet projects still
require funding, a reserve fund may be spent
down below an acceptable level.

Future taxpayers are not committed to funding
current projects.

Major projects will benefit future generations, but
they will not have to pay for them.

When a revenue shortfall exists, and if no
projects have been finance(j, there is no need to
cut funds from other state needs to make debt
payments.

Projects can more easily be delayed or cut, which
can increase the project cost due to inflation.

•
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Figure 6-3 (cont.)
Pay-As-You-Go Versus Debt Financing

' } ·OIIWvantages t ·
Money is immediately available for necessary
projects, eliminating delay.

More projects with limited merit may be funded,
because available revenue becomes less of a
factor in weighing the merits of projects.

The cost of long-term improvements is shared by
current and future taxpayers over a project's
useful life.

A project's value may be skewed (project benefits
may be over-estimated and project costs underestimated) to classify it as urgent. This could
result in higher project costs due to financing,
particularly if the project cost exceeds its useful
life.

Payments are made even during a revenue
shortfall.

Fixed long-term annual appropriations make it
more difficult to fund other projects or programs.

An ongoing debt financing program could allow for
a consistent level of projects to be addressed
each year, minimizing a backlog of projects that
could increase in cost the longer the project is
delayed.

If the state defaults on a debt payment:
- the proceeds from the sale of the property would
be used to pay off the investors, resulting in the
loss of the entire investment; and
- the state's credit rating could be negatively
impacted, limiting its ability to obtain insurance
and use the capital markets.

Annual payments can be structured to begin at a
date of the state's choosing, which:
- gives the state additional time to set aside funds
for the annual payments; and
- could mean that the payments are made in a
more favorable economic climate.

Financing costs, including transaction costs and
interest payments, increase the cost to complete
the project and leave fewer funds available for
other projects.

*Sources: Aronson, J. Richard, Management Policies in Local Government Finance (1996); Congressional Budget Office,
Innovative Financing of Highways (January 1998).

Recipients of Funded Projects
Over the past 15 years, most of Colorado's capital appropriations have been for capital
projects (89 percent), while 11 percent has been spent on controlled maintenance.
Capital construction projects. The largest recipient of capital construction funding over
the last 15 years has been higher education institutions, followed by the Department of
Corrections (DOC). Higher Education and DOC received about 65 percent of the capital
construction budget for the 15-year period. The DOC's square footage grew by 175 percent
between FY 1990-91 and FY 2003-04, from 2.4 million square feet to almost 6.6 million square
feet. The square footage for Higher Education, by contrast, grew by 33 percent, from
17.7 million to 23.6 million square feet. Figure 6-4 summarizes approwiations by major
recipients for the past 15 years.
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Figura 6-4
Breakdown of State-Funded Capital Construction Appropriations by Department
FY 1989-90 to FY 2003-04

Other
Human
15%
Service•
6%
--

Higher
Education
40%

Highways

14%
Corrections

25%

$2.9 BIiiion
Tota/State
Funds

Controlled maintenance projects. Although controlled maintenance accounted for
11 percent of total capital funding over the past 15 years, the amount appropriated for controlled
maintenance projects had been increasing annually until the recent economic downturn.
Figure 6-5 shows the funding history for controlled maintenance and breaks out the amount
appropriated from the Capital Construction Fund and the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund.
The graph demonstrates how the creation of a dedicated funding source, the trust fund, was used
to increase controlled maintenance funding. As previously discussed, however, this fund has
been depleted.
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Figure 6-5
Control.led Maintenance Funding History
Funding from the CCF and CMTF
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Constitutional Restrictions on Financing
This section explores the debt parameters established in Colorado's Constitution. In
summary, Colorado's Constitution has been interpreted to bar the state from issuing general
obligation debt. Due to TABOR, debt issued through revenue bonds is subject to voter approval.
The constitution did once allow for a statewide property tax to fund building construction.
However, TABOR eliminated the General Assembly's ability to assess a statewide mill levy.
General obligation debt. Article XI, Section 3 of the Colorado Constitution permits the
state to contract general obligation debt to:
✓
✓

✓
✓

provide for casual deficiencies of revenue;
erect public buildings for the use of the state;
suppress insurrection; or
defend the state or, in time of war, the nation.

While debt is not limited to suppress insurrection, defend the state, or assist in defending
the United States, allowable debt for casual deficiencies ofrevenue and for erecting public
buildings i~ strictly limited. Other than these exceptions, Article XI, Section 3 has consistently
been interpreted to prohibit the state from incurring general obligation.clebt, which is debt that is
secured by the full faith, credit, and taxing powers of the state. In a 1933 ruling, the Colorado
Supreme Court stated that the purpose of Article XI, Section 3, was to keep the state substantially
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on a cash basis, to prohibit the pledge of future fixed revenues, to forbid the contracting of debts,
and to make sure that one General Assembly would not paralyze the next by devouring the
available revenues of both. 17
The 1933 ruling was the result of interrogatories submitted by the legislature regarding
the constitutionality of a House bill. The bill attempted to create a fund to repay bonds issued by
the state. The bond proceeds were to fund highway improvements, while revenue to the fund
was to come from an existing excise tax on motor fuels. The court found that the state could not
rededicate revenue already provided in past years and already flowing into the state treasury for
the payment of debt.
In a more recent opinion, Submission of Interrogatories on House Bi/199-1325, 18 the
Colorado Supreme Court identified some of the characteristics of constitutionally prohibited debt
as:
✓
✓
✓
✓

obligations that pledge revenues of future years;
obligations that require the use of revenue from a tax otherwise available for general
purposes;
obligations legally enforceable against the state in future years; or
obligations for which future legislatures do not have the discretion to appropriate
funds.

The opinion also stated that if the appropriation is purely discretionary and nonobligatory,
it is not a payment on constitutional debt. The court identified previous court-approved financing
mechanisms as:
✓

✓
✓

borrowed funds repaid from the revenue generated by the improvement;
money borrowed by a public entity independent from the state; and
lease-purchase agreements entered into by the state for a building or other
improvement, where the parties are not bound to renew the lease.

Revenue bonds. Prior to the passage of TABOR, the legislature could have created a
revenue stream and special fund from which to pay revenue bonds. TABOR, however, requires
prior voter approval for any multiple-fiscal year direct or indirect district debt or other financial
obligation, unless enough money is set aside to pay for the obligation in all years the payments
are due. Further, TABOR requires a vote of the people to raise taxes. Therefore, the state cannot
issue revenue bonds without a vote of the people.
Certificates ofparticipation. Certificates of participation, or COPs, are publicly
marketed lease-purchase agreements. Neither the Colorado Constitution nor the Colorado
statutes specifically addresses COPs or defines them as debt or a financial obligation. In the past,

17.

In re Senate Resolution No. 2, Concerning the Constitutionality of House Bill No. 6, 31 P.2d 325, 94 Colo. 101.

18. 979 P.2d 549 (Colo. 1999)
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both the state and local governments in Colorado have issued COPs to fund construction or
improvements of facilities.
COPs issued by the state have included a clause stating that payments on the COP depend
upon an annual appropriation by the state. This clause is meant to distinguish the lease from debt
and release the state, if necessary, from financial obligation. Because they are subject to annual
appropriation, the General Assembly has not considered COPs issued for capital construction
projects to be debt.
None of the COPs entered into by the state to construct state facilities has been
challenged in court. Some COP transactions, however, may require prior voter approval pursuant
to TABOR's multiple-fiscal year restriction, depending on how they are structured. In
Submission of Interrogatories on House Bill 99-1325, the Colorado Supreme Court held that
some multiple-year transactions that do not create debt in violation of Article XI, Section 3, of
the Colorado Constitution nonetheless require prior voter approval pursuant to TABOR. The
court reasoned that the Colorado Department of Transportation's plan in House Bill 99-1325 to
finance transportation projects through revenue anticipation notes constituted a multiple-fiscal
year financial obligation that required prior voter approval. The court stated that, to make this
determination, the entire obligation must be viewed as a whole. The court considered the size of
the $1 billion-dollar transaction against the Department of Transportation's $585 million annual
budget. The court also concluded that the extent of the security given by the state in the event of
non-payment appeared to be a financial obligation spanning more than one year.
When does a financial transaction require voter approval? The Colorado Attorney
General has provided a list of factors to consider when determining whether a financial
transaction requires prior voter approval pursuant to the House Bill 99-1325 Interrogatories
decision. 19 According to the Attorney General, the following factors may exempt a transaction
from TABOR voting requirements:
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

✓

The transaction does not involve the issuance of negotiable instruments, such as
bonds or notes by the state;
The government receives tangible property for use rather than money to
spend;
The lender or investors have a security interest in tangible property, which
can be repossessed in the event of non-payment;
The lender or investors do not have a security interest in the balance of the
unspent cash proceeds of the transaction;
The transaction does not involve the use of credit enhancement mechanisms,
such as bond insurance or letters of credit;
The transaction has a finite duration for repayment. There is no open-ended
commitment to pay until repaid in full;

19. Formal Opinion of Ken Salazar, Attorney General, No. 01-5, AG Alpha No. PE CS AGBAQ, Certificates of Participation as
Financing Method for Vehicle Purchases by the Division of Central Services, December 10, 2001.
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✓

✓
✓

The dollar amount of the transaction is a realistically manageable obligation
and does not substantially consume or exceed the agency's total annual
budget;
A private lessor owns the equipment leased to the state; and
Incurring the cost of holding an election would be absurd under the
circumstances.

A statewide property tax/or financing capital projects. Article X, Section 11, of the
Colorado Constitution allows the state to assess a statewide property tax. However, the passage
of TABOR has effectively eliminated this option since TABOR specifically precludes the
assessment of a statewide property tax.
The statewide property tax was last imposed in 1964. Article X, Section 11 limits the
property tax rate for state purposes to four mills. It also states that the General Assembly can
approve an additional levy, not to exceed one mill, for "the erection of additional buildings at,
and for the use, benefit and maintenance, and support of the state educational institutions."
Historically, state property taxes were dedicated to capital construction financing. In
1947, the state embarked on a major building program with the adoption of23 separate bills for
construction of statewide facilities through debt financing. A combined mill levy of 0.149 was in
place for the first two years, increasing to 1.49 mills for the next eight years. This method of
financing continued in 195 5 with the adoption of additional legislation establishing a combined
levy of 1.43 mills to fund new higher education facilities and buildings in the Capitol Complex.
The debt for these buildings was retired in 1964.
Information from the Division of Property Taxation shows the history of the statewide
mill levy from 1912 through 1964. The levy ranged from 1.3 to 4.53 mills. The revenue not
dedicated for state buildings was used for general government purposes.
If the TABOR constitutional prohibition on a statewide property was removed from the
constitution, a one mill levy on 2003 property values would produce approximately $60.5 million
in revenue. This revenue would be subject to both the TABOR limits on property tax revenue
(inflation plus the net increase in property valuation) and state fiscal year spending (inflation plus
population growth).

Types of Financing
Three common types of debt financing are general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, and
certificates of participation (lease-purchase agreements). General obligation bonds and revenue
bonds are the two most common types of long-term debt in the United States, but only the latter
may be used at the state level in Colorado, unless the constitution is amended. Figure 6-6
provides a comparison of general obligation bonds, revenue bonds, and certificates of
participation.
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Figure 6-6
Comparison of General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and
Certificates of Participation

CJ•n•ral Obllflallon (GO)
·
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· •· · · · · · · · ... (COPs)

Bonda

What Is the repayment source?

Property taxes are the usual
source, but any revenue
source may be used.

Revenue from the project being
financed or a predetermined
specific and related revenue
source (which could include
taxes).

Annual appropriations from the
governing body in the form of
lease payments.

Is the obligation considered long-term debt?

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Is the repayment guaranteed?
Yes, by the full faith, credit,
and taxing powers of the
issuing government.

What happens H the planned repayment source Is not sufficient?

The government must find
another source to repay the
bonds. For example, a local
government must levy taxes
on all of its assessable
property at whatever level
needed to make the debt
service payments. In other
words, the bondholders have
an unlimited claim on the
issuing government's taxes
and other revenues until the
bonds are repaid.

Bondholders have no recourse to
other revenues of the issuing
government. The government may
choose to repay the bonds using
another revenue source, but is not
obligated to do so.

The lease terminates and the
trustee (which holds the title to
the property being financed) may
sell, re-let, or otherwise dispose
of the property, using the
proceeds to pay the investors.
The government's investment to
that point is lost.

Which option Is the least expensive, or most expensive, for the government to issue?

Because GO bonds are
backed by the full faith,
credit, and taxing powers of
the government, they are
more likely to be paid on
time. GO debt therefore
bears a lower interest rate
than nonguaranteed debt.

Revenue bonds are more costly
than GO bonds, but less costly
than COPs. The repayment by the
government is not guaranteed, and
is therefore more risky.

COPs are more costly than GO
or revenue bonds. Repayment is
subject to annual appropriations,
which makes them less reliable
than the other two options.
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Figure 6-6 (cont.)
Comparison of General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and
Certificates of Participation
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What Is the difference In costs between the options, assuming $100 ml/lion Is Issued over 30.

years?2°
The interest cost is
estimated to be $95.4 million
at 5.01 percent, assuming
the issue is property-tax
based, with no insurance.

The interest cost is estimated to
be $97.4 million at 5.10 percent,
assuming the issue is sales tax
based, with no insurance.

The interest cost is estimated to
be $101.7 million at 5.22 percent,
assuming the issue includes
AAA-rated insurance, the cost of
which is included in the interest
total.

What are the advantages of each option?

(1) Appropriate for projects
that benefit the entire
community.
(2) Least costly to the
government, since it is
backed by the full faith,
credit, and taxing power of
the issuing government.

(1) If the revenue source is
insufficient to make debt service
payments, the government is not
legally obligated to appropriate
other revenues for debt
repayment.
(2) Project is paid for by those
who benefit the most from the
project (the users).

(1) Voter approval is not required
if the COPs meet certain court
standards.
(2) Lease payments can be
structured to begin on a date of
the state's choosing, giving the
state additional time to set aside
money for the annual payments.
(3) Government has the option
of not appropriating funds for the
annual payment, if necessary.

20. Bill Dougherty, UD Advisors, Denver. CO.
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Figure 6-6 (cont.)
Comparison of General Obligation Bonds, Revenue Bonds, and
Certificates of Participation
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What are the disadvantages of each option?
(1) If planned revenue
source is insufficient, other
programs will have to be cut,
or taxes will have to be
raised.
(2) Requires voter approval.
(3) Because of the voter
approval requirement,
general obligation bonds
cannot be issued quickly to
take advantage of low
interest rates.

(1) Unlike most states, revenue
bonds in Colorado require voter
approval.
(2) Because of the voter approval
requirement, revenue bonds
cannot be issued quickly to take
advantage of low interest rates.
(3) The bond market could react
negatively to the government if a
default occurs, even though the
bonds are secured only by the
revenue of the project being
financed (Moody's indicates that it
does not include revenue bonds in
determining state debt burden, but
it monitors and publishes
information on this type of debt).

(1) If funds are not appropriated
in any year, the project will be
sold, re-leased, or disposed of,
and there is no way of recouping
the money already paid by the
government.
(2) More expensive than general
obligation or revenue bonds.
(3) Complex, which drives up
administrative costs.

(4) Generally more complex than
general obligation bonds, which
drives up administrative costs.

How Other States Pay for Their Capital Needs
This section considers how other states pay for their capital construction needs. This
could be useful in considering changes to the Colorado Constitution or statutes. A survey of a
number of states revealed dedicated revenue sources, in addition to debt financing, are routine
methods to finance large capital construction projects. General Fund revenues are typically used
for maintenance costs and debt service on general obligation bonds.
Currently, 45 states allow general obligation debt. Of these, however, four states require
voter approval for the general obligation debt and seven states have debts limits ofless than
$2.0 million. Five states are prohibited from issuing general obligation debt - Colorado,
Indiana, Nebraska, Oregon, and South Dakota. 21
Figure 6-7 summarizes funding sources for capital construction most commonly used by
other states.
'

21. National Association of State Budget Officers, Budget Processes in the States, January 2002
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Figure 6-7
Typical Nationwide Funding Sources for Capital Construction

(1) General Fund;

(1) General Fund;

(1) General Fund;

(2) Reserve accounts; and

(2) Higher-education-issued
bonds and state-issued debt;

(2) Debt financing / leasepurchase;

(3) Cash funds from tuition and
student fees;

(3) Lottery revenue; and

(3) Maintenance funds included
with new building appropriations.

(4) Fines.
(4) Public/private partnerships;
(5) Gifts, grants, and
donations;
(6) Dedicated taxes.

Dedicated revenue sources. Dedicated revenue sources, in the form of a tax, fee, or
constitutional/statutory requirement, direct general funds for capital construction purposes. The
following are examples of taxes dedicated to capital construction financing in other states:
✓
✓
✓
✓
✓

Nevada dedicates 29.8 percent of the annual slot tax for higher education capital
construction and debt retirement;
Illinois allocates 5.5 percent of its sales tax, 4.9 percent of the hotel tax, and
4.1 percent of the racing privilege tax for capital development projects;
Nebraska dedicates 3.1 percent of the sales, use, and excise tax on cigarettes for
university facility improvements;
Idaho requires 0.5 percent of individual ·and 0.2 percent of corporate income taxes go
for construction and maintenance of public buildings; and
Florida has a gross receipts utility tax for higher education capital construction.

Constitutional or statutory requirements directing general funds for capital construction
purposes vary, as shown in the following examples:
I

✓
✓

the Louisiana Constitution specifies that all excess general funds be used for capital
outlay or debt service; and
a 1998 New Jersey constitutional amendment requires general fund revenue to be
used to preserve one million acres of open space over a ten-year period, resulting in a
FY 2003-04 budget of $98 million.
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Generally, states fund controlled maintenance projects through appropriations from the
general fund. These moneys in some instances are transferred to a maintenance fund. Many
states also rely on agency rent to generate a pool of money for maintenance, and some have
established other dedicated revenue streams. Examples include the following:
✓

✓

✓
✓

Utah statutes require that 1.1 percent of the replacement cost of its facilities be set
aside from the General Fund for maintenance (this was reduced to 0.9 percent the last
two years due to budget shortfalls);
Missouri statutes allocate 0.1 percent of 1.0 percent of total General Fund revenues to
a Facilities Maintenance Reserve Fund (due to budget shortfalls this transfer has not
occurred in the last two biennial budgets);
Indiana has developed replacement fund reserves for new buildings; and
Virginia keeps a statewide maintenance reserve fund.

Debt financing. States that use debt financing view it as an equitable method of
distributing costs and benefits to both present and future generations. To reduce the cost of
issuing debt and to achieve lower interest rates, debt can be issued jointly rather than
individually. For instance, Louisiana has a "bond bank" that issues debt in the state's name that
is used for multiple jurisdictions. These "pooled debt" arrangements, where one entity issues
debt and others borrow from the proceeds, result in more cost-effective terms.

In several states oversight of debt issuance, once adopted in a state budget bill or bond
bill, is provided by separate commissions consisting of elected and governor-appointed officials.
Generally, the commissions oversee bond issuance and reissues and monitor total state debt
limits. Debt payments are generally processed through the state treasury. For example, the
Georgia State Financing and Investment Commission manages Georgia's public debt. Its duties
include the administrative responsibilities associated with issuing bonds and investing bond
proceeds. The commission also manages capital construction projects related to the issuance of
debt. The Georgia General Assembly annually authorizes the commission, through the Long
Appropriations Bill, to issue general obligation debt to finance the construction of various
projects. The commission's operating budget for FY 1999-00 was almost $2.9 million. The
operating costs are funded from interest earned on the bond proceeds. The commission members
include the Governor, President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the State Auditor, the -Attprney General, and the Director of the Office of Treasury and Fiscal Services.
The majority ofthe states that allow debt financing have debt limits or restrictions.
Several different types of limitations exist. They range from a specific dollar limit to formulas
based upon certain state economic measures. Examples of debt restrictions include the
following:
✓

✓
✓

the Virginia Constitution limits debt to an amount equal to 1.15 times the average
annual state income and sales tax revenues based upon the previous three fiscal
years;
Louisiana constitutional requirements specify that annual ~ebt service payments not
exceed 6 percent of the total annual tax, license, and fee revenue;
the Utah constitutional debt limit is 1.5 percent of the total fair market value of
taxable property, with a statutory limit on general obligation bonds of 20 percent of
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✓

the maximum allowable appropriations (less debt service) from the General Fund,
School Fund, and Transportation Fund; and
Maryland has a state policy that outstanding debt shall not exceed 3 .2 percent of
state personal income, and debt service shall not exceed 8 percent of the revenue
source dedicated for payment of the debt service.

Debt programs. States that use debt financing as a routine part of capital funding have
debt policies that are established by the executive branch or commissions responsible for debt
oversight. These polices include the types of projects that can be financed, term of the financing,
and amounts that can be financed. Examples of policies follow.
Financing terms:
✓
the term of bond financing cannot exceed the expected useful life of the project;
✓
the average maturity of general obligation bonds must be at or below a certain
number of years;
✓
on all debt-financed projects, a down payment of at least a certain percent of total
project cost must be made from current revenues;
✓
where possible, special assessment, revenue, or other self-supporting bonds instead
of general obligation bonds must be used;
Amount and types ofprojects to finance:
✓
total general obligation debt must not exceed a certain percent of the assessed
valuation of taxable property;
✓
long-term borrowing must be confined to capital improvements or projects that
cannot be financed from current revenues;
✓
long-term debt may not be used for current operations;
Debt administration:
✓
tax anticipation debt must be retired annually and general obligation bond
anticipation debt must be retired within six months after completion of the project;
✓
good communications with bond rating agencies about the government's financial
condition must be maintained;
✓
a policy of full disclosure on every financial report and bond prospectus must be
followed;
✓
proceeds must be invested during implementation to maximize earnings within
federal arbitrage regulations;
✓
adequate property loss insurance must be retained on the assets pledged; and
✓
the earnings disclosure of financial information must be tracked, calculated, and
documented.
Capital budget cuts. In the last three years, several states have cut or eliminated capital
construction funding due to revenue shortfalls. According to the National Association of Budget
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Officers, measures taken to reduce capital spending included: delaying capital projects (seven
states), shifting pay-as-you-go capital projects to debt (four states), and freezing purchases (three
states). 22

Financing Options for Capital Construction and Controlled Maintenance
The previous parts of this chapter considered how Colorado and other states have funded
capital construction and controlled maintenance projects. This section discusses several options
for paying for the state's current and future capital needs.

The Issue: Capital construction and controlled maintenance are on-going state
expenditure requirements.
Option: The General Assembly could consider extending the General Fund
transfer to the Capital Construction Fund

Issues for consideration. The state could continue funding capital projects through
transfers from the General Fund to the Capital Construction Fund, by using interest earned on
the Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund (assuming the principal of that fund is restored), and by
the oc.casional use of COPs. However, the last $100 million General Fund transfer, a major
source of capital funding, is scheduled for FY 2005-06. Continuing the statutory transfer beyond
this point allows the Joint Budget Committee and the Capital Development Committee to
assume the funding will be available annually unless the legislature, acting by bill, eliminates or
reduces the transfer. Basically, the transfer "carves out" funding for capital.

The Issue: Colorado does not have a dedicated revenue source to fund capital
construction and controlled maintenance projects and therefore funding for such
projects suffers during economic downturns.
Options: The General Assembly could consider submitting a proposal for voter
approval to create a dedicated revenue source for capital projects. One option
could be to eliminate TABOR's prohibition on a statewide property tax. A
second option could be to identify a tax or fee that directs revenue for capital
purposes.

Issues for consideration. Prior to TABOR, the General Assembly had the option of
imposing a statewide property tax of no more than four mills, plus one additional mill for
educational facilities. The property tax was used by the state for capital construction from 1947
22. National Association of Budget Officers, Fiscal Survey of the States - June 2003.
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to 1964. Repealing the prohibition in TABOR would provide the state with the flexibility to use
this revenue source, which is limited to five mills, if it so desired. If a property tax question is
subsequently presented to the voters, it could be structured to allow the General Assembly to
impose anywhere from one to five mills and not require voter approval if a higher mill was
imposed from one year to the next, as long as the total statewide mill did not exceed five mills.
A statewide mill could be appropriate in that the state's building inventory, primarily higher
education institutions and correctional facilities, are located throughout Colorado. A statewide
mill levy could spread the cost of constructing and maintaining these buildings throughout the
state.
Another option for creating a dedicated revenue source for capital construction and
controlled maintenance could be a tax, fee, or constitutional/statutory requirement that directs
the revenue for capital construction purposes. A dedicated revenue source would help to create a
dependable source for capital construction. However, depending on the economic climate, the
amount of revenue would vary on a year-to-year basis. As identified previously, other states
have identified specific tax revenue, such as percentage of the sales and use tax, for capital
construction purposes.

The Issue: Colorado's Constitution prohibits general obligation debt.
Option: The General Assembly could consider asking voters to amend the
constitution to allow for general obligation debt.

Issues for consideration. The General Assembly could submit a proposal for voter
approval to amend the constitution to allow for general obligation debt. As noted previously in
this chapter, general obligation debt is the least costly financing method, because it bears a lower
interest rate than nonguaranteed debt. The General Assembly could also consider asking voters
to approve a mechanism for creating and managing debt for capital projects wherein requiring
voter approval would not be required for each issue. Numerous states rely on general obligation
debt to finance capital projects.

,,
The Issue: The Colorado Commission on Higher Education's Tuition & Fees
Policy currently prohibits institutions from using student fees, tuition, or their
general fund increases to pay for academic facility construction needs.
Option: The General Assembly could consider allowing student fees to fund
academic facilities.

Issues for consideration. Student fees are another potential source of funds for capital
projects. The Governor's Blue Ribbon Panel on Higher Education for the 21 st Century discussed
the idea of assessing students a facility fee in the range of $100 per year that could be used to
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pay for construction projects. One higher education official estimated that this would raise
approximately $15 million per year statewide. The fees could be spent directly on projects, or
could be a revenue source for a revenue bond or a COP.

The Issue: New capital construction projects and buildings purchased by the
state are not eligible for controlled maintenance dollars for five years after
construction or purchase (starting with projects funded for FY 2002-03, the
waiting period is 15 years}, which means that the estimated future cost of
maintaining new buildings is not included in the state's backlog of controlled
maintenance projects. Once these facilities are eligible for controlled
maintenance funding, however, they contribute to the backlog.
Option: The General Assembly could consider requiring capital construction
requests to include the cost of out-year controlled maintenance costs.

Issues for consideration. This proposal would add the estimated cost of future
controlled maintenance to the total cost of a project. The estimated cost could be a percentage of
the project construction cost, and could vary based on the type of project. The cost could also be
reduced if the project is in compliance with certain standards (i.e., it exceeds standard quality of
construction materials). Because departments and institutions have only three years to spend
capital appropriations, the controlled maintenance line item could.be deposited into the
Controlled Maintenance Trust Fund. The moneys in the fund would not need to be tied to the
specific project, but instead could be "banked" for general controlled maintenance needs.
This change would not necessarily reduce the state's controlled maintenance needs, but it
would make more apparent how funding a new building will affect the state's future controlled
maintenance needs. In other words, it would provide the General Assembly with a more
accurate projection of the costs and benefits of a project. Along with the new 15-year waiting
period for controlled maintenance, the change may encourage the construction of higher quality
buildings.

l 26................................................................................ Chapter 6: Capital Construction Funding

-

~-----·---

----··- --

-------

--------------------

APPENDIX A

.

2003

HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 03-1033

BY REPRESENTATIVES King, Spradley, Berry, Boyd, Butcher, Coleman, Fritz, Hall, Hodge,
Hoppe, Miller, Romanoff, Rose, Sinclair, Stafford, Stengel, Weddig, and Williams T.;
also SENATORS Anderson, Andrews, and Nichol.

CONCERNING THE REQUIREMENT THAT THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF
CONDUCT A STUDY OF CERTAIN CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROVISIONS.

WHEREAS, The state of Colorado is experiencing an economic downturn that has reduced
state revenues and affected the ability of the state to provide various programs and services to its
citizens; and
WHEREAS, Several amendments to the state constitution, including section 20 of article X
(the TABOR amendment), section 17 of article IX (Amendment 23), and section 3 (1) of article
X (the Gallagher amendment) of the state constitution, interact so as to limit the ability of the
SU!te to address the economic downturn and maintain current service levels for the citizens of the
state; and
WHEREAS, Those constitutional amendments were approved by the voters of the state at
different times and without full knowledge of the impact the amendments would have on each
other and the state's budgetary flexibility; and
WHEREAS, The General Assembly needs to obtain thorough information on how these
constitutional amendments interact with each other and certain existing statutory provisions and
how they affect the state's budgetary flexibility in order to determine whether modifications to
the amendments should be proposed to the citizens of the state; and •
·
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WHEREAS, Pursuant to section 2-3-304, Colorado Revised Statutes, the Legislative Council
Staff is responsible for providing research services to the General Assembly and, upon direction
of the General Assembly, is to conduct studies and provide information to the General Assembly;
now, therefore,

Be It Resolved by the House of Representatives ofthe Sixty-fourth General Assembly of the
State of Colorado, the Senate concurring herein:
(I) That the Legislative Council Staff shall conduct a study of the interaction of the TABOR
amendment, Amendment 23, the Gallagher amendment, and any other relevant constitutional and
statutory provisions and how the amendments impact the ability of the state to provide funding
for various programs and services to its citizens.
(2) That, in conducting the study, the Legislative Council Staff may consult with and obtain
input and information from appropriate individuals and organizations.
(3) That, upon completion of the study, the Legislative Council Staff shall report its findings
to the Executive Committee of the Legislative Council of the Sixty-fourth General Assembly or
such interim committee as it may designate by September 1, 2003. The report shall include
options
available to the General Assembly regarding what, if any, changes to constitutional or statutory
provisions the General Assembly could pursue to better enable the state to fund necessary
programs and services in times of economic weakness and reduced state revenues.

Lola Spradley
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES

Judith Rodrigue
CHIEF CLERK OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES

John Andrews
PRESIDENT OF
THE SENATE

Mona Heustis
SECRETARY OF
THE SENATE
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APPENDIX

B

EXPENDITURES
This appendix provides a synopsis of the six largest departments of state government that
receive the greatest share of General Fund appropriations. For FY 2003-04, these departments
account for 93 percent of all General Fund obligations. In order, the departments are: Education;
Health Care Policy and Financing; Higher Education; Corrections; Human Services; and Judicial.
The departmental discussions are not comprehensive. Each synopsis focuses on the major
programs of the department, expenditures and appropriations for those programs during the
state's most recent business cycle, factors which drive expenditures, and recent cost containment
measures, if any. This appendix includes information which is the basis for the general
observations and conclusions made in Chapter 1. Legislative Council staff would like to thank
both the Joint Budget Committee staff and department staff for their assistance in compiling the
expenditure information included in this appendix.
Summary of General Fund budget drivers. Each of the six largest departments serves a
discrete caseload of individuals. General Fund appropriations and expenditures are driven by the
budgetary requirements of these caseloads, most notably caseload size and the cost of the
services provided. The costs of serving these populations are influenced by legal, demographic,
and economic factors.
Legal factors. Constitutional, statutory, and federal requirements can have a significant
effect on caseloads, as noted in the examples below.
✓

Constitutional requirements. The Colorado Constitution requires the General
Assembly to provide for the establishment and maintenance of a thorough and
uniform system of free public schools throughout the state for all residents between
the ages of 6 and 21.

✓

Statutory requirements. Criminal sentencing laws and statutory parole guidelines
affect the number of inmates and the length of stay in correctional facilities.
Similarly, the probation statutes define eligibility requirements, which affect the
number of probationers for the Judicial Branch.

✓

Federal requirements. The federal government shares in the costs of a number of
programs funded in the six largest departments. As such, the federal government
establishes parameters for all of the programs it participates in. For example, because
Colorado opts to participate in Medicaid, it must adhere to federally mandated rules
and conditions of the program stipulating which populations must be served and what
benefits they must receive.
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Broadly speaking, the General Assembly has limited control over caseload growth for
programs with constitutional and/or federal requirements, but direct control over caseload growth
for those programs governed only by statutory requirements.

General economic conditions and population growth. Caseloads and the cost of
providing services to individuals are affected by general economic conditions and population
growth. When the state and national economies are booming, the state typically experiences an
increase in tax revenues, population growth, and inflation, which in turn increases caseloads and
program costs for certain departments. When the economy is stagnating, the state will usually
experience a decrease or slowdown in tax revenues, lower net migration, and a reduction in
inflationary pressures, but caseloads and program costs for specific departments will also
increase. The following briefly describes how caseloads and program costs are affected by
economic expansions and contractions.
First, caseloads for certain departments will increase during an economic downturn. This
heightens budgetary pressures for the General Assembly because expenditures may be growing
more rapidly than tax revenues. Of the six largest departments, caseload growth during an
economic recession will be the most significant for the following:
✓

Higher Education - student enrollments tend to increase at a faster rate when the
economy stagnates and jobs are not readily available. This places upward pressure on
General Fund expenditures for public universities and colleges, or requires an
. increase in tuition to offset enrollment-related costs.

✓

Health Care Policy and Financing - Medicaid caseloads increase when
employment conditions deteriorate and a greater number of people become indigent.
The cost of providing Medicaid-related services for the department increases as a
result.

✓

Corrections and Judicial- criminal activity, such as felonies and homicides, tends
to increase when unemployment rises and income levels drop. This results in
additional case filings with the Judicial Branch and puts additional people in
correctional facilities.

Second, caseloads and program costs for certain departments will increase when the
state's economy is growing. Of the six largest departments, caseload growth or program costs
will be the most pronounced for the following during an economic expansion:
✓

Education-, K-12 enrollments are directly related to population growth. When the
economy is healthy and jobs are plentiful, more families move to Colorado, resulting
in additional enrollment in elementary and secondary schools.

✓

Health Care Policy and Financing and Human Services - the costs of medical
services and supplies, which have increased faster than the general rate of inflation,
will increase program costs during economic expansions. Additionally, both
departments contract with community providers to deliver services to eligible clients.
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To ensure that community provider arrangements remain viable over the long term,
the General Assembly has historically awarded annual inflationary increases for these
providers.
✓

Corrections and Judicial - a robust economy encourages more people to move to
Colorado, which increases case filings with the Judicial Branch. This increases
workload and may ultimately increase the nwnber of incarcerations.

Consequently, for the six largest departments, general economic conditions exert upward
pressure on expenditures when the economy is both expanding and contracting. The principal
reason for this anomaly is that caseloads are positively related to unemployment, income levels,
and population growth.
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DEPARTMENT OF EnucATION

The Department of Education supports the State Board of Education in its duty to
exercise general supervision over public schools, including accrediting public schools and school
districts. It also develops, promotes, and delivers adult education and library services; distributes
state and federal aid moneys to local public school districts; and administers direct educational
services at the Colorado School for the Deaf and Blind.

Expenditures and Appropriations
Figure B-1 shows the total state expenditures and current appropriation to the Department
of Education since FY 1990-91. Total expenditures have increased steadily during this time
period from $1.3 billion in FY 1990-91 to $3 .3 billion in FY 2003-04. This amount represents
an average increase of 7.65 percent per year over the 13 years.
Figure B-1
Department of Education Expenditures
by Source of Funds
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Figure B-2 shows the funding source and percentages that contribute to the total
appropriation amount for FY 2003-04.

Figure B-2
Department of Education Funding Source
FY 2003-04 Appropriation
Federal Funds
Cash Funds
Exempt
13•A,

~

12%

General Fund
75%
Cash Funds
<1%

Colorado's School Finance Act
Colorado's school finance act distributes over $4.2 billion annually in state and local
dollars to the state's 178 school districts for K-12 public education. Currently, these moneys are
allocated under a law called the "Public School Finance Act of 1994." The school finance act
contains a formula that calculates a per pupil funding amount for each school district based on
the individual characteristics of the district, such as the cost to live in the district and the number
of students enrolled.
As can be seen from Figure B-3 the state's share of funding has increased at a faster pace
than the local share, particularly since the enactment of Amendment 23 in 2000. Figure B-3
shows both the state and local share of school funding since the creation of the new School
Finance Act of 1994.
This increase is discussed further in the section explaining the Effects ofAmendment 23.
Associated with school finance funding, Figure B-4 shows the rate of growth of per pupil
funding since the enactment of the 1994 Act.
The state's share of total program funding represented nearly 79 percent of the budget
allocated to the Department of Education - almost entirely consisting of state General Fund.
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Figure B-3
School Finance Act Funding
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Figure 8-4
School Finance Per Pupil Funding
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K-12 enrollment growth. The number of students funded in the state's public schools
has increased from 550,207 in FY 1990-91 to 715,793 in FY 2002-03 (last count). Figure B-5
shows the relative growth in enrollment compared to the growth in the state's general population.
While enrollment tracks rather consistently with the increase in general population, its increase
has been slightly below that of population.

Figure B-5
K-12 Enrollment Growth
Compared to State Population
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Figure B-6 show the percentage change in growth for both K-12 enrollment and
population.
Figure B-6
K-12 Enrollment and State Population Growth
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This figure also shows that growth rates have been and are declining since a peak rate
during FY 1992-93. Growth rates for both enrollment and population were approximately
1.2 percent for FY 2002-03.
To the extent that the economy influences population migration, K-12 enrollment is
likewise influenced by the economy. During a recovery period when jobs are created resulting in
an increase in migration of population, it can be expected that Colorado will see a corresponding
increase in enrollment in public schools.

Amendment 23
Amendment 23, passed by the voters in 2000, was designed to guarantee an increased
level of funding to the state's public schools. It requires an increase in per pupil funding and
total state funding for categorical programs by at least inflation plus one percent per year until
FY 2010-11 and by the inflation rate thereafter.
It is not possible to predict what funding level would have been enacted by the General
Assembly absent the passage of Amendment 23. However, given the recent economic conditions
and the constraints on the state budget, it is reasonable to assume that the amendment has
required an increase in state aid for K-12 education above what the General Assembly would
have funded.
If the General Assembly would have increased K-12 education funding at the level of
inflation, as was the case in recent years, then the requirement of Amendment 23 would indicate
that the effects of the amendment would approximate the one percent requirement. Ffgure B-7
illustrates the difference in state aid without the one percent increase - state aid with inflation
only.
Figure 8-7
Effects of Amendment 23 on State Aid
K-12 Education Funding
(dollars in millions)
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Amendment 23 also creates the State Education Fund (SEF) in the State Treasury.
One-third of one percent of taxable income is diverted to the fund. Money in the SEF can be
used to meet the funding requirements of the amendment. Further, the amendment requires the
General Assembly to, at a minimum, annually increase the General Fund Appropriation for Total
Program funding by an amount not below five percent of the prior year appropriation. The
requirement does not apply in any fiscal year in which Colorado personal income grows less than
four and one-half percent between the two previous calendar years.

Effects of Gallagher and Tabor

The combination of the Gallagher amendment and TABOR effectively places the burden
of increased funding for K-12 education from Amendment 23 on the state. The Gallagher
Amendment limits the amount of property taxes paid by residential property. The residential
assessment rate has decreased since enactment of Gallagher to keep the assessed value
percentage of residential to nonresidential property about the same. Without the ability to
increase the mill levy without a vote of the people (TABOR requirement), the slow growth of
property tax revenue has shifted funding responsibility to the state. TABOR also limits the
amount of property taxes that school districts can receive, further contributing to the shift in state
funding.
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DEPARMENTOF HEALTHCARE POLICY AND FINANCING
The Department of Health Care Policy and Financing (DHCPF) administers the state's
Medicaid program, Indigent Care Program, the Comprehensive Primary and Preventive Care
Grants Program, the Home Care Allowance and Adult Foster Care programs, the Children's
Basic Health Plan, and Senate Bill 97-101 public school Medicaid-funded health care services, in
conjunction with the Department of Education. The department is the single state agency for the
receipt of federal Medicaid funds. For FY 2003-04, an estimated $300 million of the
department's General Fund appropriation is transferred to other state departments receiving
Medicaid funds: Education; Higher Education; Human Services; Public Health and
Environment; and Regulatory Agencies.
Figure B-8
Total Medicaid and Net General Fund Medicaid Expenditures
(million of dollars)
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The two largest General Fund appropriations made in the DHCPF are for the Medicaid
program and the Departm~nt of Human Services Medicaid-funded programs. Together, funding
for these programs in FY 2003-04 constitutes 96 percent of the department's General Fund
appropriation. This section is limited to a discussion of the DHCPF Medicaid program which
accounts for 74 percent of the department's budget (noted on Figure B-9 as Medical Services
Premiums).
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Figure B-9
DHCPF Programs Receiving General Fund
OHS Medicaidfunded
Programs
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Medicaid
The Medicare and Medicaid programs were federally created in the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1965:

Medicare is a 100% federal health
insurance program for the elderly funded by
a dedicated tax (part of the FICA tax rate)
and trust fund. Medicare provides acute
care coverage but does not provide longterm care. Medicare is not a means-tested
program and all eligible individuals 65 and
older qualify.

Medicaid is a health insurance plan for the
poor providing both acute and long-term
care coverage, funded and administered
jointly by the federal government and the
states. Unlike Medicare which receives its
funding through a dedicated tax, Medicaid
funding at both the federal and state level
relies on general taxation. Medicaid is a
means-tested program wherein individuals
must meet certain income criteria and asset
tests in order to qualify.

'

States are not required to have a Medicaid program. However, if a state opts to
participate in Medicaid, the state must adhere to federally mandated rules and conditions of the
program. Figures B-11 and B-12 identify the federally mandated populations and services to be
included in state Medicaid plans in addition to federally approved optional populations and
services. The federal government shares in the program's cost based ori a state's per capita
income compared with the national average. The matching rate cannot be lower than 50 percent
or higher than 83 percent. Colorado's federal matching rate has been approximately 50 percent
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over the past decade. Currently, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the five U.S.
territories have Medicaid programs. Colorado created its Medicaid program in FY 1968-69.
As a health insurance program for the poor, disabled, and elderly, Medicaid provides
essential medical services to Colorado's most vulnerable and at-risk populations. For
FY 2003-04, an estimated 363,000 Medicaid clients will be served each month. In Colorado,
Medicaid provides health insurance coverage for I out of 3 births, I out of 6 children, and 6 out
of IO persons in nursing home care.
Factors contributing to Medicaid expenditures. Two primary factors which contribute
to Medicaid expenditures are caseload growth and the increased cost of providing medical
services and supplies.
Figure B-10
Medicaid Caseload and Cost/Client
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Medicaid caseload. From April 1990 through July 200 I, Colorado's general population
increased from 3.3 million to 4.4 million, or 33 percent. During this same time period,
Medicaid's average monthly caseload grew from approximately 200,000 to 293,000, or
47 percent. The estimated monthly Medicaid caseload for FY 2003-04 is 362,537. Medicaid
caseload growth is attributed to several factors: federal and state policy/program changes;
growth in the general population; fluctuations in the economy; and length of stay.
Listed below are the major federal policy changes since 1988 which expanded Medicaid's
caseload. As federal requirements changed, Colorado adopted statutory changes to comply with
federal law.
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Year

Federal Changes in Medicaid Requirements

1988

Congress requires states to cover pregnant women and infants up to
100 percent of the federal poverty level (FPL), and adds qualified
Medicare beneficiaries to program.

1989

Congress requires states to cover pregnant women and children
under age 6 up to 13 3 percent of FPL.

1990

Phased-in coverage for children ages 6 through 18 under 100
percent of FPL begins (last age cohort phased in during
FY 2002-03).

1996

Congress enacts welfare reform. The Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) entitlement program is replaced with
the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program.
Under TANF, enrollment/termination of Medicaid is no longer
automatic with receipt/loss of welfare cash assistance.

1997

Congress adopts the Children's Health Insurance Program.
(Colorado's Children's Basic Health Plan was implemented as a
stand-alone program and is not part of the state's Medicaid
program.)

From January 1990 through July 1994, Colorado experienced 55 straight months of above
average caseload growth, attributed in large part to the phasing in of new federally required
populations, overall population growth, and an economic downturn. More recently, from March
1999 through March 2003, it has experienced 49 straight months of above average caseload
growth due to the state's economic recession. Low-income children and low-income adults are
responsible for Medicaid's recent caseload growth. As the economy improves, it is anticipated
that the Medicaid caseload will slow and may actually decline because length of stay for
low-income children and adults will be shortened. The Medicaid caseload was in decline
between FY 1994-95 and FY 1998-99 because of Colorado's booming economy.

Cost of Medicaid services. Several factors contribute to what the state pays for medical
services and supplies in the Medicaid program:
✓
✓
✓

✓
✓

medical inflation;
a statutorily established formula for nursing home reimbursement rates;
rates set through rule by the Department of Health Care Policy and Financing for a
variety of medical services and supplies (i.e., hospital payments, pharmaceuticals,
durable medical equipment, etc.);
application of the Medicare reimbursement rate (or percentage of) for certain services;
and
policy initiatives adopted by the General Assembly that affect reimbursement rates for
providers.
'
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The medical inflation rate is higher than that for other goods and services. For 2002, the
Denver/Boulder CPI inflation rate for "all items" was 1.9 percent and 3.6 percent for health care.
Although medical inflation is currently lower than that of the early 1990s (7.4% in 1992), the
U.S. Department of Labor states that medical inflation is on the rise, fueled largely by cost
increases in prescription drugs and hospital services.
Factors such as the availability of health care workers/providers and the cost of
malpractice insurance play a role for the DHCPF in setting rates through rule and for the General
Assembly when setting provider rates during the budget process.
Health care costs are also attributable to the number of services clients use and a client's
medical risk factors. New Medicaid clients often have "pent-up" medical needs and use more
services than the general population. Additionally, costs are driven up by the acuity level of
clients served by the program. For example, serving large numbers of clients with heart disease,
diabetes, or biologically-based mental illnesses increases the Medicaid program's overall cost.

Cost per client. In FY 1991-92, the average cost per Medicaid client was $2,758.23. In
FY 2001-02 (last year with actual expenditures), the average cost per Medicaid client was
$4,867.29. This represents an increase in cost-per-client services of 76.4 percent over this time
period. In addition to medical inflation and utilization of services, the cost-per-client was
impacted by two other factors:
✓

Expansion Populations: During the early 1990s, the Medicaid expansion populations
were mainly children, low-income adults, and elderly persons with Medicare
coverage. Because children and low-income adults have little or no long-term care
needs and are healthier than disabled and elderly populations, adding these
populations tend to reduce the overall cost-per-client.

✓

Spreading Risk/Acuity Mix: Colorado's Medicaid caseload is comprised of core and
fluctuating clients. Core clients are clients with acute illness or long-term disabilities
who rely on Medicaid for insurance coverage for extended periods of time.
Fluctuating clients are clients whose length of stay on Medicaid is relatively short
(usually 1 year or less). During economic recessions, the Medicaid caseload expands
with the fluctuating clients who usually have lower health care costs than the core
clients. Therefore, the medical risk for the core clients is spread against a larger
number of people and the overall cost per client decreases.

Cost containment measures. Colorado has attempted to contain Medicaid costs in both
good and bad economic times. Over the years, several cost containment measures have been
tried, from enacting community-based waiver programs in order to reduce expensive institutional
care to experimenting with managed care. Despite these efforts, General Fund expenditures in
the Medicaid program have grown, on average, 6.3 percent annually since FY 1990-91.
Senate Bill 03-176 is the most recent measure adopted by the General Assembly to
control Medicaid's costs. Although the bill eliminated optional legal immigrants from the state's
Medicaid plan, the matter is currently before the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. To date, optional
legal immigrants continue to receive Medicaid services.
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Figure B-11
Medicaid Eligible Populations

· Children who are under age 6 and below 133% of
the federal poverty level (FPL} and children ages 6
through 18 who are below 100% FPL and meet
other eligibility requirements.

I

Persons whose income is up to 300% of the SSI'
payment level and require long-term carP

I

Caseload not separately tracked and included in the1
mandatory SSI caseload.
·
·

FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 190,588 (52.6%
of total Medicaid caseload),
AH children who are recipients of foster care and
adoption assistance under Title IV-E of the Social
Security Act.
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 13,397.

I

Adults who meet the eligibility requirements that
were in place under the AFDC program in 1996.
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 47,215.

l

Pregnant women at or below 133% of FPL
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 6,303.

I

I
I

Medicaid Buy-In: Persons previously Medicaid
eligible under an SSI category but due to'
employment income or improved medical condition
are no longer eligible.

I

I

I

Caseload not separately tracked and included in the1
mandatory SSI caseload.

I

I

I

I

Children who are recipients of foster care but are1
ineligible in the mandatory category through Title IV-•
E of the Social Security Act.

Caseload not separately tracked and included in the,
mandatory foster care and adoption assistance
caseload.
Women with breast and/or cervical cancer who,
have been screened by the U.S. Department 01:
Health, meet certain income guidelines, and have1
no insurance coverage.

~~>ns eligible for Supplemental Security Income
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 90,950 (3,
subcateQories).
Qualified Medicare Beneficiaries and Special LowIncome Medicare Beneficiaries (QMBs and SLMBs).
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 9,450.
Emergency Services for Noncitizens.
FY 2003-04 estimated caseload is 4,634,

I
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Figure B-12
Medicaid Services

Federally Mandated Service$
(§ 26-4-202, C.R~S.

Federafly Approv~ Optional Services

Colorado Provldel ( 16-4-302, C.R.S.)

Inpatient Hospital Services

Prescribed Drugs

Outpatient Hospital Services

Clinic Services

Other Laboratory and X-ray Services

Home- and Community-Based Services for: the
elderly, blind and disabled; developmentally
disabled persons; persons living with AIDS; persons
with major mental illness; and persons with brain
injury

Physician Services

Optometrist Services

Nursing Facility Services

Eyeglasses (when necessary after surgery)

Home Health Services

Prosthetic Devices

Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and
Treatment (EPSDT) for Persons Under Age 21

Rehabilitation
Centers

Family Planning

Transportation

Rural Health Services

lntermedicare Care Facilities for the Mentally
Retarded

Nurse-midwife Services

Inpatient Psychiatric Services for Persons Age 65+

Pediatric Nurse Practitioner Services

Case Management

Family Nurse Practitioner Services

Therapies Under Home Health Services (speech
and audiology, physical, and occupational)

Federally Qualified Health Centers

Licensed Psychologist Services

Services to Community Health

Private Duty Nursing Services
Podiatry Services
Hospice Care
Program of All-inclusive Care for the Elderly
Treatment Program for High-Risk Pregnant Women
(alcohol and drug addiction)
Disabled Children Care Program
Residential Child Health Care
Tuberculosis-related Care

Children's Personal Assistance Services and Family
Su ort
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HIGHER EnucATION

The Department of Higher Education's primary role is to provide education beyond K-12
for Colorado residents through its 26 state campuses, two local district junior colleges, and four
area vocational schools. The Department's divisions include the Colorado Commission on Higher
Education, Council on the Arts, Historical Society, Private Occupational Schools, Student Loan
Program, and the Student Obligation Bond Authority.
Over the years, the department has been primarily funded by both General Fund support
and by tuition paid by students. The latter is represented by cash funds in the following text and
graphs. Beginning in FY 2002-03, cash funds have outpaced General Funds in support of the
department. Because of the downturn of the economy and resulting cutbacks of state General
Fund appropriations, Higher Education has been forced to rely more heavily on tuition paid by
students. Federal funds and other cash funds such as fees also make-up total funding, but are a
much smaller source compared to General Fund and cash funds. The following two figures
illustrate the funding source and expenditure history of the department from FY 1990-91 through
the appropriation for FY 2003-04 and the actual percentage funding splits for the current
FY 2003-04 appropriation.
Figure B-13
Higher Education Expenditures
By Source of Funds
(dollars in millions)
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Figure B-14
Higher Education Funding Source
FY 2003-04 Appropriation

Federal Funds
1%

r

General Fund
38%

Caah Fund• and
Caah Exempt
83%

Factors Influencing Expenditures and Driving the Budget:
The major factors influencing the budget for higher education are as follows:
✓
✓
✓
✓

enrollment growth;
inflation;
performance funding as measured by the quality indicator system; and
tuition.

Enrollment growth. Enrollment growth tends to be counter to the economy. In
Figure B-15, enrollment growth is compared to employment growth. As can be seen from the
figure, enrollment tends to be higher in those years that employment growth is declining and vice
versa. It is believed that a lack of jobs in the workforce causes students to either stay in school
longer or enroll in programs in hopes of increasing their own marketability. This phenomena
causes a higher demand on state resources during those years of larger enrollment growth when
state resources available for expenditures are lower. Small increases in student enrollment can
cause a significant need for General Fund support.
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Figure e.. 15
Higher Education Enrollment Growth Compared to
Employment Growth

Fl1eal Year

--Enrollment

--Colorado Employment

Inflation and performance funding. Similar to other state departments, institutions of
higher education require an increase in base funds to keep up with rising costs such as supplies,
maintenance,·and faculty salary increases. Prior to FY 2000-01, the General Assembly
appropriated increases in funding to higher education roughly equivalent to the inflation rate as
measured by the Denver/Boulder Consumer Price Index (CPI). Beginning in FY 2001, the
legislature appropriated funds based on the performance of higher education institutions as
measured by the quality indicator system developed by the Colorado Commission on Higher
Education (CCHE). Some funds continue to be appropriated based on inflation, primarily due to
the unique characteristics of certain programs such as: CU Health Sciences Center, CSU
Veterinary Medicine, CSU Cooperative Extension, CSU Forestry Service, and CSU Agriculture
Experiment Station. Beginning in FY 2002-03, the Colorado School of Mines switched from
being part of the performance funding formula to receiving an inflation-based increase. 1
Tuition. Prior to the passage of TABOR, the governing boards generally had total
authority to set tuition policy. TABOR authorizing legislation still allows that flexibility, but
allows the General Assembly, through the appropriations process, to cap tuition and set the
maximum revenue that schools can earn through legislative intent as stated in the long bill
footnotes.

I.

FY 2003-04 Budget Briefing. Staff Presentation to the Joint Budget Committee
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Figure B-16 shows the decline in rate of growth in tuition beginning in FY 1993-94
followed by a relatively flat rate of increase until FY 2000-01 at which time the demands of the
state budget severely cut General Fund moneys to higher education, causing a need for increased
funding coming from tuition.

Figure B-16
Higher Education Tuition Revenue Growth
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In some years, the legislature has attempted to "buy down" resident tuition by holding rate
increases below the increase in the CPI and substituting General Fund for the difference in tuition
revenue to the higher education institutions. In FY 2002-03 the General Assembly did this for
just the Community Colleges, rather than the entire system, to reduce tuition increases by two
percentage points. 2

Unique Statutes Related to Funding Higher Education
The following are several aspects about the funding of higher education institutions that
are unique from funding other state agencies:
✓

2.

CCHE, after consulting with the governing boards, makes annual system-wide
funding recommendations for the state funded higher education institutions to the
General Assembly and the Governor, after consulting with the governing boards,
CCHE establishes the distribution formulas of General Fund and tuition cash fund
appropriations to each governin~ board to reflect:

FY 2003-04 Budget Briefing. Staff Presentation to the Joint Budget Committee

22......................................................................................................... .Appendix B: Expenditures

- - - -----·

·-

•
•
•
•

the statutory roles and missions of the institutions;
fixed institutional costs and those that vary with enrollment and program
changes;
an emphasis on decentralized decision making and stability of funding; and
achievement of the statewide expectations and goals as measured by the
quality indicator system.

✓

The amount of cash funds (i.e., tuition income, fees, indirect cost recoveries)
appropriated in the Long Bill for the governing boards is the maximum amount of
cash funds that the governing boards can raise for the fiscal year;

✓

The annual appropriations of General Fund and tuition cash funds are made as a
single line item to each governing board for the operation of its campuses consistent
with the distribution percentages developed by CCHE. The annual appropriations of
non-tuition revenue are also made as a single line item to each governing board for
the operation of its campuses;

✓

Each governing board allocates their appropriations to the institutions under its
control in the manner deemed most appropriate by the board. In allocating its General
Fund appropriations, each governing board is to consider the progress made by the
institutions under its control toward achieving the statewide expectations and goals,
as measured by data received through the quality indicator system. The governing
board is also to ensure that any amount required to be set aside for application to
achieving the statewide expectations and goals is allocated for that purpose;

✓

The governing boards are authorized to retain all moneys appropriated from fiscal
year to fiscal year; and

✓

All money raised by a governing board is available for expenditure only by that
governing board and cannot be transferred or otherwise made available for
expenditure by any other governing board.

Higher Education Capital Construction
Although higher education receives roughly 13 percent of the state's operating budget, it
historically received 39 percent of capital construction funds because of the total square footage
of buildings and structures. The square footage of higher education facilities amounts to roughly
63 percent of all state buildings. As Figure B-17 illustrates, state funding for capital construction
and controlled maintenance grew steadily from FY 1990-91 through FY 1998-99 where it began
a significant decline to the present FY 2003-04 appropriation level of$519,779.
Given the current constraints of the state's revenue and expenditure limitations, funding
for capital construction and controlled maintenance is not likely to rea~h the funding level of
FY 1998-99 in the foreseeable future even when the state revenue picture improves. To the
extent possible, funding for these items in the short-term will more than likely come from other
sources. Institutions may struggle to meet the balance of programs versus infrastructure.
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FlgureB-17
·Higher l!ducaHlon Capital Constructloh/
Controlled Maintenance Appropriations
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DEPARTMENT OF CoRRECTIONS

The Colorado Department of Corrections is responsible for managing and supervising the
penal, correctional, and reformatory institutions of the state; operating a counseling and parole
supervision program to enable incarcerated persons to regain productive independence; and
developing and administering a correctional industries program to. supply manufactured products
to state institutions and to provide rehabilitative benefits for inmates. Presently, the Department
of Corrections operates 24 prisons throughout the state, each with varying levels of security .. The
department also contracts for prison capacity with several county and private facilities.
Of the department's total appropriation in FY 2003-04, approximately 88 percent comes
from General Fund revenues. From 1989-90 until FY 2003-04, General Fund expenditures of
the department have increased from $133 million to $4 70 million, or at an average annual rate of
9 .4 percent. Of the six largest state agencies, the Department of Corrections had the fastest rate
of growth in this period of time. In comparison, total General Fund expenditures have increased
at an average annual rate of 5 .8 percent since FY 1989-90. Figure B-18 displays the trend in
General Fund spending for the Department of Corrections over the past 15 years.
Figure B-18
General Fund Expenditures: Department of Corrections*
(millions of dollars)

$500
$450
$400 - t - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - · ~
$350
$300
$250
$200
$150
$100 $50
$0

I... enen...... enen... ...i ...i i... ...Ien ...enen.... i... en...i
N

M

in

00

0
0

~

~

0

N

•Fr 2002-03 and FY 2003-04 are appropriations, not expenditures.

Of the department's total General Fund appropriation, about 66 percent is spent on
correctional institutions for the costs of utilities, maintenance, housing and security, food
services, medical services, superintendents, the Youth Offender System, and the specialized San
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Carlos Correctional Facility, which houses mentally ill inmates. The second largest budget item,
comprising 14 percent of the General Fund appropriation, is external capacity, which covers the
costs of housing inmates in either private contract facilities or county jails. Approximately 380
inmates are being held in county jails and 2,307 inmates are being held in private contract prisons
in the state. The balance of the department's budget is spent on support services, inmate
programs, parole and community services, and management. Figure B-19 provides a breakdown
of the FY 2003-04 General Fund appropriation to the Department of Corrections.

Figure B-19
Department of Corrections, GF Appropriation
FY2003-04, $489.8 million
Suppport Services
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hmate Programs
6%

Parole and
ColTIT'IJnity
Services

hstitutions
66%

4%

Managerrent
6%

External capacity
14%

In general, spending by the department is driven by the number of inmates and parolees
and the costs of incarcerating prisoners. More inmates require additional housing, security, food
service, medical care, and other support services and programs. In tum, the number of inmates
sentenced to the Department of Corrections is determined by the criminal codes and sentencing
laws of the state. Since FY 1989-90, the adult inmate population has grown at an annual average
rate of 7.4 percent, and the parole population has grown by 5.4 percent per year. Both groups
have grown considerably faster than the state's population, which has increased at an average rate
of 2.6 percent per year. Figure B-20 compares the state's population growth with prison and
parole population growth over the period 1990-2002.
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Figure B-20
DOC Prison and Parole Population, Average Annual Rates of Growth
1990-2002
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In addition, Figure B-21 shows the direct correlation between department expenditures
and inmate population since 1985. As indicated in the graph, the percent change in department
spending closely tracks the percent change in inmate population, once the lagged impact of the
run-up in prison population is accounted for in the late 1980s. The dramatic increase in prison
population in the late 1980s was primarily the result of legislation passed in 1985 (HB85-1320)
that doubled the maximum penalties of the presumptive ranges for all felony classes and
mandated that parole be granted at the discretion of the Parole Board. As a result, the average
length of stay for new commitments nearly tripled.
Figure B-21·
Percent Change in Adult Prison Population and Department
of Corrections GF Expenditures
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TABOR amendment considerations. The TABOR amendment to the state constitution
specifies that non-exempt state revenue growth in any fiscal year cannot exceed the sum of
inflation and population growth in the prior calendar year. This aggregate revenue limit
effectively serves as a fiscal year spending limit for all state agencies.
For the Department of Corrections, expenditures are driven by the growth in inmates and
the costs of incarcerating prisoners. If inmate population growth exceeds the state's population
growth (assuming inflation affects the TABOR limit and departmental costs in the same amount),
expenditures of the department may exceed the TABOR limit and create additional budgetary
pressure for the legislature to meet the aggregate TABOR spending limit. Figure B-22 shows the
yearly percentage growth in adult inmates in comparison with the state's population growth. As
indicated, in every year since FY 1989-90, the growth in inmates has exceeded the state's
population growth. Thus, the budgetary requirements of the Department of Corrections may
create budgetary pressures for other state agencies receiving General Fund revenues.
Figure B-22
State Population Growth Limit vs. Prison Population Growth
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DEPARTMENT OF HuMAN SERVICES
The Department of Human Services (DHS) administers and supervises the state's
non-medical public assistance and welfare activities including cash and food assistance
programs; child support enforcement, child welfare, and child care services; rehabilitation
programs; veterans programs; alcohol and drug treatment programs; and programs for the aging.
The DHS is also responsible for the care and treatment of dependent citizens who are mentally
ill, developmentally disabled, or juvenile offenders.
Currently, direct General Fund for DHS programs represents 8.0 percent of total state
General Fund appropriated ($460.3 million). The average annual growth in General Fund
support for the DHS has been 4.3 percent since FY 1990-91. The department provides services
to a number of client groups. However, four programs, including child welfare, mental health,
developmental disabilities, and youth corrections, received 83.0 percent of the total General Fund
appropriated to the DHS in FY 2003-04, compared with 67 .1 percent in FY 1990-91. Because
these four programs offer services eligible for Medicaid reimbursement, an additional
$263.4 million General Fund is directly appropriated in the Department of Health Care Policy
and Financing for DHS Medicaid-funded programs. Thus, the total General Fund appropriation
for FY 2003-04 is $723.7 million. This section of the report is limited to a discussion of the four
largest program areas in the department.

Figure 8-23
Department of Human Services, General Fund
Appropriations, FY 2003-04 ($723.7 million)
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Child Welfare Services
Overview. Colorado's child welfare programs are designed to protect children from harm
and assist families in caring for and protecting their children. These programs are supervised by
the state department and administered by the 64 county departments of human services. Local,
federal and state dollars provide funding for child welfare programs.

For FY 2003-04, 24.0 percent of DHS total General Fund is appropriated for child
welfare services, compared with 9 .3 percent for FY 1990-91. For FY 2003-04, $77 .8 million of
the department's child welfare appropriation is for those children placed in Medicaid-funded
treatment programs ($38.9 million General Fund). Over 98 percent of the moneys appropriated
for child welfare services is allocated to the counties to administer.
In general, federal law establishes requirements or "conditions of aid" for states to receive
funding for child welfare programs. Relevant federal law is found in Title 42 of the United
States Code. Relevant state law can be found in the Children's Code (Title 19, C.R.S.) and
throughout various sections of Title 26, C.R.S.
Factors contributing to child welfare expenditures. The four major factors which have
contributed to child welfare expenditures from FY 1990-91 to the present are:
✓
✓

✓
✓

the Child Welfare Settlement Agreement;
an increase in the number of children in out-of-home care (caseload growth);
an increase in the the cost of out-of-home care; and
a change in how the state funds social services programs as a result of federal
welfare reform.

Child Welfare Settlement Agreement. In response to a 1992 lawsuit, the Governor and
the Department of Human Services signed the Child Welfare Settlement Agreement in 1995,
resulting in significant funding increases for child welfare programs. Moneys were appropriated
to increase the number of county child welfare staff, increase rates paid to out-of-home care
providers, and expand core services for children and their families (mental health services, drug
and alcohol abuse services, day treatment, etc.). The requirements of the Settlement Agreement
resulted in the establishment of a higher base for future program needs.
Caseload and cost of care. The out-of-home caseload rose dramatically in FY 1994-95
through FY 1996-97, the same time period during which new funding was provided for county
child welfare staff pursuant to the Settlement Agreement. In FY 1994-95, 12,980 children were
in an out-of-home placement, compared with 13,960 in FY 1996-97 (7.1 % increase). The
FY 2003-04 appropriation assumes a 2.8 percent caseload increase over the prior year.
Individual provider rates have generally increased over time due to the following:
✓

Providers received a 10 percent rate increase in January 1996 in response to
the Settlement Agreement. Additionally, cost-of-living adjustments
averaging 2.4 percent were provided between FY 1998-99 and FY 2001-02;
no increases have been funded since that time.
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✓

Rates have increased as a result of refinancing initiatives designed to enhance
rates paid to providers serving specific, high-need populations. Beginning in
FY 1994-95, residential treatment centers (RTCs) qualified for Medicaid
reimbursement for care and treatment.

✓

Caseload allocation among providers has also affected the average rate paid.
Over time, shifts from county-administered foster and group homes to child
placement agencies, and shifts from residential child care facilities to RTCs
have resulted in increased average payments.

Figure B-24
Number of Children in Out-of-Home Care and
Subsidized Adoption and Average Cost/Child/Month
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State Funding/or Social Services Programs Post Federal Welfare Reform. Senate Bill
93-254 established the Family Issues Cash Fund (FICF). General Fund savings realized as a
result of earning federal Title IV-A Emergency Assistance funds for child welfare services were
deposited into the FICF. Between FY 1993-94 and FY 1996-97, Colorado earned $99.2 million
in federal funds, with a like amount of General Fund deposited into the FICF. Thus, these
federal funds provided a significant source of additional revenues, allQwing the state to improve
its child welfare system as required by the 1995 Child Welfare Settlement Agreement. Beginning
in FY 1997-98, federal welfare reform legislation consolidated federal funding for several
programs under Title IV-A of the Social Security Act, creating a single block grant for states to
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provide "temporary assistance to needy families" or TANF. This consolidation resulted in two
significant funding changes for social services programs:
✓

The funding mechanism for the FICF effectively ended. Once the balance in
the FICF was exhausted, other funding sources were required to continue
support for ongoing programs that were reliant on the FICF.

✓

In FY 1997-98, General Fund appropriations shifted from the AFDC Program
to child welfare services, and federal funds appropriations shifted from child
welfare services to the Colorado Works Program. Although this action
resulted in no net change in funding for either the Works Program or child
welfare programs, it has significantly changed the funding mix for each
program.

Cost containment measures. In response to out-of-home care cost increases that began
in FY 1994-95, the General Assembly adopted legislation in 1997 to cap the state's
reimbursement to counties for child welfare services. Counties were also authorized to use
capped allocation moneys without category restriction and to negotiate rates, services, and
outcomes with providers. Thus, counties now receive a "block grant" to cover the costs of
out-of-home care, subsidized adoptions, and related administrative functions. From FY 1997-98
through FY 2003-04, the total amount appropriated for counties to provide child welfare services
(including out-of-home care) has increased an average of 4.1 percent per year. Despite these
increases, county child welfare expenditures have exceeded the annual appropriation for the last
three fiscal years. Counties make up this shortfall with county-only funds as noted in the figure
below.

Figure 8-25
State and County Funding for Child Welfare Services
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Developmental Disability Services
Overview. The DHS provides community and institutional services for Coloradans of all
ages with developmental disabilities and a work therapy program which provides supportive
employment for people with developmental disabilities. Persons determined to have a
developmental disability under state eligibility criteria may receive services in their local
communities through 20 Community Centered Boards (CCBs). Additionally, persons may
receive care in one of Colorado's three regional centers located in Grand Junction, Wheat Ridge,
and Pueblo. The regional centers operate residential and support services in large congregate
settings (institutions), or they operate group homes. The regional centers have traditionally
served persons with developmental disabilities where appropriate community programs are not
available.
Federal and state dollars provide funding for developmental disability services, in
addition to client cash revenue (room and board costs charged persons in institutions). During
the ten-year period, direct General Fund support to the DHS declined from $33.2 million to
$26.0 million, but overall General Fund support increased due to a greater number of services
qualifying for Medicaid funding. During this time period, total Medicaid funding increased
209 percent from $66.6 million to $205.7 million. Total funding for community services more
than doubled in the ten-year period, increasing by 121 percent from $117.6 million to $260.0
million.
Generally speaking, all services provided to persons with developmental disabilities are
discretionary. However, the vulnerability of this population makes significant reductions in
services or in the number of people served difficult. Relevant state law regarding developmental
disability services can be found in various sections of Title 26 and Title 27, C.R.S.
Factors contributing to Developmental Disability Services expenditures. The three
major factors which have contributed to these services from FY 1990-91 to the present are: (1)
community provider rate increases; (2) base rate increases; and (3) increases in the number of
clients served.
Rate increases. To ensure that community provider arrangements are viable over the
long term, the General Assembly provides them with annual cost-of-living increases. In the early
1990s, each type of community provider received a slightly different rate increase. Between
FY 1999-00 and FY 2002-03, the average increase was 1.9 percent; no increase was provided in
FY 2003-04. In FY 2001-02, the DHS received a 5.3 percent base rate increase for certain
services provided by community providers. Continued base rate increases have the potential to
double the impact of community provider rate increases on the developmental disability services
budget.
Increases in number of clients served. Each CCB maintains a waiting list when the
number of persons or families requesting services exceeds the resoure\!s available. Currently,
there are waiting lists for all developmental disability services. In each of the last several years,
the General Assembly has appropriated additional resources to reduce the number of persons and
families on waiting lists. Furthermore, new resources are frequently requested for a partial year
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(e.g., 9 months) because it talces planning time to set up services to meet each person's unique
needs. Each appropriated "partial-year" resource will require additional dollars in the following
year to ensure that funding is sufficient to provide services for a full year.

Cost containment measures. Since FY 1990-91, developmental disability services has
experienced continued program growth. However, in FY 2003-04, the family support services
program for families with children with developmental disabilities was reduced by half;
inflationary increases provided in FY 2002-03 were eliminated; and only ten new resources were
provided for individuals needing comprehensive services despite the existence of significant
waiting lists.

Colorado's Mental Health System
The OHS delivers mental health services to Colorado residents via a network of
community mental health centers and at the state's two public mental health institutes. Mental
Health Services, a division of the Office of Behavioral Health and Housing, contracts with a
network of mental health centers across the state to provide services to individuals in their
communities. Individuals with serious conditions are served at the Colorado Mental Health
Institute at Pueblo and the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Fort Logan.

Community mental health centers. The OHS contracts with 17 community mental
health centers and six specialty mental health clinics across the state for mental health services.
Figure B-26 shows appropriations for the state's community mental health program since
FY 1990-91. Medicaid is a significant funding source for the community mental health system.
The General Fund appropriations shown in Figure B-26 include the state match on Medicaid•
dollars required by the federal government. The state match is generally at 50 percent. General
Fund appropriations to the community mental health system increased at an average annual rate
of 5.6 percent between FY 1990-91 and FY 1996-97, from $31.9 million to $46.7 million. A
sharp increase occurred in FY 1998-99, when the Medicaid Mental Health Capitation program
became fully operational. 1 General Fund appropriations accelerated over the next few years
before decreasing in recent years as a result of the revenue shortfall, increasing at an average
annual rate of 3.3 percent during the five years since the Mental Health Capitation program was
fully implemented. Total appropriations, including federal Medicaid dollars, increased at an
average annual rate of 8.9 percent over the same period.

1. Implementation of the Mental Health Capitation program began in FY 1995-96. It was operating in 51 counties prior
to FY 1998-99, but the program's funding was not reflected in the budget for the Department ofHuman Services until
FY 1998-99.
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Figure B-26
Community Mental Health Appropriations
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Figure 8-27
Appropriations to Pueblo and Fort Logan Mental Health Institutes
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Mental Health Capitation program. The Medicaid Mental Health Capitation program is
a managed mental health care system. Funded primarily with Medicaid dollars, approximately
half of its funding originates in the General Fund. The program divides the state into eight
geographic regions. In each region, the DHS is responsible for selecting an organization via a
competitive bid process to manage the provision of mental health servi'ces in that region. The
organization is referred to as a "Mental Health Assessment and Services Agency," or MHASA.
Most Medicaid recipients in Colorado are automatically enrolled in the program. Under the
program, the state pays each MHASA a flat fee per Medicaid recipient enrolled in the MHASA
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on a monthly basis. In return, the MHASA is required to provide all necessary services to each
patient free of charge. Medicaid patients are required to receive any needed mental health
services from the MHASA. The funding for the Mental Health Capitation progam has remained
fairly stable during the last three years at approximately $147 million.
Factors contributing to Mental Health Capitation expenditures. Funding for the
Medicaid Mental Health Capitation program is influenced heavily by Medicaid eligibility and the
results of the competitive bid process, which determines the fee paid to each MHASA. Actual
eligibility increased at an average annual rate of9.5 percent since FY 1998-99, from 222,025
people to a projected 348,939 people in FY 2003-04. Funding for the program increased at an
average annual rate of 4.0 percent during the same period, from an estimated $121.2 million in
FY 1998-99 to $147.3 million in FY 2003-04. Eligibility increases were offset by two mcDsurcs
made to reduce the budget since FY 2001-02. First, capitation rates paid to MHASAs have been
reduced 6.4 percent since FY 2001-02. Second, the Mental Health Performance Incentive
program was eliminated in FY 2002-03, saving $2.6 million that year.

Figure B-28
Community Mental Health Caseload and Cost Per Case

---caseload --Total Cost -Net General Fund Cost

Mental health institutes. Inpatient hospitalization for patients with serious mental health
illnesses are provided by state mental health institutes in Pueblo and Fort Logan. Direct General
Fund appropriations to the institutes increased at an average annual rate of 1.4 percent between
FY 1990-91 and FY 2003-04, from $52.3 million to $62.5 million. Ho'Yever, Medicaid funding
to the institutes decreased from $13.3 million to $3.3 million during the same period. The
remainder of the funding comes primarily from patient revenues and the Department of
Corrections.
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Figure 8-29
Pueblo and Fort Morgan Mental Health Institutes
Average Daily Attendance (ADA) and Cost per ADA
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Factors contributing to institute expenditures. Figure B-28 illustrates that two opposing
trends have driven costs out to the mental health clinics in recent years. Consistently falling
demand for services at the institutes has been offset by increasing demands for staffing intensity
for those remaining. Demand for bed space began to decline during the mid 1990s. As Figure
B-29 shows, the average daily population at the two institutions decreased from 760 patients in
FY 1997-98 to an estimated 570 in FY 2003-04. Meanwhile, staffing needs associated with
patient severity and lower use of seclusion and restraint increased during this period. This
occurred partially as a result of a lawsuit, which demanded higher staffing levels in forensics
units, where people committed either as innocent by reason of insanity or mentally incompetent
to stand trial for crimes are served. Staffing was increased by 58.2 FTE in FY 2001-02,
53.2 FTE in FY 2002-03, and 20.7 FTE in FY 2003-04.

Division of Youth Corrections
The Division of Youth Corrections (DYC) is responsible for the supervision, care, and
treatment of detained juveniles awaiting adjudication2, juveniles sentenced to the DHS by the
courts, and juveniles on parole from a facility operated or contracted for by the division.
Juveniles sentenced to the DYC may be sentenced either to commitment or detention.
Commitment is a court-ordered transfer of legal custody to the DHS lasting up to seven years
following the determination that the juvenile has been involved in a serious offense. Detention is
typically for less serious offenses and involves a short-term confinment of no more than 45 days
to a detention facility. The DYC owns thirteen residential facilities, two of which are privately

2. Adjudication occurs when a court determines that a juvenile has been involved in a delinquent act.
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operated. Of these, four are detention facilities, four are commitment facilities, and five are
multi-purpose facilities, housing both detention and commitment populations. The DYC
augments these facilities by contracting with private facilities for additional detention and
commitment beds. In addition, the DYC administers the Senate Bill 91-94 grant program,
intended to divert juveniles from detention and commitment, or to reduce their length of stay.
Figure 8-30 shows a history of appropriations to the DYC and the average daily
population of youths receiving services. Approximately 88 percent of the DYC's funding comes
from the General Fund. The remainder comes from Medicaid funding, with some funding from
the federal government, local governments, private contractors, and the Department of
Education. General Fund appropriations to the DYC, shown in Figure B-30 by the unmarked
line, increased from $30.0 million in FY 1990-91 to a peak of $103 million in FY 2001-02. They
decreased 6.1 percent in FY 2002-03 and 3.1 percent in FY 2003-04, to $94.3 million. While a
lower caseload contributed to the decrease, funding for some programs were reduced or
eliminated during both years to help the state cope with the budget shortfall.

Figure B-30
Caseloads are the Primary Budget Driver
DYC Appropriations and Average Daily Populations
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Population is driving spending. As shown in Figure 8-30, the primary driver for DYC
spending is the average daily population at the commitment and detention facilities and in the
parole program. The DYC population is.influenced by demographic, legal, and social factors.
The degree to which economic factors drive growth in DYC populations is unclear.
Demographic factors driving D YC population growth. The rate of growth in the state's
population between the ages of 10 and 17 has a significant effect on DYC populations. While
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this population increased 40 percent between 1990 and 2000, it is expected to increase less than
10 percent between 2000 and 2010. This should translate into slower growth in the DYC
population during the current decade than was seen during the 1990s.

Federal, state, and local policy changes driving DYC population growth. Policies that
change the capacity of detention and commitment facilities or create or restrict judges' sentencing
alternatives affect the population. Several policy changes in recent years have significantly
affected the detention and parole populations, in particular. Senate Bill 91-94, which allowed
communities to create diversionary, alternative, community-based programs to prevent youths
from being detained or committed by DYC, has been credited with substantially reducing DYC's
detention population during the last five years. The 1995 federal court-ordered cap on the
Denver Gilliam Youth Services Center's population also had an effect on the detention
population. Youths released from detention or commitment did not receive parole services until
FY 1996-97, after House Bill 96-1005 created the juvenile parole division and mandated a
minimum parole period of one year for each juvenile. Since then, the minimum parole period
has been reduced twice. Senate Bill 01-077 reduced it to nine months, and Senate Bill 03-284
further reduced it to six months. It is estimated that Senate Bill 03-284 will reduce the average
daily parole population by 66.4 youths in FY 2003-04 and 108.8 youths in FY 2004-05.
Socia/factors driving DYC population growth. Social factors include school
participation rates and the incidence of juvenile delinquency. School dropout and graduation
rates are strongly correlated to juvenile delinquency. Colorado dropout rates for grades 7 through
12 have decreased during each of the last four school years from 3 .5 percent in the 1997-98
school year to 2.6 percent in the 2001-02 school year. In addition, the social climate among
youths regarding juvenile delinquency affects population growth. This is something that cannot
be directly or precisely measured.
Economic/actors driving DYC population growth. While it has been shown that
household income and employment is linked to decreased participation in criminal activities
among adults, the economy's effect on delinquency among youth is not clear. While it seems
reasonable that teenage employment and/or labor market participation may reduce juvenile
deliquency, we have not seen conclusive evidence that the current recession and dismal job
environment for youths has led to a larger DYC population.
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JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
The judicial branch is responsible for administering the state court system, including the
Colorado Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, district courts, county courts and water courts.
The branch also administers adult and juvenile probation services in the state's 22 judicial
districts. The General Fund appropriation to the judicial branch includes three independent
agencies: the Colorado State Public Defender, the Office of the Alternate Defense Counsel, and
the Office of the Child's Representative. The Public Defender's Office represents indigent
criminal defendants and the Alternate Defense Counsel represents indigent defendants in cases
where the Public Defender has a conflict of interest. The Office of the Child's Representative is
responsible for representing the best interests of children who appear before the court, but who
do not have counsel. From FY 1989-90 to FY 2003-04, General Fund expenditures of the
judicial branch, including appropriations to these three independent agencies, increased from
$105 million to $207 million, or at an average annual rate of 5 .0 percent. In comparison, total
General Fund expenditures increased at an average annual rate of 5.8 percent over the same time
period.
However, General Fund appropriations for the branch decreased in FY 2002-03 and
increased marginally in FY 2003-04. Staffing cutbacks accounted for most of the General Fund
reduction, but some activities were cash funded, requiring fewer General Fund resources. In
FY 1989-90, trial courts and probation services were 99 percent and 98 percent funded with
General Fund resources, respectively. For FY 2003-04, these same functions are expected to be
73 percent and 67 percent funded with General Fund resources, respectively. Figure B-31 shows
the trend in General Fund spending for the judicial branch since FY 1989-90.
Figure B-31
General Fund Expenditures: Judicial Branch*
(millions of dollars)
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For the entire judicial branch, the majority of spending goes toward the activities of the
trial courts and the Division of Probation Services. In FY 2003-04, trial courts and probation
services accounted for 62 percent of the branch's General Fund appropriation. The Public
Defender's Office, Alternate Defense Counsel, and the Office of Child's Representative
accounted for 15 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent respectively of the branch's total General Fund
appropriation. In FY 1989-90, trial courts and probation services accounted for 71 percent of the
branch's General Fund expenditures and the Public Defender's Office accounted for 15 percent.
Figure B-32 displays the judicial branch's FY 2003-04 General Fund appropriation, by function.

Figure 8-32
Judicial Branch GF Appropriation, FY 2003-04, $207.3 mllllon
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In general, spending by the branch is driven by three factors: the number of case filings,
the number of adult and juvenile probationers, and the costs of providing court and probation
services. These factors are, in turn, related to population growth, the criminal codes and
sentencing laws of the state, and general inflationary pressures. The number of judges,
magistrates, probation officers, public defenders, and judicial staff will increase with the caseload
of the branch. Since 1990, case filings in all of the trial courts have increased by 1.8 percent per
year, to more than 639,000 in FY 2001-02. District court case filings have grown by 1.5 percent
per year and county court case filings have increased by 1.8 percent per year. 1 The number of
probationers has grown by 5.0 per year since I 990, to more than 48,000 in FY 2001-02. Figure
B-32 displays the average annual rate of growth of new case filings and probationers in
comparison with the state's population growth; while Figure B-33 displays overall trends in new
case filings and probationers since FY 1989-90. The latter graph does not clearly indicate any
cyclical economic influences upon either caseload or the number of probationers, although it
could be argued that criminal caseloads may be inversely related to the health of the state's
economy. The reduction in caseloads in FY I 998-99, FY 1999-00, and FY 2000-01, when the

1. Case filings in district courts and county courts account for 99 percent of all new case filings.
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state's economy was relatively healthy, is indicative of this potential economic effect. The
increase in caseload in the last two years, when the economy has stagnated, also supports this
relationship.
Figure B-33
Judicial Branch New Case Filings and Probationers
Average Annual Rates of Growth
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Figure B-34
Number of New Case Filings and Probationers
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TABOR amendment considerations. For the judicial branch, d.penditures are principally
driven by the growth in caseloads and probationers. If the growth in caseloads and probationers
exceeds population growth (assuming inflation affects the TABOR limit and departmental costs
in roughly the same amount), expenditures of the branch may exceed the TABOR limit and
Append'ix B: Expenditures.......................................................................................................... 43

create additional budgetary pressure for the legislature to meet the aggregate TABOR spending
limit. For example, the growth in case filings and probationers exceeded the state's population
growth in FY 1994-95, FY 1995-96, and FY 1996-97, creating the potential for additional
budgetary pressure. In other years, population growth exceeded the growth in case filings and
probationers, e.g., in FY 1998-99 and FY 2000-01, which could lessen budgetary pressures for
the General Assembly.
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Alaska

Legislative
referendum.

State
appropriations.

Yearly appropriations
may not grow
annually by more
than the percentage
increase in
population and
inflation.

Appropriations
may be made
from the Budget
Reserve Fund if
revenues
decrease.

No provisions.

No provisions.

Appropriations of
state tax
revenues.

Annual
appropriations growth
is limited to 7.23
percent of state
personal income.

Waiver requires
two-thirds
legislative
approval for
specific additional
appropriations.

The Legislature is
required to modify
the limit if court
order or legislative
enactment transfers
program
responsibility
between federal,
state and local
governments.

No provisions.

1982
Const.

Arizona

Legislative
referendum.

1978
Const.

California

Citizen initiative.

1979

Const

Appropriations of
state tax
revenues.

Yearly appropriations
growth is limited to
the percentage
increase in
population and per
capita personal
income.

During
emergencies, the
limit may be
exceeded. But
any increased
expenditures must
be compensated
for by reduced
expenditures over
the following three
years. Any voterapproved changes
are only operative
for four years.

(1) The limit must
be altered if
program
responsibility is
transferred from one
government entity to
another, or private
entity.
(2) The state must
provide funding
when it requires
local governments
to provide a
program.
(3) Any
appropriation that is
used to comply with
federal requirements
is exempt from the

limit.

One-half of all
surplus revenues
are required to
be returned to
taxpayers
through a
reduction in tax
rates or fee
schedules within
the next two
fiscal years; onehalf are allocated
to Kindergarten 12th grade school
districts.
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'Adoption
Colorado

Legislative vote.

1991

Statutory.

State General
Fund
appropriations.

Appropriations are
limited to the lesser
of 5 percent of
Colorado personal
income ora 6
percent increase over
the prior year's
General Fund
appropriation.

The limitation may
be exceeded upon
the declaration of
a state fiscal
emergency by the
General Assembly
and the Governor.
The 6 percent
limitation does not
apply to any
appropriation
made for new
programs or
services required
by federal law or
court order. The
limitation also
does not apply to
Medicaid
overexpenditures
or any
appropriation of
moneys derived
from any voterapproved tax or
fee increase.
Certain transfers
are also not
subject to the limit.

No provisions.

No provisions.
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Colorado

Citizen initiative.

1992

Const.

Connecticut

Legislative vote.

1991, 1992 1

Statutory.
Legislative
referendum.
Const.

1

·· ,,"'.,Govemmerif ·
·.. Programs

~~reatmerit or
· .Surpluses

All state revenue
and tax increases.

Most state revenues
are limited to
population growth
and inflation.
Spending limits in
place at the time of
its passage cannot
be weakened without
voter approval.

All tax increases
require voter
approval. The
General Assembly
can declare a nonfiscal emergency
by a two-thirds
vote and raise
emergency taxes
subject to voter
approval.

Locals can reduce
or end their subsidy
for any statemandated program
except for K-12
education; 90 days
notice is required
and adjustment can
occur in a maximum
of three equal
annual installments.
Local taxes
supporting these
programs must be
reduced
accordingly.

Revenues in
excess of the
limit must be
refunded in the
next fiscal year,
unless voters
agree to let the
state keep the
surplus.

State
appropriations
(but excludes debt
service, state
grants,
expenditures from
budget reserve
fund, and certain
other expenditures
for federal
mandates or court
orders).

Appropriations are
limited to the
increase in state
personal income that
is averaged over the
preceding five years,
or the increase in
inflation for the
preceding 12 month
period, whichever is
greater.

Governor can
declare an
emergency or the
existence of
extraordinary
circumstances;
waiver requires
approval by threefifths vote of both
House and
Senate.

No provisions.

(1) Budget
Reserve Fund
(rainy day fund)
(2) State
Employees
Retirement Fund
(3) Reduction of
debt.

The constitutional amendment will not take effect until the legislature enacts defmitions, by a three-fifths majority, to implement the limit. The statutory limit remains in effect until that time.
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Delaware

~

1978

~
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1

Legislative
referendum.

~;PrcS~iions for
.. ·•.waiver

Surpluses go into
a cumulative
cash balance and
are available for
appropriations in
the following
fiscal year.

All state revenues
including taxes,
fees, licenses, and
charges.

Revenue limit is
determined by
multiplying the
average annual
growth rate in Florida
personal income over
the previous five
years by the
maximum amount of
revenue permitted
under the limitation in
the previous year.

Waiver requires
two-thirds vote of
the Legislature.

Legislature by
statute can adjust
the limit to reflect
transfers in funding
responsibilities
between state and
local governments.

Excess revenues
go to the Budget
Stabilization
Fund. When the
fund reaches a
statutory
maximum, the
excess is rebated
to taxpayers.
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No provisions.
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1994

Treatment of .

Any portion of the
amount between
98 and 100
percent of the
estimated General
Fund revenue for
any fiscal year
maybe
appropriated in
the event of
emergencies
involving health,
safety, or welfare.
Waiver requires
declaration of an
emergency and
three-fifths vote of
each chamber.
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Legislative
referendum.

.Government .
Programs

Appropriations
cannot exceed 98
percent of estimated
General Fund
revenue and prior
year's unencumbered
funds.
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Fund
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I Idaho

I 1980

Legislative vote.
Statutory.

I State General
Fund
appropriations
(modified in 1994
to exclude onetime
expenditures).

Treabnent of
Surpluses

General Fund
appropriations are
not to exceed the
average state
personal income
growth rate for three
previous years.

Specific
appropriations
over the limit
require two-thirds
approval in both
legislative
chambers.

The state must
share the cost of
any new program or
service increase
required of local
governments by the
Legislature.

If the state
General Fund
balance in each
of two
succeeding years
exceeds 5
percent of
General Fund
revenues, the
Legislature
provides a tax
refund.

Appropriations are
limited to 5.33
percent of state
personal income.

No provisions.

Adjustments to the
limit are made if
court order or
legislative
enactment transfers
responsibility
between state and
local governments
or between federal
and state
governments.

No provisions.
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No provisions.

No provisions.

Statutory.

Appropriations
cannot exceed 99
percent of adjusted
General Fund
receipts.

Excess goes to
the Cash
Reserve Fund,
then to the
Rebuild
Infrastructure
Account, and
then to the
Economic
Recovery Fund.

Louisiana

Legislative vote.

State tax revenue.

Statutory.

Statute may be
amended by vote
of the Legislature.

No provisions.

1979

Revenue is limited to
the ratio of FY 197879 tax revenue to
1977 state personal
income.
Expenditures for any
given year shall not
exceed anticipated
state revenues for
that year.

State revenue in
excess of limit
shall be
deposited in the
Tax Surplus
Fund;
appropriations
from that fund
must be made for
paying tax
refunds.

Louisiana

Legislative
referendum.

State General
Fund
appropriations.

State spending is
limited to 1992
appropriations plus
per capita personal
income growth.

Waiver requires
two-thirds vote by
the Legislature.

No provisions.

Surplus may only
be used to retire
debt in advance
of maturity.

Legislative vote.

1992
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Surpluses

State General
Fund
appropriations.

Iowa
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Massachusetts

Citizen
initiative.

1986
Statutory.

State revenue.

Growth in revenue
cannot exceed the
three-year average
growth of wages and
salaries.

Vote of
Legislature.

Vote of Legislature.

,Treatment of
···Surpluses
Excess revenues
are transferred to
a Budget
Stabilization
Fund which is
only allowed to
grow to 5 percent
of the state tax
revenue. If the
fund grows by
more, the excess
goes back to the
taxpayers as an
income tax credit
in proportion to
the tax liability.
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Michigan

Citizen initiative.

1978

Const.
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Government
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- Treatment of
- Surpluses

1) Limit may be
adjusted if program
responsibility is
transferred from one
government level to
another by means of
a constitutional
amendment.
2) State is prohibited
from reducing
current proportion of
local services
financed through
state aid.
3) No new program
shall be required of
local governments
unless funded by
state.
4) The proportion of
total state spending
paid to all units of
local government as
a group shall not be
reduced below
proportion for FY

Revenues
exceeding limit
by 1 percent or
more shall be
used for tax
refunds set in
proportion to
income tax
liability. Excess
of less than 1
percent may be
transferred to the
State Budget
Stability Fund.

,T

I All state revenues
less federal aid.

'-:C~•e of.transfer of -

__ . :,-R,esponsibility)or

The growth of state
revenue may not
exceed 9.49 percent
of prior year's
personal income.

Provisions require
the Governor to
first specify an
emergency; then
the Legislature
must concur by
two-thirds vote in
each chamber.

1978-79.
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Mississippi

Legislative vote.

1992

Statutory.

::s

Missouri

Citizen initiative.

r,

1980

Const.

Budget
recommendations
and
appropriations.

The budget and
appropriations are
limited to 98 percent
of projected
revenues.

No provisions.

No provisions.

One-half of yearend surplus
remains in the
General Fund
and one-half
goes into a
working
cash/stabilization
reserve fund up
to the 7.5 percent
ceiling. The
remainder goes
into a special
education fund.

Total state
revenue.

Revenue is limited to
the ratio of FY 198081 state revenue to
1979 state personal
income, multiplied by
the greater of state
personal income in
any calendar year or
the average state
personal income over
the previous three
calendar years.

Provisions require
the Governor to
first specify an
emergency; then
the legislature
must concur by
two-thirds vote in
each chamber.

1) Limit may be
adjusted if program
responsibility is
transferred from one
level of government
to another.
2) State is prohibited
from reducing
current proportion of
local services
financed through
state aid.
3) No new program
shall be required of
local governments
unless funded by
the state.

Revenues
exceeding the
limit by 1 percent
or more shall be
used for tax
refunds set in
proportion to
income tax
liability. Excess
of less than 1
percent may be
transferred to the
General Revenue
Fund .
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Montana

Legislative vote.

1981

Statutory.

Nevada

Citizen Initiative.

1979

Statutory.

State biennial
appropriations.

Biennial
appropriations are
limited to state
appropriations for the
preceding biennium
plus the product of
preceding biennial
appropriations and
the growth
percentage. The
growth percentage is
defined as the
difference between
average state
personal income for
three calendar years
immediately
preceding the next
biennium and the
average state
personal income for
the three calendar
years immediately
preceding the current
biennium.

Provisions require
the governor to
declare an
emergency.
Legislature must
then approve
specific additional
expenditures by
two-thirds vote of
each chamber.

No provisions.

No provisions.

Governor's
proposed General
Fund
expenditures.

State expenditures
are limited to
population growth
and inflation using
the 1975-76 biennium
as the base.

Waiver provisions
are not applicable.

No provisions.

No provisions.
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New Jersey

Legislative vote.

1990

Statutory.

North Carolina

I

Legislative vote.

General Fund
state
appropriations
less exemptions
for debt service,
state aid, grantsin-aid and capital
construction.

I State
appropriations.

1991
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I Statutory.

Appropriations
growth is limited to
the average growth
rate of state per
capita personal
income in the prior
three years.

Provisions require
two-thirds vote of
the Legislature.

Any adjustments to
the limit shall be
made if program
responsibility is
transferred between
state and local
governments.

No provision, but
the state has a
rainy day fund.

Appropriations
growth is limited to 7
percent of the
projected total state
personal income for
that fiscal year.

Limit may be
exceeded to the
extent that
Medicaid, prison
operations, or
state health
insurance
increases exceed
the percentage
increase in state
personal income.

No provisions.

No provisions.
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1996
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Approval and

iGovernment

•TypeofLaw

Programs

Legislative
vote.
Statutory.

Any excess above
the annual yearend balances in
the General
Revenue Fund,
Budget
Stabilization Fund,
and certain
appropriations.

The limit is applied to
the excess revenues
above a statutorily
set minimum yearend balance in the
General Revenue
and Budget
Stabilization Fund.
The General
Revenue fund must
have a year-end cash
flow balance of 0.5
percent of prior-year
revenue.
The Budget
Stabilization Fund
must have a yearend balance of at
least 5 percent of
prior year General
Revenue Fund
revenue. Certain
appropriated
expenses are added
to these balances.
Revenues in excess
of the year- end
balances and
appropriations
become the basis for
the surplus (tax cut).

s...

1.-.i

Provisions require
that there be
sufficient moneys
to pay for capital
projects
appropriated in
prior capital bills.
Moneys must also
be available to
offset an expected
deficit in the next
fiscal year.

No provisions.

.< ..

i

Treatment of
Surpluses

By July 31 st of
each year, the
surplus (if any) is
certified and
refunded to
taxpayers
through a
proportional
reduction in
graduated state
income tax rates.
The reduction is
based on
estimated income
tax collections.

Oklahoma

Legislative
referendum.

Appropriated
revenues.

Appropriated
revenues are limited
to:
1) 12 percent yearly
increase (adjusted for
inflation); and
2) 95 percent of
certified revenue.

No provisions.

No provisions.

Revenue to
General Fund in
excess of
estimate (up to
10 percent) is
deposited into a
rainy day fund.

Actual and
forecast revenues.

General Fund actual
revenue is limited to
2 percent over
estimated revenue.

Two-thirds
majority vote of
each house may
enact legislation
declaring an
emergency.

No provisions.

Taxpayers are
given an income
tax refund or
credit if actual
revenu~s are
more than 2
percent of
forecast at the
time the budget
is adopted. The
credit or refund
must be made in
proportion to

1985
Const.

Oregon

Legislative
referendum.

20002
Const.
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taxes owed.
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Originally passed by legislative vote in 1979.
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Oregon

Legislative vote.

2001

Statutory.
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Rhode Island

Legislative
referendum.

~

1992
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~
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.:. Government·
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Treatment of
Surpluses

State
appropriations.

Appropriations
growth is limited to no
greater than eight
percent of projected
personal income for
the biennium.

May be exceeded
if governor
declares an
emergency and
there is a threefifths majority vote
of each house.

No provisions.

No provisions.

State General
Fund
appropriations.

Appropriations
growth is limited to 98
percent of estimated
General Fund
revenue and prior
year's unencumbered
funds.

No provisions.

No provisions.

Of the surplus, 2
percent must be
put into a rainy
day fund.

State
appropriations
approved by the
General
Assembly.

State appropriations
are limited to the
average growth of
personal income over
three preceding
years or 9.5 percent
of total state personal
income, whichever is
greater. Also, the
number of state
employees is tied to
state population.

Limit may be
exceeded for one
year by a twothirds vote of the
Legislature if it
first declares a
financial
emergency. Also,
every five years
the Legislature
can review the
composition of the
limit.

No provisions.

Excess revenues
may be spent to
match federal
programs, for
debt purposes,
tax relief, or
transferred to a
reserve fund.

§

c:i..

~

't:i

~

Const.

to,.

....i"

~

South Carolina

Legislative
referendum.

1980, 1984
Const.

"""
VI,

Tennessee

Const.
convention.

Appropriations of
state tax revenue.

Appropriations
growth is limited to
the growth in state
personal income.

Specific additional
amount may be
approved by
majority vote of
the Legislature.

State must share
cost if it increases
local government
expenditure
requirements.

No provisions.

Appropriations
(biennial) of state
tax revenues not
dedicated by the
state constitution.

Biennial
appropriations are
limited to the growth
of state personal
income.

Specific additional
amount may be
approved by
majority vote of
the Legislature if it
first adopts a
resolution that an
emergency exjsts.

No provisions.

No provisions.

State
appropriations.

Yearly appropriations
growth is based on
formulas that use
inflation, population
growth, and growth in
state personal
income.

Waiver requires
that an emergency
must be declared
by the governor
and confirmed by
more than twothirds of both
houses of the
Legislature.

1) Adjustments to
the limit shall be
made if program
responsibility is
transferred between
state and local
governments.
2) Adjustment to the
limit shall be made if
program funding is
transferred from
general fund to nongeneral fund
sources or viceversa.

No provisions.

1978
Const.

Texas

Legislative
referendum.

1978
Const.
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Utah

Legislative vote.

1989

Statutory.
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Washington

Citizen initiative.

1993

Statutory.

State
expenditures.

Expenditures are
limited to a threeyear rolling average
of inflation and
population growth.

Waiver requires
that an emergency
must be declared
and approved with
two-thirds vote of
the Legislature.
Revenue
increases need
two-thirds vote in
the Legislature if
within expenditure
limit. Voter
approval is
needed to exceed
limit.

Prohibits state from
imposing new
mandates on local
governments unless
fully reimbursed .

Excess revenue
goes into the
Emergency
Reserve Fund; if
the fund exceeds
5 percent of
General Fund
revenue, the
additional surplus
is placed in the
Education
Construction
Fund.

Source: NCSL survey of legislative fiscal officers, April 1996. The table has been updated and revised by Legislative Council Staff to reflect
changes since April 1996
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APPENDIX D: TABOR REFUND METHODS
The following paragraphs describe each of the TABOR refund mechanisms that are used to
refund the TABOR surplus. Each method is used only if the TABOR surplus reaches a certain
threshold that is adjusted annually by the percentage change in Colorado personal income. The
projected thresholds for the FY 2004-05 surplus are indicated. The amount of the FY 2000-01
surplus returned via each refund method is also indicated.

House Bill 99-1383 and House Bill 00-1049 - Earned Income Credit. The Colorado
earned income credit "piggybacks" off the federal earned income tax credit. Colorado taxpayers
receive 10 percent of the federal credit amount. The federal credit may be claimed by certain
taxpayers with modified federal adjusted gross incomes less than a certain amount. This threshold
was approximately $34,200 in 2002. Colorado taxpayers who claim the federal credit may claim the
state credit. Projected threshold: $67.4 million; last amount refunded: $32.3 million.
House Bill 00-1361 - Individual Development Account Credit. The Individual
Development Account (IDA) program creates a new type of deposit account in financial institutions.
The program allows persons earning 200 percent or less of the federal poverty income level to save
money for post-secondary education, or, for persons earning 80 percent or less of the area median
income, to save for the purchase of a home. Moneys deposited in an IDA may be matched with
philanthropic donations. The funds can be used for post-secondary education, including
occupational training, first-time purchase of a home, or business capitalization. This refund
mechanism allows an income tax credit for donors who provide matching funds to an IDA. The
maximum credit is 25 percent of the amount donated, but the total amount of the tax credits cannot
exceed $5 million annually. No donor can receive a credit in excess of $100,000 per year. Projected
threshold: $237.2 million; last amount refunded: $9,000.
House Bill 01-1313 - Foster Care Credit. This refund mechanism allows an income tax
credit to taxpayers who incur non-reimbursed expenses in connection with providing foster care to
children under18 years of age. Projected threshold: $227.0 million; last amount refunded: $0.2
million.
House Bill 99-1311 and House Bill 01-1287-Business Personal Property Tax Refund.
Businesses receive a refund equal to 100 percent of the first $700 in personal property taxes paid,
plus 16 percent of the tax paid in excess of $700. Projected threshold: $229. 0 million; last amount
refunded: $99.8 million.
House Bill 00-1063 and House Bill 01-1257- Credit/or Rural Health Care Providers.
The refund offered through this income tax credit is available to health care professionals who
resided and practiced in a rural health care professional shortage area for at least 180 days of the
income tax year and have committed to residing and practicing in the area for three to five years.
The credit is equal to one-third of the amount of the student loan or one:third of the balance due and
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owing on the student loan, up to the amount of the taxpayer's actual income tax liability. Unused
portions of the credit may be carried forward for up to ten years. Projected threshold: $355. 7
million; last amount refunded: $0. 2 million.

House Bill 00-1351 - Child Care and Child Tax Credits. Colorado taxry:'1yers already
receive a child care credit and a child tax credit, though these crt!dits are not TA B<JR refund
mechanisms. As a TABOR refund mechanism, the existing child care tax c1.;;Jit .i::; .increased from
50 percent to 70 percent and the qualifying population is expanded to those with federal adjusted
gross incomes greater than $60,000, but less than $64,001. The existing child tax credit for children
under six years of age is increased from $200 to $300 and the income limitations are expanded in
the same manner as for the child care tax credit. The age limit is expanded to 12 years of age for
children who are cared for in their own family-operated child care home that is either licensed or
legally exempt from licensing requirements. Projected threshold: $361.9 million; last amount ·
refunded: $23.5 million.
House Bill 99-1137 and House Bill 00-1171 - Exclusion of Interest, Dividend, and
Capital Gains Income. Individuals may deduct the lesser of $1,500 or their total amount of interest,
dividend, and capital gains income on their state income tax return. Joint filers are allowed to deduct
up to $3,000 of such income. House Bill 00-1171 increased the amount of the exclusion from the
original $1,200 and $2,400 amounts. Projected threshold: $436.8 million; last amount refunded:
$44. 0 million.
House Bill 99-1237- Exclusion of Capital Gains on Colorado Assets. Individuals and
businesses may receive a deduction for capital gains taken on Colorado assets purchased prior to
May 9, 1994. The gains must be taken during the preceding tax year. Projected threshold: $350.3
million; last amount refunded: $49.8 million.
House Bill 01-1081-Sales and Use Tax Refund/or Research and Development This
refund mechanism provides a refund of sales and use tax paid on purchases of tangible personal
property used predominantly for research and development in the state. Projected threshold:
$407. 0; last amount refunded: $0, this refund method was not effective until FY 2002-03 .
House Bill 00-1355 - High Technology Scholarship CrediL This refund mechanism
provides a 25 percent income tax credit for donations made to the Colorado High Technology
Scholarship Program. The credit cannot exceed 15 percent of the amount of income tax due.
Partnerships, S corporations, and other pass-through entities that donate to the scholarship program
can allocate the credit to the entity's partners or shareholders in proportion to the partners' or
shareholders' distributive shares of income from the entity. The program provides scholarships to
in-state students earning high-technology related certificates or degrees. Projected threshold:
$411.9 million; last amount refunded: $3,000.
House Bill 00-1227 - Reduction of Motor Vehicle Registration Fees. This refund
mechanism reduces annual registration fees for motor vehicles. The fee for registering a passenger
vehicle is reduced to $2.50 and the fee for registering other vehicles is reduced by 25 percent.
Projected threshold: $411.9 million; last amount refunded: $34.0 million.
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House Bill 00-1053 - Exemption/or Certain Charitable Contributions. This refund
mechanism allows individuals who claim the basic standard deduction on their federal income tax
return to subtract charitable contributions in excess of $500 from federal taxable income on their
state income tax return. Projected threshold: $436. 8 million; last amount refunded: $2. 4 million.
House Bill 00-1052-Creditfor Contributions to Telecommunication Education. This
refund mechanism provides an income tax credit equal to 15 percent of a taxpayer's total monetary
contribution made to the Colorado Institute for Telecommunication Education (CITE) for the
purpose of funding grants or scholarships for students enrolled at the institute. The credit cannot
exceed the smaller of $10,000 or the taxpayer's actual tax liability for the income tax year, and
cannot be carried forward or refunded to the taxpayer. The CITE is an auxiliary unit at the
University of Colorado to promote, support, enhance, and provide interdisciplinary education that
relates to telecommunications and information technology. Projected threshold: $436.8 million;
last amount refunded: $0, the CITE had been eliminated by legislation; it has been restored and this
credit will be effective again.
House Bill 00-1259 - Sales and Use Tax Rate Reduction on Commercial Trucks. This
refund mechanism reduces the sales and use tax rate on the sale of a new or used commercial truck,
truck tractor, tractor, semitrailer that has a gross vehicle weight rating in excess of 26,000 pounds,
to 0.01 percent. Projected threshold: $436.8 million; last amount refunded: $4.2 million.
House Bill 00-1257-Sales and Use Tax Exemption/or Pollution Control Equipment.
This refund mechanism is for a sales and use tax exemption for purchases of equipment installed or
used to detect, eliminate, reduce, or prevent air, water, or other environmental pollution. Projected
threshold: $436.8 million; last amount refunded: $1.9 million.
House Bill 01-1086-Agriculture Value-Added Development Fund Program. A board
within the Department of Agriculture is authorized to offer tax credits, loans, and equity investments
to eligible agricultural value-added cooperatives and other eligible agricultural businesses. The
board may assess a fee to applicants for financial assistance and other services. This refund
mechanism provides income tax credits that may be earned through value-added investments or
purchased from the board. The board is allowed to certify $4 million in tax credits per year.
Projected threshold: $454. 0 million; last amount refunded: $0.4 million.
House Bill 00-1104 - Purchase of Private Health Benefit Plan Credit. This refund
mechanism allows Colorado residents to claim an income tax credit for amounts paid for health
benefit plans. The credit is restricted to individuals, spouses, and dependents who obtain private
medical/health insurance and who were not covered by an individual health benefit plan or an
employee or group health benefit plan during any portion of the income tax year immediately
preceding the income tax year for which the credit is being claimed. The credit is limited to
residents whose federal adjusted gross income does not exceed $25,000 for individuals with no
dependents; $30,000 for two individuals with no dependents filing a joint return, or two married
individuals with no dependents filing separate returns; and $35,000 for resident individuals with
dependents. The maximum credit is limited to $500, is not refundabh! to the taxpayer, and cannot
be carried forward. Projected threshold: $499.2 million; last amount refunded: $2.4 million.
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Ho,ue Bill 00-1209- Capital Gains Deduction/or Assets Held/or One to Five Years.
This refund mechanism modifies the refund provision of House Bill 99-123 7 and establishes a new
refund mechanism for other capital gains. House Bill 99-1237 established a deduction for certain
Colorado assets that were held for a period of at least five years and purchased prior to May 9, 1994.
While the original refund mechanism required the transaction to occur on or after l.::.nuary 1, 2000,
this refund mechanism amends it to allow transactions that occurred in 1999 to qualify for the
deduction. This refund mechanism applies to the capital gain arising from the sale of certain
Colorado assets on or after January 1, 2001, that were held by the taxpayer for a period of from one
to five years. Projected threshold: $536. 7 million; last amount refunded: $27.5 million.

House Bill 99-1001-Sales Tax Refund. This final refund mechanism allows individuals
to receive a state sales tax refund based on six modified federal adjusted gross income tiers and the
filing status of the taxpayer. The amount of excess revenue refunded through this mechanism is
determined by subtracting the amount estimated for other refund methods from the total TABOR
refund. The Department of Revenue sets the dollar amount of each tier and each tier's refund based
on set percentages of the refund and taxpayers in each tier. Projected threshold: no threshold; last
amount refunded: $576.6 million.
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